Are Children Punished for Parents' Sins/2

Are Children Punished for Parents' Sins?

Exegetical Approaches

Overview

The phrase "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" raises two questions which are flip sides of the same coin:  Does Hashem punish innocent children (צדיק ורע לו), and does He permit guilty parents to go unpunished (רשע וטוב לו)?  In other words:
1. Who sinned in this verse – only the parent, only the child, or both?
2. Who is punished – only the parent, only the child, or both?

Almost all of the possible permutations and combinations of answers to these questions can be found in the various commentators. Exegetes choose between them based on the different contexts in which the phrase appears and by culling evidence from various Biblical stories and prophecies which describe crime and punishment. In doing so, they attempt to present composite theories of how Divine justice works in Tanakh and throughout the course of history.

Ibn Kaspi and Shadal maintain that, indeed, the parent is the only one who sinned and the child is the only one punished, and they attempt to explain the morality of vicarious punishment. At the other end of the spectrum, this option is rejected in favor of a theory of complete individual justice. Thus, R. Y.S. Reggio reinterprets "עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" and claims that it is the children who sinned, and Mishnat R. Eliezer reinterprets "פֹּקֵד... עַל" and suggests that it is only the parents who are punished. The majority of commentators, though, chart various compromise positions according to which justice is either collective or only semi-vicarious. They do so by positing that either both the parents and children sinned (Ibn Ezra / R"Y Bekhor Shor), both the parents and children are punished (Ralbag), or a combination of these two (Pesikta / Radak).

Many of these exegetes explore whether ultimate reward and punishment comes in this world or the next, on the familial level or the national level, and to the person himself or his descendants. They also relate to the status of minor children, the distinction between idolatry and other sins, parental/filial interdependence, and to whom the merits of the Patriarchs are applied. Finally, they shed light on whether Hashem's ways of administering justice changed in the wake of the Babylonian Exile.

Yes: Children Suffer for Their Parents' Sins

Even righteous children are punished for the sins of their parents. This approach subdivides over whether the children are the only ones punished, or whether they are simply punished along with their parents:

Vicarious Punishment

Although the parents are the only sinners, the children are the only ones punished for these sins. Hashem punishes the children in lieu of their parents, because of their parents' sins.

Sources: R. Yosi in Avot DeRabbi NatanVersion 2, Chapter 22About Avot DeRabbi Natan,¹ rejected opinion in Talmud BavliBerakhot 7aAbout the Bavli,² first interpretation in Mishnat R. Eliezer5About Mishnat R. Eliezer,³ R. Yosef ibn KaspiTirat Kesef pp.151-153Shemot 20:5Shemot 34:7Devarim 24:16Yechezkel 18:19About R. Yosef ibn Kaspi, R. Shelomo AstrucMidreshei HaTorah Parashat Korach (pp.169-170)About R. Shelomo Astruc,⁴ HaMeamerVayikra 20:5About R. Meir Wolf,⁵ ShadalShemot 20:5-6Devarim 24:16About R. S.D. Luzzatto,⁶ R. D"Z HoffmannShemot 20:5Devarim 7:10Devarim 13:16Devarim 24:16About R. D"Z Hoffmann, U. CassutoShemot 20:6About U. Cassuto

Which sins? Idolatry is the context in which "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" appears in the Decalogue,⁷ but Shadal rejects the possibility that the phrase refers exclusively to idolatry,⁸ arguing that it is not the context when the phrase appears again in the Thirteen Attributes of Mercy.⁹

What form of punishment? Most of these commentators do not specify the nature of the punishment of the children, and Shadal speaks of a mild one with reversible effects. R. Astruc, though, discusses only death, and R. Meir Wolf (HaMeamer) is even more extreme in understanding the punishment to be that all of the sinner's descendants die an untimely death during his lifetime.¹⁰

Individual or national? Most of these sources explain that vicarious punishment is applied even for the sins of individuals. Cassuto, however, explains that vicarious punishment of children occurs only on the national level,¹¹ and that the terms "אָבוֹת" and "בָּנִים" are speaking of the nation as a whole.

Adult progeny or minors?

• According to most of the above sources, even adult children are punished for the sins of their parents. This is, in fact, how Avot DeRabbi Natan and Mishnat R. Eliezer explain the phenomenon of "צדיק ורע לו"‎.¹² They assert that all rewards or punishments a person receives in this world are directly correlated, not with the individual's own actions,¹³ but with those of his parents.¹⁴
• R. Astruc, though, appears to limit such punishment to younger children, and he cites the formulation of the RambamRambam Teshuvah 6:1About R. Moshe Maimonides that minors are considered to be part of their parents' property.¹⁵ The general notion of innocent children dying for their parents' sins appears also in Midrash TannaimDevarim 24:16About Midrash Tannaim,¹⁶ Bavli ShabbatShabbat 32bAbout the Bavli,¹⁷ and Rashi DevarimDevarim 24:16About R. Shelomo Yitzchaki.¹⁸

"פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" – mercy or vengeance? These commentators all agree that parents care most about their children, and thus the worst possible punishment for the parents is for their children to suffer.¹⁹ As such, they all also agree that the fear of such a fate serves as a powerful deterrent from sin.²⁰ They disagree, though, in how they view the nature and main objective of Hashem's actions.

• Mercy – Shadal views "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" as a merciful act in which the child is not punished harshly but just enough to educate the parent and encourage him to repent.²¹ Some sources who limit the application of the principle to minors, go so far as to say that the death of young children atones for their parents' sins and enables their parents to merit a portion in the World to Come.²²
• Vengeance – For R. Meir Wolf (HaMeamer) who asserts that all of the sinner's descendants are wiped out, this is the ultimate act of Divine retribution. Cassuto, while adopting a more moderate interpretation of the punishment, also views it as a manifestation of the Divine attribute of harsh justice. According to these understandings, it is difficult to understand why Moshe would have included the phrase in his prayer on behalf of the nation after the sin of the Spies.
• Both – Ibn Kaspi suggests that "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" is both mercy on the parent who is not immediately punished and rather receives the opportunity to procreate,²³ but also vengeance on the child who is punished for no sin of his own. Thus, Ibn Kaspi explains that the phrase appears in both a context of vengeance in the Decalogue and a context of mercy in the Thirteen Attributes.²⁴

Moral justification – Ibn Kaspi suffices with simply stating that although Hashem's ways are perfect and just (Devarim 32:4), humans are not capable of comprehending them (Yeshayahu 55:9).²⁵ Other commentators, however, do offer various possible approaches to understanding the morality of punishing innocent children:

• Shadal suggests that the punishment visited upon the children is not total or permanent,²⁶ and that Hashem compensates them²⁷ at a different point in their lives for any undeserved suffering.²⁸
• R. Shelomo Astruc, R. Meir Wolf, and R. D"Z Hoffmann contend that the death of a child is in effect a punishment only for his parents,²⁹ whereas the child himself ascends to a better world³⁰ where he receives his just reward.³¹
• Cassuto, who limits the principle to the national level, views the Jewish nation as a unified transgenerational community with a collective life of its own. Thus, he says, it is only reasonable that the actions³² of any generation or part of this body would have a lasting impact on all of the rest.³³
• Other sources which limit vicarious punishment to young children could explain like the RambamRambam Teshuvah 6:1About R. Moshe Maimonides that minor children are considered to be simply an extension of their parents.

Historical cases and Divine implementation – While there are many cases of vicarious punishment in Tanakh,³⁴ there are also many cases in which the sinners themselves are physically punished by God, either alone or as part of a collective.³⁵ These can be accounted for in different ways:

• Avot DeRabbi Natan and Mishnat R. Eliezer³⁶ might claim that sometimes there are exceptional cases which require an expedited judicial track and cannot wait for future generations.³⁷
• Ibn Kaspi asserts that the historical record demonstrates that Hashem has multiple modes of justice, but the rules for when Hashem punishes just the sinner, also his descendants, or only his descendants, as well as which generations of them, are not consistent or readily comprehensible to humans.³⁸ He adds that it is impossible to fathom why Hashem didn't punish Menashe immediately as mandated by Devarim 7,³⁹ or why Hashem punished the generation of Tzidkiyahu for the sins of Menashe, but did not reward them for the virtues of Yoshiyahu. Similarly, he points out the difficulty in understanding why Yehu received such a great reward for a small good deed, why Chizkiyahu received a very harsh punishment for a minor infraction, or why the Babylonian Exile was only for seventy years while the Roman Exile lasted many times that.
• For Cassuto, the national cases are readily understood⁴⁰ as, according to his theory, there is no reason the punishment should not also apply to the sinners themselves.⁴¹
• R. Shelomo Astruc, R. Meir Wolf, and R. D"Z Hoffmann, who maintain that it is really the surviving parents who are being punished when children die, will have difficulty explaining cases like Datan and Aviram in which the parents perished together with the children.⁴²

Targeting of the family in Vayikra 20 – Vayikra 20:5 provides the impetus for R. Meir Wolf's position that the offspring are sometimes wiped out entirely because of their parents' sin. Shadal who limits vicarious punishment to mild forms, and Cassuto who restricts it to the national level, must interpret this verse to refer to family members who participated in the sin.⁴³

Confession for the sins of parents – Shadal notes that Vayikra 26:39-40 and other verses⁴⁴ which speak of a dual confession for both personal sins and the sins of parents prove that children are punished also for parental sins.⁴⁵

Children being punished – There are several verses in Neviim Acharonim and Ketuvim which imply that children are punished for the sins of their parents.⁴⁶ This approach could maintain that all of these refer to vicarious punishment.

Immediate punishment of the sinner in Devarim 7

• Ibn Kaspi posits that the many contradictory Biblical descriptions of how Hashem administers justice are intended to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.⁴⁷ Thus, Devarim 7:10 describes how Hashem sometimes dispenses justice immediately upon the sinner himself, while Shemot 20 explains that at other times He waits many generations.⁴⁸ Similarly, in the case of Midyan (Bemidbar 31), the Israelites are commanded to take immediate revenge, while by Amalek (Devarim 25), there is a waiting period of several generations.
• R. D"Z Hoffmann⁴⁹ explains that Devarim 7:10 merely means that, during his own lifetime, the sinner will witness Hashem's punishing of multiple generations of his descendants.

"אִישׁ בְּחֶטְאוֹ יוּמָתוּ" in Devarim 24 and human implementation – Ibn Kaspi and Shadal explain that Devarim 24:16 refers to human courts.⁵⁰ Humans are forbidden from implementing vicarious or collective punishment on their own because they do not have the capabilities to do so justly.⁵¹

Punishment of only the sinner himself in Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel

• According to Ibn Kaspi, the nation is complaining that they are righteous and being unfairly punished for their parents' sins, and the prophets respond that a day will come when the people will recognize their sins and the justness of Hashem's actions.⁵²
• In contrast, Shadal understands that the nation had despaired of the efficacy of repentance, claiming that there was no point in repenting since the prophets had already ordained that the destruction of the Temple was going to occur because of the sins of Menashe. In response, the prophets reassure the people that only small and temporary punishments come as a result of parental sins, and if they repent they will avoid a more severe and enduring penalty.⁵³
• R. Saadia GaonHaNivchar BaEmunot UvaDeiot 9:3About R. Saadia Gaon in HaNivchar BaEmunot UvaDeiot suggests that the verse in Yechezkel must be referring to punishment in the World to Come.⁵⁴
• This approach could also maintain that Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel herald a profound change in the system of Divine justice – see discussion below of Bavli Makkot.

"לְשֹׂנְאָי" – Ibn Kaspi, Shadal, and R. D"Z Hoffmann all explain that this must refer to the parents who sinned, rather than to their righteous descendants.⁵⁵ R. D"Z Hoffmann brings a proof for this interpretation from the parallel use of "לְשֹׂנְאָיו" in Devarim 7:10.

"וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי" – This position could explain that there is vicarious reward, just as there is vicarious punishment, as good fortune for one's descendants is the greatest recompense a righteous person could receive.⁵⁶ Shadal, however, notes that this does not mean that descendants are automatically rewarded even if they sin, but rather that Hashem has an eternal covenant with Avraham that any punishments meted out to his descendants will be designed to motivate them to repent.⁵⁷ According to Cassuto, the reward and punishment both apply on the national level, rather than on the personal level.

"רִבֵּעִים" and "לַאֲלָפִים"

• Most of these exegetes understand "רִבֵּעִים" to be the maximum number of generations that the sinner will live to see,⁵⁸ but that, in contrast, the reward is maintained even after the righteous person's death, for a thousand generations ("לַאֲלָפִים").
• However, Ibn Kaspi explains that both of these terms are simply hyperbolic ways to say multiple generations,⁵⁹ and that Hashem does not reward virtue for a greater number of generations than he applies punishment.⁶⁰ He proves this from the fact that Yehu received his reward for only four generations and not a thousand. Postulating that these are simply round numbers also allows Ibn Kaspi to maintain that Divine reward and punishment are not always consistent, and that the specific number of generations can vary from case to case.⁶¹

Moshe's concerns about Divine justice – Mishnat R. Eliezer depicts Moshe as asking Hashem why sometimes the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper,⁶² and Hashem responding that this is because reward and punishment in this world is dependent on the actions of one's parents rather than on one's own actions.

Collective Punishment

Even if only the parents sin, both they and their children are punished for these sins. Hashem metes out collective punishment, but not vicarious punishment, punishing children along with parents, but not instead of them.

Sources: RambamRambam Avodah Zarah 4:6Rambam Teshuvah 6:1Moreh Nevukhim 1:54About R. Moshe Maimonides, RalbagShemot 20:4-5Shemot 34:7-9Vayikra 20:4-5Vayikra 26:39-40Bemidbar 14:18Bemidbar 16:32Devarim 13:16Devarim 24:16Yehoshua 7:1Yehoshua 7:24-25About R. Levi b. Gershom, Akeidat YitzchakShemot #45Shemot #54About R. Yitzchak Arama,⁶³ MalbimYechezkel 18:2-3About R. Meir Leibush Weiser,⁶⁴ Hoil MosheShemot 20:5Vayikra 26:39-40Yehoshua 7:24Shemuel II 12:14Melakhim II 5:27Yechezkel 18:1About R. Moshe Yitzchak Ashkenazi

Which sins and punishments?

• Sins in general – Ralbag and the Hoil Moshe understand that the principle of collective punishment applies equally to all types of sins and punishments.⁶⁵
• Only idolatry – Rambam and Malbim restrict the application of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" to the sin of idolatry,⁶⁶ as per the context of Shemot 20:5.⁶⁷ According to them, the seriousness of this crime mandates the obliterating of any trace of the sinner or his progeny.⁶⁸ See also below that Malbim connects the change in the time of Yechezkel to the weakening of the inclination towards idolatry.
• Capital crimes – The Akeidat Yitzchak maintains that the principle of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" applies to all crimes for which the sinner deserves to die. According to him, Hashem spreads out the punishment instead of killing off the sinner.⁶⁹

Dynamics of the process – There is a fundamental divide between how these sources perceive the process of the collective punishment:

• Collateral damage – According to Ralbag and the Hoil Moshe, the children are not the intended target of the punishment, but only suffer as a natural consequence of their parents being punished.⁷⁰ Ralbag offers an analogy to a person punished by the confiscation of his property whose children will thus be poorer as they receive no inheritance.⁷¹
• Intentional response – Rambam and Malbim view the death of all living descendants of the idolater as a Divinely designed and guided measure, unique to the sin of idolatry. Rambam's position is unique in that all four generations are killed together on the same day.⁷²
• Distributed punishment – The Akeidat Yitzchak explains that Hashem divides and spreads out the sinner's punishment among four generations, rather than killing the sinner immediately. This allows the sinner to have progeny and for his bloodline to survive.⁷³

"פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" – mercy or vengeance?

• Vengeance – For Rambam and Malbim, the collective punishment for idolatry is a vengeful act mandated by the severity of the crime. While this would explain why Hashem emphasizes this concept in His prohibition of idolatry, it is difficult to understand why Moshe would have used the phrase when he prayed for the nation after the sin of the Spies.
• Both – According to the Akeidat Yitzchak, it combines mercy on the sinner with vengeance on his descendants. He notes that it must contain some element of mercy, as otherwise Moshe would not have incorporated it in his prayers on behalf of the nation. R. Arama explains that Moshe asked Hashem not to wipe out the nation in one fell swoop ("וְהֵמַתָּה אֶת הָעָם הַזֶּה כְּאִישׁ אֶחָד"), but rather to spread the punishment out over time, even though this would result in the descendants suffering as well ("וְנָשְׂאוּ אֶת זְנוּתֵיכֶם עַד תֹּם פִּגְרֵיכֶם בַּמִּדְבָּר").
• Neither – For the Ralbag and Hoil Moshe, the collective punishment is merely natural order and does not manifest any particular Divine attribute.⁷⁴ This interpretation encounters difficulty in explaining Moshe's inclusion of the phrase in his prayers for mercy.⁷⁵

Moral justification

• Just natural order – Ralbag⁷⁶ and the Hoil Moshe explain that the collective punishment is merely a consequence of natural order. The Hoil Moshe adds that Hashem makes sure to compensate the children for any undeserved suffering.
• Protecting society – For Rambam and Malbim, idolatry is such a pernicious evil which could endanger everyone, that society's need to eradicate all traces of it trumps the right to life of the sinner's family and justifies even the punishing of innocents.
• Survival – According to the Akeidat Yitzchak, it would be unjust for Hashem to entirely forego punishment for sins, and if not for the transferring of some of the brunt of the punishment, the sinner's descendants would never be born.

Historical cases and Divine implementation – Ralbag and the Hoil Moshe must account for all of the Biblical cases which appear to be vicarious punishment or intentional collective punishment.⁷⁷ Thus, Ralbag claims that innocent family members did not die along with Korach,⁷⁸ and the Hoil Moshe adopts the position that only the sons of Geichazi who had abetted his actions were punished, but not their descendants.⁷⁹ The Hoil Moshe also explains that the sins of Menashe placed the nation in a disastrous situation which ultimately led to the exile, but that the nation was not punished vicariously and could still have repented and avoided punishment.⁸⁰

Punishment of only the sinner himself in Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel – What are these prophets saying will change to cause people to no longer say that Hashem punishes the innocent?

• Malbim, who maintains like the Rambam that Hashem dispenses collective punishment only for idolatry, connects the changes prophesied by Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel to the weakening of the desire to worship idols after the Babylonian Exile.⁸¹ Thus, he explains that "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" would no longer apply, not because Hashem changed his ways, but rather because idol worship would be eliminated.⁸²
• The Hoil Moshe similarly explains that Yechezkel is not describing any fundamental change in reality or the ways of Hashem's judgment,⁸³ but merely that the people will now realize that, despite the sins of the previous generations, their destiny is still in their own hands, and that if they repent, Hashem will save them.

Individual or national? Ralbag, the Akeidat Yitzchak, and the Hoil Moshe apply the concept of intergenerational collective punishment on both the individual and national levels. Ralbag explains that once the nation has already been exiled, a higher level of virtue is needed in order to merit redemption, than would have been necessary to merely remain in the land. Thus, subsequent generations pay the price for the sins of their parents. The Hoil Moshe adds that the natural process is that once a nation is weakened militarily or economically, the effects do not simply disappear overnight but can rather last for many generations.

Adult progeny or minors? All of these sources maintain that the collective punishment applies to adult children as well, but the Rambam's position may vary between his different works.⁸⁴

Four generations in Egyptian Exile – AbarbanelBereshit 15About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel suggests that three generations of Yosef's brothers' descendants endured exile in Egypt as part of the collateral damage from the brothers' punishment for their sale of Yosef.⁸⁵ See Purposes of the Egyptian Bondage.

Targeting of the family in Vayikra 20

• For the Rambam, collective punishment is required in Vayikra 20:5, as it is a case of idolatry,⁸⁶ and thus Hashem actively seeks out the sinner's family to punish them.
• For Ralbag and the Hoil Moshe, collective punishment of innocents is never intentional. Thus, Ralbag explains that the verse refers only to the guilty family members who followed in the idolater's footsteps ("וְאֵת כָּל הַזֹּנִים אַחֲרָיו").
• For the Akeidat Yitzchak who maintains that the purpose of collective punishment in general is not to wipe out the sinner, and certainly not his family, this verse is difficult.

Confession for the sins of parents – The Hoil Moshe notes the difficulty that Vayikra 26:39-40 and similar verses pose for the position that there is collective punishment in general, as there is little point in confessing the sins of others.⁸⁷ Ralbag thus explains that the children are confessing that their own sins have continued those of their parents and thereby delayed the redemption from the exile which began during the time of their parents.

Children being punished – There are several verses in Neviim Acharonim and Ketuvim which imply that children are punished for the sins of parents.⁸⁸ This approach would maintain that in all of these cases children are being punished along with their parents.

Immediate punishment of the sinner in Devarim 7 – Devarim 7:10 poses no contradiction for this approach, as it merely affirms that the sinner himself is punished.⁸⁹

Punishing the children of an עיר הנדחת‎ – The Rambam in Mishneh Torah rules that even the wives and young children of the idolaters in the עיר הנדחת are put to death.⁹⁰ In his Moreh Nevukhim, he explains that the special status of idolatry requires even human courts to punish the descendants of the idolater.⁹¹

"אִישׁ בְּחֶטְאוֹ יוּמָתוּ" in Devarim 24 and human implementation – Ralbag says that Devarim 24:16 comes to dispel any possible notion that human courts have the authority to imitate the ways of Hashem and implement collective punishment.⁹² In light of this, Ralbag interprets that Akhan's children were not put to death but were only brought to witness Akhan's execution,⁹³ while the Hoil Moshe offers the alternatives that this was a fulfillment of a special Divine command and not a human initiative,⁹⁴ or that they had been accomplices.⁹⁵

"וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי" – This approach understands that reward, like punishment, is extended to future generations, either intentionally or as a natural consequence (Ralbag). According to the Akeidat Yitzchak, the reward is distributed among the various generations.

Only if They Persist in Their Parents' Path

Righteous children are never punished, but if children continue down their parents' sinful path ("אוחזין מעשה אבותיהם בידיהם"), Hashem punishes them for both their own sins and those of their parents.

Sources: Pseudo-PhiloBiblical Antiquities 11:6About Pseudo-Philo, Mekhilta DeRabbi YishmaelYitro BaChodesh 6About Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael,⁹⁶ Talmud BavliBerakhot 7aSanhedrin 27bShevuot 39a-bAbout the Bavli,⁹⁷ Pesikta DeRav KahanaSelichot 25:3About Pesikta DeRav Kahana, Targum OnkelosShemot 20:4Vayikra 20:5Vayikra 26:39Devarim 7:10About Targum Onkelos, Targum Pseudo-JonathanShemot 20:4Vayikra 20:5Vayikra 26:39Devarim 24:16About Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, R. Saadia GaonCommentary Bereshit 25:22Commentary Shemot 32:1-6Commentary Shemot 34:7Tafsir Devarim 7:10cited by R. Yosef Nachmiash Yirmeyahu 31:29About R. Saadia Gaon,⁹⁸ RashiShemot 20:4Vayikra 20:5Vayikra 26:39Devarim 7:10Yechezkel 18:2About R. Shelomo Yitzchaki, RashbamBereshit 15:16Shemot 20:4Devarim 7:10Devarim 24:16About R. Shemuel b. Meir, Ibn EzraShemot Long Commentary 20:4-5Shemot Short Commentary 20:4Shemot Short Commentary 34:7Devarim 24:16About R. Avraham ibn Ezra, RadakBereshit 15:16Yehoshua 7:15Shemuel II 3:29Shemuel II 21:1Melakhim II 5:27Yirmeyahu 31:28Yechezkel 18:2-6Tehillim 30:6Tehillim 103:18About R. David Kimchi, R. Avraham b. HaRambamShemot 20:5About R. Avraham Maimonides, RambanBereshit 4:17Bereshit 15:16Shemot 20:4-5Devarim 13:16About R. Moshe Nachmanides, R. Yosef NachmiashYirmeyahu 31:28-29About R. Yosef Nachmiash,⁹⁹ AbarbanelShemot 20, Question 9Shemot 20Shemot 34Devarim 24About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel, SefornoShemot 20:4Shemot 34:7Devarim 24:16About R. Ovadyah Seforno

Dynamics of Divine justice – This approach rejects the possibility that the conduct of parents predetermines the fate of the children, and it allows for vicarious or collective punishment only in a case where children opt to continue their parents' offenses.¹⁰⁰ Justice is dispensed in this world also, and is not just reserved for the World to Come.

Are the parents punished for their own sins? The Mekhilta, Bavli, Targumim, and Rashi are all silent on this issue, but most of the later commentators address the question. Their conflicting opinions determine whether "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבֹת עַל בָּנִים" describes the primary address of the punishment or just the secondary one. This, in turn, has fundamental ramifications for whether the phrase should be understood as a reflection of mercy or vengeance and for making sense of its different usages by both Hashem and Moshe:

• Yes, the parents are punished – According to Radak and R"Y Nachmiash, every person always gets rewarded or punished for their own deeds,¹⁰¹ and thus it goes without saying that the parents themselves are punished. The verse of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" comes in the Decalogue to teach that, in addition, when children continue in their parents' sinful path,¹⁰² God punishes them with a vengeance¹⁰³ also for their parents' sins, resulting in their receiving an extra measure of punishment.¹⁰⁴ This position encounters significant difficultly in explaining why Moshe would mention it in his prayer for mercy.¹⁰⁵
• Only if their children are also sinners – Pesikta DeRav Kahana implies that punishment is meted out on all generations,¹⁰⁶ but only if four consecutive generations sin,¹⁰⁷ and R. Saadia states explicitly that having righteous children can partially¹⁰⁸ reduce the punishment of the parents.¹⁰⁹ According to R. Saadia, "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" can play out as either an attribute of vengeance or mercy depending on the child's behavior,¹¹⁰ as it engenders a harsher result for the child if he continues in his parents' path,¹¹¹ but allows for the alleviating of the parents' punishment if the child is righteous.¹¹² Thus, R. Saadia explains that Moshe utilizes it in his prayer for mercy, petitioning "הארך להם ה' כמו שהבטחת אולי יהיו מבניהם צדיקים".
• Only if their children are righteous – R. Yisrael b. Yosefcited by R. Yosef Nachmiash Yirmeyahu 31:29About R. Yosef Nachmiash suggests that the Attributes of Mercy present an array of different options for how Divine justice is dispensed.¹¹³ When Hashem knows that the sinner will have righteous children, He punishes the sinner himself, but He is still "אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם" and postpones the implementation of the punishment. However, when Hashem knows that the children will also do evil, He is "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" and waits to punish the sinner vicariously through his children.¹¹⁴
• No, parents are not punished – According to Ibn Ezra, Ramban, and Seforno¹¹⁵ the punishment is vicarious and is visited only upon the descendants (assuming they also sin) and not the original sinner.¹¹⁶ Ibn Ezra maintains that "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" is primarily an attribute of mercy,¹¹⁷ as Hashem affords ample opportunities for repentance and administers punishment only if four straight generations are wicked.¹¹⁸ This position is thus able to explain the presence of the phrase in Moshe's requests for Divine mercy after both of the sins of the Golden Calf and the Spies.

Which sins? Many of these commentators apply this principle across the board to all types of sins. Some sources,¹¹⁹ though, limit it to when successive generations worship idolatry.¹²⁰ This restriction significantly reduces the number of cases in which children are punished for the sins of their parents, and conversely, allows for the expansion of who is included in the category of "לְאֹהֲבַי וּלְשֹׁמְרֵי מִצְוֹתָי" to all non-idolaters.¹²¹

Moral justification – Shadal asks why it is fair that children who follow in their parents' footsteps should be punished also for their parents' sins and not just for their own.¹²² These commentators offer several suggestions:

• Deterrent – R. Saadia argues that a greater punishment is needed to deter the children of sinners from their natural inclination to follow in their parents' evil ways.
• Rehabilitation – RalbagShemot 20:4-5Shemot 34:7-9Yehoshua 7:1About R. Levi b. Gershom, in explaining the position of the Bavli,¹²³ contends that Divine punishment is designed, not for revenge, but rather to prompt the sinner to repent and prevent him from sinning further. When a child continues in his parents' path and becomes mired in sin, he requires a greater punishment to help him out of his morass than other sinners do.¹²⁴
• Retribution – The Hoil MosheShemot 20:5About R. Moshe Yitzchak Ashkenazi, in explaining the opinion of the Bavli and Targum Onkelos,¹²⁵ proposes that the child of a sinner is treated like a repeat offender ("הולך בקרי") and punished more severely, because his sin constitutes an act of defiance against God, as he did not learn from the punishments already suffered by his parents for their sins.¹²⁶

Which generations of sinners are punished?

• All of the generations – Pesikta DeRav Kahana, R. Saadia, Radak, and R. Yosef Nachmiash maintain that no sinner goes unpunished.¹²⁷
• Just the fourth generation – Ibn Ezra explains that Hashem does not punish¹²⁸ the first three generations¹²⁹ in the hope that they will repent themselves or at least have righteous descendants.¹³⁰ By the fourth generation, though, there is no hope left.¹³¹
• It varies – Ramban and Seforno say that the sins are cumulative, and can reach critical mass at any time between the second and fourth generations.¹³² Seforno cites examples from the book of Melakhim for dynasties being wiped out during each of the second, third, and fourth generations.

What form of punishment?

• Death and wiping out of the sinner's bloodline – Pesikta DeRav Kahana, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, Ramban, and Seforno.¹³³
• All types and degrees – R. Saadia, Radak.¹³⁴

Adult progeny or minors? Radak and R"Y Nachmiash maintain that minors are considered the personal property of the parents and may be punished even if they have not yet continued in their parents' sinful ways.¹³⁵

4th generation and the sin of the Amorites – According to Rashbam, Ramban, and Seforno, the sins of the Amorites were cumulative and reached critical mass by the fourth generation.¹³⁶

Targeting of the family in Vayikra 20 – This approach rejects the possibility that collective punishment affects innocent people. Thus, Bavli Shevuot, Targum Onkelos, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, and Rashi all follow the SifraKedoshim 10About Sifra in reading collective punishment out of Vayikra 20:5 by limiting it to accomplices.¹³⁷

Confession for the sins of parents – Bavli Sanhedrin, Targum Onkelos, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, and Rashi all follow the SifraBechukotai 2About Sifra and interpret the verses in Vayikra 26:39-40 to refer to a case where the children continue their parents' sins.

Children being punished – There are several verses in Neviim Acharonim and Ketuvim which imply that children are punished for the sins of their parents.¹³⁸ This approach would maintain that these all refer to cases where the children are continuing in their parents' evil ways.¹³⁹

Immediate punishment of the sinner in Devarim 7 – Targum Onkelos, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, R. Saadia GaonHaNivchar BaEmunot UvaDeiot 5:2About R. Saadia Gaon, and Rashi all reinterpret Devarim 7:10 to refer to the small reward which the wicked get in this world so that they will receive their full measure of punishment in the World to Come.¹⁴⁰ However, Rashbam,¹⁴¹ Ibn Ezra,¹⁴² and others say that the verse refers to the punishment received by the sinner.¹⁴³

Punishing the children of an עיר הנדחת‎ – Ramban (citing the Sifre DevarimDevarim 94About Sifre Devarim) rejects the possibility that innocent children are killed. It is possible, though, that Radak and R"Y Nachmiash, who say that minor children are considered their parents' property, would also claim that in an apostate city they are punished along with their parents.

"אִישׁ בְּחֶטְאוֹ יוּמָתוּ" in Devarim 24 and human implementation

• R. Saadia, Rashbam, Ibn Ezra, Radak, and R. Avraham b. HaRambam all explain that Devarim 24:16 comes to distinguish between Divine and human modes of punishment, and to clarify that punishment for the sins of others is not applied by human courts.¹⁴⁴
• In contrast, the Bavli and Pesikta DeRav Kahana maintain that this verse too speaks of Divine punishment,¹⁴⁵ but that it refers to a case where the children do not follow in their parents' sinful path.¹⁴⁶

Historical cases and Divine implementation – This approach must account for all of the Biblical cases which appear to be collective or vicarious punishment of innocents. The commentators do so by employing four basic methods:

• The children were not punished at all – Bavli Sanhedrin 44a and Rashi posit that Akhan's children were not executed but were rather brought only to watch.¹⁴⁷
• The children were not innocent but rather abetted the original crimes – Radak utilizes this explanation in the cases of Akhan's family,¹⁴⁸ Yoav's descendants, and Geichazi's sons,¹⁴⁹ and R. Saadia¹⁵⁰ uses it for the story of Shaul's descendants and the Givonim,¹⁵¹ as well as to explain the plague which affected the nation after David's census.¹⁵²
• The children were not innocent but rather continued their parents' evil ways – Radak utilizes this explanation in the cases of Eli's household,¹⁵³ Shaul's descendants and the Givonim,¹⁵⁴ and the dynasties of Yorovam, Achav, and Menashe.¹⁵⁵
• The children were minors and thus considered their parents' property¹⁵⁶ – Rashi¹⁵⁷ notes that even infants were punished in Korach's rebellion,¹⁵⁸ and this may also explain the cases of Yavesh Gilad, David and Batsheva's son, Chiel Beit HaEli's sons, and the children of Amatzyah the priest of Beit El.

Punishment of only the sinner himself in Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel – Radak explains that the prophecies of both Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel conform precisely to the Torah's two rules that each person always receives punishment for their own sins and that children who follow their parents in worshipping idols are doubly punished.¹⁵⁹ On this backdrop, he says:

• Yirmeyahu is telling the nation that, in the future, everyone will worship Hashem, and thus there will be no further cases of idolatry or a child being punished for a parent's sin.¹⁶⁰
• Yechezkel, on the other hand, is addressing the past and clarifying to the people that while it is true that the prophets stated that Menashe's iniquity was the initial trigger for the Exile, this had not sealed the nation's fate,¹⁶¹ and the destruction and exile could still be avoided entirely if the current generation did not continue down Menashe's evil path.¹⁶²
• Radak then illustrates the Divine principles of justice through application to the Judean kings. Chizkiyahu and Yoshiyahu, he says, are examples of righteous kings who were not punished for their father's sins, Menashe is an instance of a wicked king who was punished despite his father's good deeds,¹⁶³ and Amon is a case of a wicked king who was doubly punished with an abbreviated two year reign because he followed in his father's evil ways.
• According to Radak's approach, the seeming contradiction between the Torah and Yechezkel results only from a difference in subject matter. The verses in the Torah speak only of a רשע בן רשע and a צדיק בן צדיק,‎¹⁶⁴ while the chapter in Yechezkel speaks only of a רשע בן צדיק and a צדיק בן רשע.‎¹⁶⁵

While Radak's approach is able to reconcile the verses from Yechezkel, the Pesikta and R. Saadia (who say that a sinner is punished only if his descendants are also wicked) will have difficulty understanding Yechezkel's verdict that every sinner is punished regardless of the conduct of his ancestors or descendants. This also poses a problem for the commentators like Ibn Ezra who maintain that Hashem punishes only the fourth consecutive generation of sinners.¹⁶⁶

Individual or national – Most of these commentators discuss punishment on the individual level, but Radak applies the principle on the national level as well.

"פֹּקֵד" – Within this general approach, there are a number of possible meanings of the word:

• Remember – Ibn Ezra explains that Hashem remembers the sins of the first three generations.
• Avenge – Targum Onkelos, Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, Ramban.¹⁶⁷
• Store up – R. Saadia according to R"Y Nachmiash's first possibility.¹⁶⁸
• Reduce – R. Saadia according to R"Y Nachmiash's second possibility.¹⁶⁹

"לְשֹׂנְאָי" – Commentators disagree whether this term refers to the children or parents:

• Children – Rashi and Rashbam explain that the verse is saying that Hashem punishes the descendants if they hate Hashem and do evil.
• Parents – Shadal and R. D"Z Hoffmann contend that even though the Bavli, Targum Onkelos, and Targum Pseudo-Jonathan say that the verse is limited to a case where the descendants are wicked, they still understand the word "לְשֹׂנְאָי" to refer to the parents.¹⁷⁰
• Both – This may be the position of Ibn Ezra and R"Y Nachmiash.

"וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי"

• Which children? – Ibn Ezra, Radak, and R"Y Nachmiash all note that just as additional punishment for parents' sins is meted out only when the descendants are wicked, so too extra reward is given only when the descendants are righteous.¹⁷¹ For Radak and R"Y Nachmiash, though, idolatry is the determining factor, and the bar is set very low. Thus, they explain that every non-idolater today qualifies to receive reward for the deeds of the Patriarchs.
• Are also the righteous parents rewarded? – According to Radak and R"Y Nachmiash, the parents themselves should also always be rewarded. However, according to R. Saadia, this should be dependent on whether their descendants are righteous,¹⁷² and according to Ibn Ezra it should be the descendants who receive the main reward.¹⁷³

"רִבֵּעִים" and "לַאֲלָפִים" – R. Yishmael b. Yosef cited by R"Y Nachmiash suggests that both of these simply mean for eternity, and that there is no difference between how Hashem relates to virtue and sin.¹⁷⁴ R"Y Nachmiash, while noting that this theory could explain cases like Eli in which a punishment is promised for eternity,¹⁷⁵ nevertheless rejects it as it does not explain why the Torah would have differentiated between the numbers for reward and punishment.

Moshe's concerns about Divine justice – The Mekhilta portrays Moshe's concern that Hashem will punish people more than they deserve, and his relief upon thinking that there would never be a case of four consecutive sinners.¹⁷⁶ Similarly, the Bavli depicts Moshe as asking Hashem why sometimes the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper, and Hashem responding that these are people who are not completely righteous or wicked.

No: Children are Punished Only for Their Own Sins

Hashem punishes children for their own sins only, but never for the sins of their parents, even if the children follow in their parents' footsteps. This approach subdivides over whether punishment even for one's own sins is sometimes waived or deferred, because of the merits of either one's parents or children.

Strict Individual Justice

Hashem punishes every generation precisely according to its own sins, and each of parents and children always receive their just deserts, no more and no less.¹⁷⁷

Sources: Bavli MakkotMakkot 24aAbout the Bavli, Bemidbar Rabbah13:33About Bemidbar Rabbah, Shadal in Ohev GerOhev Ger 25 (pp.17-18)About R. S.D. Luzzatto,¹⁷⁸ R. Y"S ReggioBikkurei HaIttim HaChadashim (1846)Bikkurei HaIttim (full pdf)Vayikra 20:5Bemidbar 16:27Devarim 13:16About R. Yitzchak Shemuel Reggio¹⁷⁹

Dynamics of Divine justice – According to this approach, Divine justice is neither vicarious nor collective, and the actions of others have no impact whatsoever on the reward or punishment received by the individual.¹⁸⁰

What about "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים"?

• Retracted – Bemidbar Rabbah says that this is one of the three things Hashem modified or withdrew as a result of Moshe's intercession.¹⁸¹ In contrast, Bavli Makkot attributes the cancellation to Yechezkel.¹⁸²
• Reinterpreted – Shadal in Ohev Ger and R. Reggio explain that the phrase "עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" means the sins which children learned from their parents' conduct, rather than the sins of the parents themselves.¹⁸³

Hashem and Moshe's usages of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" – R. Reggio proves from the context of the Decalogue that the phrase comes to buttress the prohibition of idolatry and explain why Hashem is superior to all other gods, rather than simply to instill a fear of the consequences of Divine wrath. According to him, the Torah is saying that the proof that Hashem is the true God is from His ability to constantly and eternally reward and punish.¹⁸⁴ R. Reggio adds that the reason the Torah specifically uses the phrase "עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" is to teach that having wicked parents is not considered extenuating circumstances and does not allow one to evade punishment. However, this approach encounters difficulty in understanding why Moshe would have included "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" while praying for mercy.

Moral justification and uniform application – According to these sources, every sinner (both parents and children) receives their deserved punishment, and there is no distinction between different types of sins or sinners.

"וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי" and merits of the Patriarchs – R. Reggio similarly interprets this phrase as describing how Hashem gives each person their just due. Thus, he reads it as simply saying that Hashem will always bestow kindness upon (only) those who are righteous,¹⁸⁵ and not as referring to any special Divine favor transmitted from one generation to another.¹⁸⁶ In similar fashion, R. Reggio explains that our prayers which mention the merits of our Patriarchs are merely intended to inspire us to emulate their actions so that we will then become worthy of Divine grace.¹⁸⁷

Targeting of the family in Vayikra 20 – R. Reggio proposes that the word "וּבְמִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ" in Vayikra 20:5 does not mean his family, but rather refers to those who act similarly (to the sinner).¹⁸⁸

Confession for the sins of parents – Shadal in Ohev Ger explains that Vayikra 26:39-40 and similar verses refer to the sins learned from parents, rather than the sins of the parents themselves.¹⁸⁹

Children being punished – There are several verses in Neviim Acharonim and Ketuvim which imply that children are punished for the sins of their parents.¹⁹⁰ Of them, R. Reggio suggests that Yeshayahu 14:21 and Tehillim 109:14 are merely poetic language.¹⁹¹

Immediate punishment of the sinner in Devarim 7 – R. Reggio says that sometimes Hashem punishes the sinner immediately, but that at other times He waits to punish.¹⁹² These latter cases, he notes, account for the phenomenon of רשע וטוב לו.

Punishing the children of an עיר הנדחת‎ – According to R. Reggio, only the idolaters are killed, but innocent children are spared.¹⁹³

"אִישׁ בְּחֶטְאוֹ יוּמָתוּ" in Devarim 24 and human implementation – Bemidbar Rabbah understands Devarim 24:16 to be speaking of the Divine way of justice after Moshe's intercession.¹⁹⁴

Historical cases and Divine implementation

• Bemidbar Rabbah, R. Reggio, and Shadal in Ohev Ger must account for all of the Biblical cases which appear to be collective or vicarious punishment of innocents. For the case of Korach's rebellion, see R. Reggio's interpretation that the verse emphasizes that Datan and Aviram's families participated in the rebellion and were thus included in the punishment.
• Bavli Makkot, on the other hand, can simply say that the cases of collective or vicarious punishment predate the change in Divine mode of judgment in the time of Yechezkel.

Yoshiyahu and the roots of the erroneous notion of vicarious punishment – R. Reggio suggests that the belief that children are punished for the sins of parents originated with an attempt to explain Yoshiyahu's death in battle despite his generally exemplary and righteous conduct.¹⁹⁵ R. Reggio, though, argues that this was a misconception, and that the real reason for Yoshiyahu being punished was that he did not consult with Yirmeyahu before waging war.

Punishment of only the sinner himself in Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel – According to Bavli Makkot, these verses depict a newly updated concept of Divine justice, and one must analyze what caused this change.¹⁹⁶ According to the other sources, these verses simply reflect how Hashem always administered justice.

"לְשֹׂנְאָי" – R. Reggio claims that "לְשֹׂנְאָי", like its counterpart "לְאֹהֲבַי" in the following verse, must refer to the children.¹⁹⁷

"רִבֵּעִים" and "לַאֲלָפִים" – R. Reggio understands "רִבֵּעִים" literally as the number of generations that the original sinner might see in his lifetime, and he says that the Torah is emphasizing that the father is being punished by witnessing the punishment of his descendants and knowing that he is responsible.¹⁹⁸ Like Ibn Ezra, though, he understands "לַאֲלָפִים" to mean forever.¹⁹⁹

Moshe's concerns about Divine justice – Bemidbar Rabbah depicts Moshe as challenging Hashem's system of vicarious justice, and Hashem acknowledging the correctness of Moshe's point and changing His ways.

Saved by Righteous Ancestors

Hashem punishes people for their own sins only if the three consecutive generations of their immediate ancestors were all sinners. If any of the ancestors were righteous, their next three generations of descendants are all spared.

Sources: Mekhilta DeRashbiShemot 20:5About Mekhilta DeRashbi, R. Yosef Bekhor ShorShemot 20:5-6Shemot 34:7Vayikra 20:4-5Bemidbar 14:18Devarim 7:10cited by Sefer HaGan Bereshit 15:16About R. Yosef Bekhor Shor, MeiriSanhedrin 27bAbout R. Menachem HaMeiri²⁰⁰

Dynamics of Divine justice – Hashem punishes only for the individual's own sins, and He never administers vicarious or collective punishment,²⁰¹ and thus every person has control of their own destiny. On the other hand, a person's potential is evaluated in light of their lineage and their ancestors' track record, and this affects the number of chances they are given to repent. Hashem punishes only as a last resort, after all hopes for repentance or for righteous offspring have been exhausted, and therefore He does so only after the sin has been ingrained for three generations.²⁰² Conversely, the virtues of a righteous ancestor protect the next three generations of his descendants from being punished, even if they sin.²⁰³

What about "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים"? According to this approach, the verse means that Hashem remembers or stores the sins of parents and waits to see how the subsequent three generations (their children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren) will conduct themselves. If all of these sin, Hashem waits no longer and punishes the great-grandchildren for their own sins.²⁰⁴ If, however, any of the generations were righteous, Hashem does not punish anyone.²⁰⁵

Hashem and Moshe's usages of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" – When Hashem uses the phrase in the Decalogue, He is warning the people that if they and their descendants sin, their actions will ultimately catch up with them and their descendants will be punished.²⁰⁶ However, when Moshe uses the expression, he is appealing for Divine mercy that will withhold immediate punishment and give the sinner and his descendants a chance to survive and repent. The fact that Moshe includes "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" in his prayers proves, according to R"Y Bekhor Shor, that it constitutes an attribute of mercy.²⁰⁷

Which sins and punishments? According to R"Y Bekhor Shor, the principle deals with capital crimes, and when there are four consecutive sinners, the fourth dies without an opportunity to produce any offspring.²⁰⁸

Moral justification – According to this approach, Hashem is merciful and never punishes anyone unless they have sinned and there is no potential for repentance.

"וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי" – R"Y Bekhor Shor explains that extra Divine reward similarly applies only to consecutive righteous generations,²⁰⁹ but not to sinners.²¹⁰

4th generation and the sin of the Amorites – R"Y Bekhor Shor applies the same Divine principles of justice to non-Jews as well. Thus, he explains, Hashem waited for the fourth consecutive generation of Amorites to sin before wiping them out.

Targeting of the family in Vayikra 20 – R"Y Bekhor Shor maintains that "וּבְמִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ" in Vayikra 20:5 refers to those who abetted the crime, rather than to family.²¹¹

Confession for the sins of parents – This approach would say that Vayikra 26:39-40 and similar verses refer to a case where the children continue their parents' sins.

Children being punished – There are several verses in Neviim Acharonim and Ketuvim which imply that children are punished for the sins of their parents.²¹² This position would explain that these all refer to cases where the children themselves sinned²¹³ and were following in the path of several generations of their ancestors.

Immediate punishment of the sinner in Devarim 7 – This approach could explain that Devarim 7:10 refers to the fourth consecutive generation of sinners.

"אִישׁ בְּחֶטְאוֹ יוּמָתוּ" in Devarim 24 and human implementation – R"Y Bekhor Shor understands Devarim 24:16²¹⁴ to be referring to Divine judgment²¹⁵ in a case of consecutive generations of sinners.

Historical cases and Divine implementation – Mekhilta DeRashbi and R"Y Bekhor Shor read the promise to Yehu that his dynasty will last for four generations, as a fulfillment of the principle that punishment is deferred until the fourth generation.²¹⁶ This approach, though, will encounter considerable difficulty in explaining all of the other cases in Tanakh in which the sinner and/or his descendants are punished without there being any indication that this followed prior consecutive generations of sinners.

Punishment of only the sinner himself in Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel – While this position matches the prescription in Yechezkel that no person suffers for another's sins,²¹⁷ it does not accord with the verdict there that the wicked person dies for his sins even though he is the son of a righteous person and not the fourth consecutive generation of sinners.²¹⁸

"פֹּקֵד" – R. Yehuda in Mekhilta DeRashbi defines the word as to gather and store up, while R"Y Bekhor Shor may be interpreting it as to remember.²¹⁹

"רִבֵּעִים" and "לַאֲלָפִים" – R"Y Bekhor Shor explains that the distinction between the terms is because in the case of the sinner, his bloodline ceases to exist after four generations, and there are no subsequent generations of which to speak.

Saved by Righteous Descendants

Hashem punishes people for their own sins only if the four consecutive generations of their immediate descendants are all sinners. If any of the these descendants are righteous, their ancestor is spared.

Sources: Second interpretation in Mishnat R. Eliezer5About Mishnat R. Eliezer²²⁰

Dynamics of Divine justice – Hashem punishes only for the individual's own sins, and He never administers vicarious or collective punishment,²²¹ and thus every person has control of their own destiny. However, an evaluation of a person's complete legacy must take into account the impact he has on future generations.²²² Therefore, Hashem views righteous descendants as a mitigating factor when deciding whether to punish a sinner.²²³ Moreover, since a person can be evaluated only in retrospect, a sinner is placed on probation pending a review of the conduct of his descendants.²²⁴

What about "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים"? According to Mishnat R. Eliezer, the verse means that Hashem remembers or stores the sins of parents and waits to see how the subsequent four generations conduct themselves. If all of these are sinners, Hashem punishes the parents for their own sins, but if any of the generations were righteous, Hashem does not punish anyone.²²⁵

Hashem and Moshe's usages of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" – When Hashem uses the phrase in the Decalogue, He is reminding the people that if they and their descendants sin, they will ultimately be punished. However, when Moshe uses the expression, he is appealing for Divine mercy that will withhold immediate punishment and give the sinner's descendants an opportunity to atone for him. Mishnat R. Eliezer attempts to prove from this latter context that the words must be an attribute of mercy.²²⁶

What form of punishment? Mishnat R. Eliezer applies this to both punishments in this world and in the World to Come.

Adult progeny or minors? According to Mishnat R. Eliezer, both can play a role in saving their parents. Adult descendants, through their righteous actions, can save any of the previous four generations of their ancestors from punishment, while the death of young children atones for the sins of their biological parents.²²⁷

Moral justification – According to this approach, Hashem is merciful and never punishes anyone unless they have both sinned and not produced any meritorious descendants.

Historical cases and Divine implementation

• Korach – Mishnat R. Eliezer explains that because Korach's sons were righteous, Moshe petitioned Hashem to make a special exception to the rule of suspending punishment because of righteous descendants, and to bring about Korach's death despite the righteousness of his sons.²²⁸
• David and Batsheva's son – Mishnat R. Eliezer maintains that the infant died as an atonement for David's sin,²²⁹ and that his death was actually a relief for David because it saved him from Gehinom.
• Other cases – This approach, though, will encounter considerable difficulty in explaining many of the other cases of punishment in Tanakh²³⁰ in which the sinner and/or his descendants are punished without there being any indication that their descendants were four consecutive generations of sinners.

"וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי" – It is unclear how Mishnat R. Eliezer explains this process and whether it is parallel to "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת".

Targeting of the sinner and his family in Vayikra 20 – Mishnat R. Eliezer might explain that Hashem is punishing the sinner because his descendants are also wicked.

Confession for the sins of parents – Mishnat R. Eliezer might explain that the descendants are atoning for their ancestors' sins.

Children being punished – There are several verses in Neviim Acharonim and Ketuvim which imply that children are punished for the sins of their parents.²³¹ It is unclear how Mishnat R. Eliezer would explain them.

Immediate punishment of the sinner in Devarim 7 – Mishnat R. Eliezer would likely interpret Devarim 7:10 to mean that the sinner will be punished in his lifetime, if his descendants are wicked.

Punishment of the sinner himself in Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel – Mishnat R. Eliezer must explain Yechezkel's statement that a wicked person dies for his sins even though he has a righteous son. It is possible that in this case the father's sins were too grievous for the son to atone for them.²³²

"פֹּקֵד" – Mishnat R. Eliezer interprets the word as to keep hanging pending further developments.

"רִבֵּעִים" – Mishnat R. Eliezer counts four generations, not including the sinner himself, as per the verse in Shemot 34 which lists also "בְּנֵי בָנִים".

¹ Avot DeRabbi Natan does not discuss the Biblical verses, but rather attempts to address the theological question of why righteous people suffer and wicked people prosper. See also the variation of this Midrashic theme found in Midrash Aggadah (Buber)Shemot 20:12About Midrash Aggadah (Buber).

² The Bavli rejects the position found in Avot DeRabbi Natan because it contradicts the interpretation of the Mekhilta (and others) below which limits "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" to cases where children follow in the evil path of their parents.

³ Like Avot DeRabbi Natan, Mishnat R. Eliezer's point of departure in its first section is not the Biblical verses of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת", but rather the theological problem of "צדיק ורע לו" and "רשע וטוב לו". In this opening section, Mishnat R. Eliezer states that in this world (as opposed to the World to Come) even a righteous child suffers for its parents' sins. Similarly, a few paragraphs later, Mishnat R. Eliezer cites R. Yehoshua as saying "ומה אם מדת הפורענות, שהיא מעוטה, נמשכו הבנים אחר האבות בעון האבות".

However, in its second section which offers an interpretation of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת", Mishnat R. Eliezer explains that the verse means that righteous children can save their wicked parents from punishment (see discussion below), and that children are never punished for their parents' sins ("כל אחד ואחד נתפס על מעשיו" even when both parents and children do evil). This contradiction could possibly be reconciled if one maintains that the second section refers only to the World to Come (note, though, that regarding reward, it is clear from Mishnat R. Eliezer's discussion of Nadav and Avihu that righteous children can save their parents from death even in this world). Alternatively, one might simply explain that Mishnat R. Eliezer is an eclectic work which synthesizes various Midrashic texts that are not always consistent with each other. For more on Mishnat R. Eliezer's additional motif of vicarious atonement in this world through the death of one's young children, see the note below.

⁴ It is not completely clear whether, according to R. Astruc, the children are punished instead of the parents (vicarious punishment), or along with the parents (collective punishment), as in the case of Datan and Aviram (his point of departure).

⁵ According to HaMeamer, the sinner also ultimately dies himself as the concluding act of the punishment, but only after witnessing the extended process of his descendants perishing. Thus, the main focus of the punishment is vicarious. This is fundamentally different from the position below that the parents are being punished themselves and their descendants merely bear the consequences of the punishment or its aftermath. Thus, the Meamer's approach is categorized under vicarious punishment rather than collective punishment.

⁶ In his commentary on Shemot, Shadal retracts the interpretation he had previously published in his commentary on Onkelos, entitled Ohev Ger. In this earlier commentary (see below), Shadal had argued that "עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" refers to sins of the children which they had learned from watching their parents sin (see also Hoil Moshe below). Cf. the Bavli and other commentators below who also explain that the children sinned but still interpret "עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" as the sin of the parents.

⁷ Idolatry is also the context of other passages in the Torah which describe punishment of children. See Vayikra 20:5 which speaks of Molekh worship, and Vayikra 26:30,39-40 which also speaks of idolatry.

⁸ See below that this possibility is adopted by the Rambam.

⁹ However, see AbarbanelShemot 20About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel who notes that the idolatry of the Golden Calf was the backdrop for the transmission of the Attributes of Mercy.

¹⁰ HaMeamer reads "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" as parallel to "וְשַׂמְתִּי אֲנִי אֶת פָּנַי בָּאִישׁ הַהוּא וּבְמִשְׁפַּחְתּוֹ וְהִכְרַתִּי אֹתוֹ" in Vayikra 20:5. He explains that, in both phrases, the parent witnesses the deaths of all of his offspring. See below for the similar interpretations of R. Yosef Bekhor ShorShemot 34:7cited by Sefer HaGan Bereshit 15:16About R. Yosef Bekhor Shor regarding the eradication of the Amorites, RambanBereshit 4:17About R. Moshe Nachmanides about the wiping out of Kayin's bloodline, and MalbimYechezkel 18:2-3About R. Meir Leibush Weiser on the idolater.

This obliteration of the sinner's bloodline is the ultimate form of punishment, as it in effect erases the sinner's life and legacy. The notion of preservation of the family name and the fear of dying without an heir are expressed in many places in Tanakh and are commonplace today as well.

Shadal objects to this interpretation, arguing that the verse in Shemot 20 does not say "עֲרִירִים יָמֻתוּ". However, the Meamer could respond that "עֲרִירִים יָמֻתוּ" is reserved for someone who never had children, while "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן" and "וְהִכְרַתִּי" mean that the progeny die young. Shadal's objection is also likely influenced by his own desire to paint a sympathetic portrait of a much more merciful God – see below.

¹¹ See Reward and Punishment for the general position that all of the verses in the Torah which promise recompense for good or evil deeds are speaking of the fate of the nation as a collective, but not the individual person. It is unclear whether Cassuto rejects the possibility that the Torah is speaking on the individual level because he thinks that vicarious punishment on the individual level would be unjust (i.e. while a nation may bear collective responsibility for the actions of its ancestors, a son bears no more responsibility for his father's sin than any other person), or because he thinks that in this world there is no recompense on the individual level whatsoever.

¹² They claim that a "צדיק ורע לו" is a "צדיק בן רשע", and that righteous people suffer in this world for the sins of their parents.

¹³ According to them, only a person's reward in the World to Come is dictated by his own actions.

¹⁴ It is difficult to find cases in Tanakh where it is clear that adult children are being punished for their parents' sins and not their own (the age of Chiel Beit HaEli's sons is not specified). To accomplish this, one would need to find a case where an adult child is clearly righteous and is nevertheless punished. This is a formidable challenge, at least in part, because cases of "צדיק ורע לו" are hard to come by in Tanakh. [Prophets such as Eliyahu and Yirmeyahu and Iyyov are some of the rare exceptions, but we know nothing about their parents.]

Mishnat R. Eliezer thus attempts to adduce proof from the physical afflictions (he claims) Chizkiyahu suffered throughout his life despite being righteous. He explains that these were a Divine punishment for the sins of Chizkiyahu's father Achaz, and that this is the meaning of the verse in Yeshayahu 38:15. There is little textual basis, though, for this assertion, and Bemidbar Rabbah13:33About Bemidbar Rabbah, in fact, brings Chizkiyahu as one of Moshe's showcase examples demonstrating the impossibility of punishing a "צדיק בן רשע" for his father's misdeeds. See also Radak below.

Additionally, Mishnat R. Eliezer exercises selectivity in bringing Yitzchak b. Avraham as an example of a "צדיק בן צדיק" and Amon b. Menashe as an example of a "רשע בן רשע", while ignoring their first degree relatives, Avraham b. Terach and Yoshiyahu b. Amon. Indeed, these latter two figures are Bemidbar Rabbah's other two "proofs" that a "צדיק בן רשע" does not bear his father's cross.

¹⁵ While R. Astruc argues that the Rambam's explanation does not suffice, he does not reject the assumption that the application is limited to minors.

¹⁶ The fourth interpretation in Midrash Tannaim attempts to reconcile the textual contradiction between Shemot 20:5 and Devarim 24:16 by proposing that the "בָּנִים" in "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" are minors, while "בָּנִים" in the verse of "וּבָנִים לֹא יוּמְתוּ עַל אָבוֹת" refers to adults.

¹⁷ The Bavli speaks of specific sins of parents for which children die.

¹⁸ It is not completely clear whether, according to Midrash Tannaim, the Bavli, and Rashi, the children are punished instead of the parents (vicarious punishment) or along with the parents (collective punishment). See also below for additional sources which go a step further and say that the death of young children atones for their parents' sins.

¹⁹ Shadal and Cassuto personally experienced the deaths of children at a young age.

²⁰ This is explicit in Ibn Kaspi, Shadal, R. D"Z Hoffmann, and Cassuto. Shadal adds that even if this does not deter the sinner himself, he will become a living lesson which will prevent others from sinning.

²¹ Shadal interprets "פֹּקֵד" as to intentionally punish, however he says that, like "אֵל קַנָּא", this is merely a figure of speech intended to instill a fear of God, while in reality Hashem does not act out of vengeance.

²² See R. Yehuda in Yerushalmi SanhedrinSanhedrin 10:1About the Yerushalmi, Bavli SotahSotah 48b-49aAbout the Bavli (and Rashi), Kohelet Rabbah4:1About Kohelet Rabbah, and the assorted supporting material cited in Mishnat R. Eliezer5About Mishnat R. Eliezer (particularly his interpretation of David's relief over the death of his son from Batsheva). Mishnat R. Eliezer also claims that the deeds of (living) righteous children can protect parents from being punished even in this world – see its discussion of Nadav and Avihu and Korach.

²³ Cf. the Akeidat Yitzchak below.

²⁴ Cf. R. Saadia below.

²⁵ See Ibn Kaspi for other places where he dismisses the possibility of understanding the ways of Hashem. Ibn Kaspi points out that humans lack the detailed knowledge of both what other people do and how Hashem works. He thus explains that, while Hashem is able to punish vicariously, human courts are prohibited from doing so (Devarim 24:16). See below that according to Ibn Kaspi, there are also no discernible patterns in how and when and to whom Hashem delivers justice. This apparent inconsistency is a major factor in making Divine justice incomprehensible. Nevertheless, the Torah describes the various ways of Hashem, so that when people see a sinner not being punished immediately they will still know that ultimately he will get his just deserts.

²⁶ According to Shadal, the punishment is just enough to accomplish its intended purpose of motivating the parents to repent.

²⁷ Shadal equates "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" with "וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים", claiming that neither constitutes a travesty of justice, and that just as Hashem does not let wicked sinners off the hook just because they had righteous ancestors, so too He makes appropriate adjustments so that justice is served for the righteous child of the sinner.

²⁸ Shadal's theory does not account for cases in which young children die. Perhaps, he might explain like the Rambam below that minors are considered part of their parents' property.

²⁹ This approach does not account for cases where the child suffers in this world.

³⁰ R. Astruc actually speaks of the Resurrection Era rather than the World to Come.

³¹ This matches the formulation in Avot DeRabbi Natan and Mishnat R. Eliezer that a person's fate in this world is predetermined by their parent's behavior, while only their reward in the World to Come is determined by their own actions. This position fits naturally within the general approach that all recompense mentioned in the Torah is bestowed only in the World to Come – see Reward and Punishment.

³² This would apply equally to both virtue and sin.

³³ In essence, Cassuto is attempting to convert the more difficult concept of intergenerational vicarious punishment into the somewhat simpler to absorb notion of collective punishment. While Cassuto's theory can account for why the subsequent generations of the descendants are also punished, it does not explain why Hashem does not deliver punishment also to the sinners themselves.

³⁴ Throughout the book of Melakhim, the punishment of wicked kings and their generations is visited only upon their descendants.

³⁵ See the Introduction for some examples.

³⁶ See above that according to them, a person's fate in this world is determined by the actions of his parents, and that conversely punishments in this world are visited upon the sinner's offspring.

³⁷ For example, in the case of Korach, Datan, and Aviram, the rebellion they were fomenting needed to be stopped before it spread further, and their punishment could not wait until the next generation. Cf. Mishnat R. Eliezer who notes that, in the words "וּפְקֻדַּת כָּל הָאָדָם יִפָּקֵד עֲלֵיהֶם", Moshe petitions Hashem that the standard track of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" not be applied in this case. [It might also be possible, but rather difficult, to say that in such cases punishment is delivered because of an earlier, unmentioned, parental sin.]

This approach would also need to maintain that the Divine punishment of כרת refers (like "ערירי") to the elimination of the sinner's descendants, rather than to the sinner's own untimely death. See above for R. Meir Wolf who explains "וְהִכְרַתִּי" in Vayikra 20:5 in this way, and see Karet.

³⁸ Cf. R. Yisrael b. Yosef cited by R. Yosef NachmiashYirmeyahu 31:29About R. Yosef Nachmiash below who suggests that the Attributes of Mercy themselves present an array of different options for how Divine justice is dispensed. R. Yisrael, though, maintains that Hashem punishes vicariously only when the child is also wicked.

³⁹ Cf. Mishnat R. Eliezer which explains that Menashe was a "רשע בן צדיק", and was thus punished only in the World to Come, and see discussion of Radak's position who says that Menashe was punished.

⁴⁰ Regarding cases on the individual level, Cassuto might maintain that these work differently than the national level.

⁴¹ In fact, as noted above, for Cassuto, collective punishment is more easily understood than vicarious punishment.

⁴² See below for the position of R. Yisrael b. Yosefcited by R. Yosef Nachmiash Yirmeyahu 31:29About R. Yosef Nachmiash that the dead are aware of what happens in this world and that there can be posthumous vicarious punishment.

⁴³ Cf. SifraKedoshim 10About Sifra below.

⁴⁴ See Yirmeyahu 14:20, Daniel 9:16, Nechemyah 9:2.

⁴⁵ See, however, the Hoil Moshe who questions the value of confessing the sins of others.

⁴⁶ See the notes in the Introduction for a full list.

⁴⁷ See Ibn Kaspi regarding his general approach to resolving Biblical contradictions.

⁴⁸ See above that according to Ibn Kaspi, man does not have the capacity to process all of the factors which Hashem takes into consideration.

⁴⁹ Citing Rashbam – cf. Rashbam's position below.

⁵⁰ This position would distinguish between the simple (קל) form "יָמוּת" which means to die by the hand of God and the הפעל form of "יוּמָת" which means to be put to death by human hands. However, this distinction is not always so clear cut – see מות.

⁵¹ This problem does not exist when humans are merely fulfilling a Divine command. This would account for the cases of Akhan and Shaul's descendants and the Givonim, and for the possible collective punishment of the children in an עיר הנדחת – see Rambam below. See R. D"Z Hoffmann Devarim 13:16 who follows the Rambam and explains that the apostate city is a special case because of the severity of the sin and its infecting of an entire population. In the case of Yavesh Gilad, it is unclear if the people acted properly or with Divine sanction.

⁵² Ibn Kaspi also says that these prophecies merely describe one of Hashem's many complementary modes of justice.

⁵³ Cf. Ibn Kaspi who says that had the nation repented they would still have been subjugated to Nevukhadnezzar, but the destruction and exile would have been prevented.

⁵⁴ R. Saadia points out that in this world there is no difference between the righteous and the wicked. See also R. Saadia's discussion earlier in the workHaNivchar BaEmunot UvaDeiot 5:2About R. Saadia Gaon where he similarly explains that the verses of Yechezkel 18:22-27 are referring to reward in the World to Come, and see Avot DeRabbi Natan and Mishnat R. Eliezer cited above. Cf. RadakYechezkel 18:6About R. David Kimchi who, while agreeing with R. Saadia that the main reward and punishment is in the World to Come, disagrees with him on whether this is a viable reading of Yechezkel 18, claiming that this would have been an inadequate response to the nation's complaints which focused on the conditions in this world. R. Saadia, though, could respond that Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel were prophesying about the era of the redemption, at a time when the people will realize that ultimate reward is in the World to Come.

⁵⁵ Shadal argues that even the Bavli and Targum Onkelos, who maintain that the verse speaks of children who also sinned (see below for analysis of their position) still explain that "לְשֹׂנְאָי" refers to the parents. See also R. D"Z Hoffmann who agrees and adds that Midrash sometimes restricts the application of a verse to a particular scenario, even when this limitation is not explicit in the text.

⁵⁶ Shadal notes that "לְאֹהֲבַי" refers to the righteous person himself, and he (like the first opinion in the Mekhilta DeRabbi YishmaelYitro BaChodesh 6About Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael) points to Hashem's referring to Avraham as "אֹהֲבִי" in Yeshayahu.

⁵⁷ Shadal explains that this parallels the purpose of Hashem's punishments to a wicked person's descendants.

⁵⁸ The point of vicarious punishment is greatly reduced after the person's death.

⁵⁹ Cf. the similar suggestion of R. Yishmael b. Yosef cited by R. Yosef NachmiashYirmeyahu 31:29About R. Yosef Nachmiash, but see R"Y Nachmiash himself who asks that, if so, why would the Torah have differentiated between the numbers for reward and punishment.

⁶⁰ Ibn Kaspi also says that, in contrast to "לְאֶלֶף דּוֹר" in Devarim 7:9, "לַאֲלָפִים" does not refer to generations at all, but rather to myriad acts of kindness. Cf. Jubilees 23:31.

⁶¹ Cf. R"Y Nachmiash below who notes that this theory could also explain cases like Eli in which a punishment is promised for eternity.

⁶² The textual basis for this is Moshe's words "הוֹדִעֵנִי נָא אֶת דְּרָכֶךָ".

⁶³ Cf. Ibn Kaspi and see AbarbanelShemot 34About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel who presents the Akeidat Yitzchak's position without attribution.

⁶⁴ See below that the Malbim synthesizes the Rambam's position (which he thinks is the simple reading of the text) with the Talmud BavliBerakhot 7aSanhedrin 27bAbout the Bavli cited below. This results in a two tracked approach, in which Hashem punishes children for parental sins, as long as at least one of two factors exist – either the parents' sin was idolatry or the children continue in the parents' path (even for sins other than idolatry). Cf. Radak below who says both factors must be present.

⁶⁵ Ralbag notes that Shemot 20:5 is speaking specifically of idolatry, but he does not apply the principle exclusively to idolatry.

⁶⁶ Rambam states that "לְשֹׂנְאָי" in the Torah refers exclusively to idolaters. See also Moreh Nevukhim 1:36 where he says that the same is true about the languages of "קנא" and "חרה אף". It is even possible (see Shadal's reading of the Rambam) that Rambam thinks that "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" refers exclusively to an עיר הנדחת, and the Divine attribute manifests itself solely through human implementation. Cf. the Sifre BemidbarBemidbar 112About Sifre Bemidbar which explicitly states that even for idolatry, the descendants are not punished with כרת.

⁶⁷ Idolatry is also the context of other passages in the Torah which describe punishment of children. See Vayikra 20:5 which speaks of Molekh worship, and Vayikra 26:30,39-40 which also speaks of idolatry. See above that Shadal attempts to refute the Rambam's position from the mention of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" without idolatry in Shemot 34, but that Abarbanel responds that the idolatry of the Golden Calf formed the backdrop for the Attributes of Mercy. A more difficult question is from its inclusion in Moshe's prayer after the sin of the Spies – see below. Also see below for others who combine the limitation to idolatry with the additional requirement that the children continue in their parents' path. Finally, see the discussion below of the possibility that "לְאֹהֲבַי" includes all non-idolaters.

⁶⁸ Cf. HaMeamer's position above.

⁶⁹ The Akeidat Yitzchak's approach is thus the complete opposite of HaMeamer and Rambam above and Ibn Ezra and R"Y Bekhor Shor below, who say that the meaning of the verse is that Hashem wipes out the sinner's line.

⁷⁰ For Ralbag, collective punishment, both in the specific case of future generations and in general, is not caused by active Divine intervention, but rather by passive removal of Divine providence. For more, see Collective Punishment. [See also Philipson (cited by Reggio) who suggests that natural occurrences are sometimes attributed to Hashem.] AbarbanelShemot 34About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel heatedly disputes Ralbag's position ("ודעתו זה לא ייטב בעיני ה' ואין ראוי לקבלו כל איש אשר בשם ישראל יכנה"), and asserts that all punishments happen because of Divine providence and not because of natural consequences. However, see Abarbanel BereshitBereshit 15About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel where he himself applies Ralbag's theory.

⁷¹ The Hoil Moshe takes this analogy a step further, noting that, in such circumstances, consigning the children to live in poverty is simply a practical necessity. Were the children to have financial means, they would simply support their parent and prevent him from receiving his due punishment.

⁷² Thanks to Prof. Zev Harvey for adding this point.

⁷³ It is not clear, though, why Hashem cannot mete out the full punishment to the sinner himself, after he already has children.

⁷⁴ Cf. Ralbag's second interpretation (which develops the approach of the Bavli) cited below, which emphasizes the compassionate and educative nature of the Divine punishment.

⁷⁵ See Ralbag's attempt to say that Moshe is emphasizing that Hashem's way of justice is to discipline in order to rehabilitate rather than obliterate.

⁷⁶ Ralbag addresses the theological question explicitly. Moses Mendelssohneditorial comment on the Biur Vayikra 26:39About Moses MendelssohnAbout the Biur adopts the Ralbag's position (but see also his interpretations of Shemot 20:5 and 34:7).

⁷⁷ The cases of collective punishment are not a problem for the position of the Akeidat Yitzchak, and the cases of collective punishment for idolatry are not a problem for the Rambam.

⁷⁸ Cf. Ramban. Ralbag notes that this was one of the most amazing aspects of the miracle. It is unclear, though, what Ralbag says regarding the children of Datan and Aviram.

⁷⁹ Cf. Radak. The Hoil Moshe also attempts to claim that the death of David's son was not a punishment for either David or the son, but rather an atonement. Cf. Mishnat R. Eliezer below.

⁸⁰ Cf. Ibn Kaspi regarding the staged process through which both the Babylonian and Roman Exiles came to pass.

⁸¹ Malbim is following the Midrash in Bavli Yoma 69b and Sanhedrin 64a.

⁸² Malbim's creative interpretation is attempting to temper the more radical formulation in Bavli Makkot (see below) which says that Yechezkel abolished the Torah's principle of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת". Cf. Radak's approach below. There are two important distinctions between the approaches of Radak and Malbim:

1. Radak holds that "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" applies only when the sin is idolatry and the child continues in the parent's evil ways (both factors must exist according to Radak). Malbim, though, maintains that these two factors are two separate tracks which function independently, and "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" applies when either one is present. According to the Malbim, the simple reading of the verse applies to idolatry only, and this aspect is what no longer applied after the time of Yechezkel. However, the second aspect found in the Talmud BavliBerakhot 7aSanhedrin 27bAbout the Bavli below continued to exist even after Yechezkel. [Both Radak and the Malbim are attempting to synthesize the Bavli with the Rambam's view and the context of the Decalogue. The Rambam, himself, likely maintains that there is only a single track of idolatry.]
2. Both Radak and Malbim relate the prophecy to the elimination of idolatry, but Malbim suggests that the prophecy was fulfilled soon after the Exile, while Radak speaks of it coming true only in the future.

⁸³ See Ralbag who rejects the possibility that Hashem's modus operandi could have changed "ולא יתכן שנאמר, שעד העת ההוא יהיה נוהג השם יתברך לענוש הבנים על חטא אבותם, ואחר כך ישנה מנהגו, כי זה מבואר הביטול". He does not elaborate, though, on how he understands the verses in Yirmeyahu and Yechezkel.

⁸⁴ In Moreh Nevukhim, Rambam includes adult children in the collective punishment for idolatry, and he feels a need to emphasize that even minors are included, while in Hilkhot Teshuvah he seems to entertain the possibility that specifically minors would be punished even for other sins of parents, as only they are deemed the personal property of the parents. In Hilkhot Avodah Zarah, Rambam mentions only minors – see below for further discussion. This raises the possibility that Rambam imposes a dual limitation on the application of collective punishment – only idolatry and only minors.

⁸⁵ Abarbanel on Bereshit 15 cites the verse of "עַל שִׁלֵּשִׁים וְעַל רִבֵּעִים", and he also cites Ralbag's theory that collective punishment results from collateral damage. Abarbanel's position in Bereshit differs fundamentally from his position in Shemot – see below.

⁸⁶ Malbim, though, interprets these verses in accordance with the SifraKedoshim 10About Sifra – see below.

⁸⁷ He therefore suggests that the verse is a proof for the alternative of the Bavli that the children continued along the path of the parents.

⁸⁸ See the notes in the Introduction for a full list.

⁸⁹ For the Akeidat Yitzchak, though, the word "לְהַאֲבִידוֹ" poses a difficulty.

⁹⁰ For a fuller discussion of the halakhic sources on this issue, see Children of the Apostate City. The Rambam's position aroused the opposition of figures such as the Ramah and R. Shimshon of Sens who attacked it as having no basis. In response, R. Aharon b. Meshulam attempted to defend the Rambam's position by appealing to the precedents from the cases of Korach, Datan, and Aviram, Yavesh Gilad, and Shaul's descendants and the Givonim. To this Ramah replied that these were all cases of special Divine instruction and therefore invalid as sources of normative halakhah. Interestingly, Ralbag here follows the position of the Rambam, even though with regard to Korach, Datan, and Aviram, Ralbag says that all of the children did not perish – see below.

⁹¹ While in Mishneh Torah, Rambam included only the killing of minor children ("טף"), in Moreh Nevukhim, Rambam expands the scope of the law to multiple generations of even adult children.

⁹² According to Ralbag and the Hoil Moshe, even Hashem does not intentionally render collective punishment.

⁹³ Ralbag is following the Bavli Sanhedrin. The Hoil Moshe argues against this interpretation that it would be unprecedented cruelty to force children to watch the execution of their father. Ralbag also raises the option that the children were minors (cf. Radak Yehoshua 7:15 following Rambam cited above that minor children are considered parental property).

⁹⁴ Cf. Radak with regard to the case of Shaul's descendants and the Givonim. In the case of Yavesh Gilad, it is unclear if the people acted properly or with Divine sanction.

⁹⁵ Cf. Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer 38 and Radak.

⁹⁶ See also Midrash TannaimDevarim 5:9About Midrash Tannaim. Neither the Mekhilta nor the Midrash Tannaim is explicit that the children are punished also for the sins of their parents, but that seems to be their implication.

⁹⁷ RashiSanhedrin 27bAbout R. Shelomo Yitzchaki explains the Bavli as saying that the children are punished also for the sins of their parents, and this seems to be the simple reading of the Bavli. See the MeiriSanhedrin 27bAbout R. Menachem HaMeiri below, however, who maintains that the Bavli means only that the sinner is punished if he is following in his parents' path, but not that he is punished also for his parents' sins.

⁹⁸ See also the citations of R. Saadia by Ibn Balaam (text found in R. Kafah's edition of Tafsir R. Saadia p.180 n.7) and R. Shemuel b. Yitzchak HaSefaradi (text brought in R. Kafah's edition of Tafsir R. Saadia pp.200-202).

⁹⁹ R"Y Nachmiash's perspective is heavily influenced by Radak's exegesis. In general, see R. Yosef Nachmiash.

¹⁰⁰ As such, it charts a middle ground between the first and third categories, agreeing with the former that vicarious or collective punishment is within the realm of possibility, but siding with the latter that Hashem is merciful and punishes only when there have been consecutive wicked generations.

¹⁰¹ They emphasize that this works in both directions, and that there are also no free rides for the son of a righteous person. As an example of a רשע בן צדיק who was punished despite the merits of his father, Radak cites the case of Menashe – see the discussion below of the backdrop of Yechezkel's prophecy. R"Y Nachmiash also cites the Sifre DevarimDevarim 329About Sifre Devarim which says that Avraham's merits did not save Yishmael and Yitzchak's merits did not save Esav.

According to Radak and R"Y Nachmiash, the verses of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבֹת עַל בָּנִים... לְשֹׂנְאָי" and "וְעֹשֶׂה חֶסֶד לַאֲלָפִים לְאֹהֲבַי" come only to add that there is a secondary measure of punishment or reward when the child follows in the parents' footsteps, but they do not negate or replace the primary level of judgment in which each person is judged for their own actions. Thus, these verses also do not relate to cases where the parent and child are opposites in their conduct (as in Yechezkel – see below). In the words of R"Y Nachmiash: "אבל הרשעים לא תועיל להם צדקת אביהם כאשר הצדיקים לא תזיקם רשעת אביהם, כי הכתובים לא דברו אלא ברשעים בן רשעים וצדיקים בן צדיקים כדכתיב לאוהבי ולשומרי מצותי, אבל ברשע בן צדיק ובצדיק בן רשע לא דברו הכתובים הללו". Cf. the formulation of the Mekhilta that "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" is not speaking of "מסורגין".

¹⁰² See below that Radak and R"Y Nachmiash also limit the application to idolatry. Also see Abarbanel who says that the idolatrous sinner described in the verse is already the fourth generation of sinners.

¹⁰³ See R"Y Nachmiash who says: "מ"מ אני יכול לפרש גם המדה הזאת הכתובה עם י"ג המדות לנקמה, ואע"פ שכל הי"ג מדות רחמים כך ראוי לשלטון להיות רוב מדותיו רחמים ומעוטם משפט נקמה".

¹⁰⁴ I.e., they are punished for both their parents' sins and for their own sins. See, though, Abarbanel who raises the possibility that Hashem remembers the parents' sins only to cancel out the merits of one's ancestors, but that the sinner is really punished only for his own sins.

¹⁰⁵ This is especially true in light of the fact that Moshe's prayer omits the word "לְשֹׂנְאָי" which limits the scope of the punishment.

¹⁰⁶ See the analogy brought by Pesikta DeRav Kahana of all four barrels being consumed by fire.

¹⁰⁷ According to Pesikta DeRav Kahana, it is either all or nothing, and no punishment is carried out whatsoever unless there are four straight sinners. Cf. the position of Mishnat R. Eliezer below.

¹⁰⁸ In contrast to Pesikta DeRav Kahana which understands that "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" speaks of capital punishment (an all or nothing proposition) and the elimination all at once of the entire line of sinners, R. Saadia explains that it refers to various types of punishment which can be increased or decreased.

¹⁰⁹ R. Saadia cites the verse from Bereshit 18:19 "כִּי יְדַעְתִּיו לְמַעַן אֲשֶׁר יְצַוֶּה אֶת בָּנָיו וְאֶת בֵּיתוֹ אַחֲרָיו וְשָׁמְרוּ דֶּרֶךְ ה' לַעֲשׂוֹת צְדָקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט לְמַעַן הָבִיא ה' עַל אַבְרָהָם אֵת אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר עָלָיו" as support for the notion that children's actions affect the parents' fate. See also the sources adduced by Mishnat R. Eliezer discussed below.

R. Saadia also relates to the opposite scenario of a righteous ancestor with wicked descendants. Regarding this, he says that the father is not punished unless he neglected to educate his child, adding "ואין לך סחורה שיש בה רווח ולא הפסד". For an example of a father who may have been punished for not properly instructing his children, see the case of Eli in Shemuel I 2-3.

R. Saadia notes that the concept of children influencing their parents' fate provides an incentive for parents to educate their children properly. Cf. the similar notion expressed in Mishnat R. Eliezer "וכן שלמה אמר יסר בנך ויניחך, מדינה שלגיהנם, ויתן מעדנים לנפשך, בגן עדן עם הצדיקים". R. Saadia's theory also provides an option for understanding "רשע וטוב לו" which in some ways is the opposite of the view of the vicarious punishment theory of Avot DeRabbi Natan and Mishnat R. Eliezer brought above.

¹¹⁰ R. Saadia thus attempts to account for how the same phrase appears in opposite contexts in the Torah: "וזה לפי שפוקד עון אבות על בנים על שלשים כלול בארבעה מקומות בתורה, שנים פורענות והם כתובים בפסוקי לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים וכבר פירשנו זאת פירוש מלא. והשנים האחרים הם חלק מן הרחמים והם הכתובים כאן ובפרשת סלח נא לעון העם הזה". R. Shemuel b. Chofni GaonBemidbar 14:18About R. Shemuel b. Chofni Gaon (passage transcribed by M. Zucker in על תרגום רס"ג לתורה, (New York, 1959): 330 n. 30 and in פירוש רב סעדיה גאון לבראשית, (New York, 1984): 423 n.23) disagrees with R. Saadia and says that the language of "פקידת עון" cannot have a merciful connotation (cf. Ramban). See also the further discussion of R. Saadia's position in R"Y Nachmiash.

¹¹¹ R. Saadia notes that this serves as a necessary deterrent for the son of a wicked person.

¹¹² In essence, R. Saadia synthesizes the two different interpretations of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" found in Bavli Berakhot and the second position of Mishnat R. Eliezer (discussed below). On the relationship between R. Saadia and Mishnat R. Eliezer, see M. Zucker, "לפתרון בעית ל"ב מדות ו'משנת ר' אליעזר'", PAAJR 23 (1954): 1-39 (Hebrew).

¹¹³ Cf. Ibn Kaspi above.

¹¹⁴ R. Yisrael b. Yosef explains like Ibn Kaspi et al. above that the worst punishment for the sinner is for his children to be harmed, and he notes that this is true even when the punishment arrives only posthumously. See also R"Y Nachmiash who cites the Bavli Berakhot 18a-b to demonstrate that the dead know what transpires in this world. In contrast to Ibn Kaspi, though, R. Yisrael maintains that Hashem punishes vicariously only when the child is also wicked.

¹¹⁵ This may also be the position of Rashbam, who in his interpretation of Bereshit 15:14 indicates that only the fourth generation is punished. It is unclear whether Rashbam Devarim 7:10 is saying that the sinner himself is punished, or merely that he witnesses his descendants being punished.

¹¹⁶ See below that Ibn Ezra and Ramban differ, though, regarding which generation of descendants is punished. Ibn Ezra says that it is only the fourth, while Ramban argues that it could be the second, third, or fourth, depending on how quickly the sins accumulate.

¹¹⁷ He writes "ובפרשת כי תשא אפרש לך איך תכנס מדת פוקד עון אבות במדת רחמים" and ".וכבר פירשתיו בפרשת וישמע, גם זאת מדת רחמים, שיאריך לאב עד בוא הבן, ואם הבן טוב לא יפקד עון האב עליו".

¹¹⁸ Even Ibn Ezra would agree that when four straight generations do sin, the fourth generation bears the full force of Hashem's cumulative wrath and "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" becomes an attribute of vengeance. Cf. Mekhilta DeRashbi and R"Y Bekhor Shor below who say that the fourth generation is punished only for its own sins.

¹¹⁹ See Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael, Rashi, Radak, R. Avraham b. HaRambam, Ramban, R. Yosef Nachmiash, Abarbanel. Radak speaks of "idolatry and similarly large sins", and both he and R"Y Nachmiash include sins which constitute a desecration of God's name (Eli's sons).

¹²⁰ See the discussion above on the positions of Rambam and Shadal regarding the relative advantages and disadvantages of this proposal. R"Y Nachmiash notes that the cessation of the punishment after four generations applies only to idolatry in private, while punishment for public idolatry, like in the case of the Golden Calf, continues for many more generations.

¹²¹ See Radak and R. Yosef Nachmiash ("ולכך יש לנו זכות האבות לפי שכולנו צדיקים מעון זה") who point out that as no Jews today are idolaters, all of them (and even sinners) are worthy of Divine grace because of the merits of the Patriarchs. See also Love of Hashem and Ramban Shemot 20:5 regarding the definition of "לְאֹהֲבַי".

¹²² See also R. Y"S ReggioBikkurei HaIttim (1846)About R. Yitzchak Shemuel Reggio who notes ("כ"ש רשע בן צדיק") that children of righteous parents had a good example to follow, and thus should be punished at least as harshly as children of wicked parents.

¹²³ See above for Ralbag's own and preferred approach.

¹²⁴ Ralbag compares this to the repeat offender ("הולך בקרי") in Vayikra 26 who receives a seven fold punishment in an attempt to steer him to a correct path.

¹²⁵ See above for the Hoil Moshe's own approach.

¹²⁶ The Hoil Moshe assumes, like Radak and R"Y Nachmiash above, that the father is also punished.

¹²⁷ This is logically consistent with the position of Radak and R. Yosef Nachmiash that the parents are always punished, as well as the position of Pesikta DeRav Kahana and R. Saadia that the parents are punished if their descendants sin.

¹²⁸ See below that according to Ibn Ezra, the verse is speaking of capital punishment.

¹²⁹ See above for discussion of Ibn Ezra's position that the parents are not punished.

¹³⁰ Cf. Cassuto who dismisses this approach, arguing that the verse is depicting God's wrath rather than his mercy.

¹³¹ Cf. R"Y Bekhor Shor below who alludes to the concept of a חזקה or a presumption that the status quo will continue after three times. There is some ambiguity as to whether Ibn Ezra includes the original sinner in his count of four generations, and whether "רִבֵּעִים" refers to the great-grandchildren or the great-great-grandchildren. This depends on whether the "בְּנֵי בָנִים" which appear only in Shemot 34 are an intervening generation before the "שִׁלֵּשִׁים" and "רִבֵּעִים" or a general term which includes them. Most of Ibn Ezra's commentary speaks of only three generations in addition to the father. However, his words "ובני הבנים נקראים בנים, על כן אחז דרך קצרה" seem to indicate that there are four additional generations, and this is how his position is understood by Ramban. Ramban, himself, disagrees and maintains that there are only three generations besides the father.

¹³² Ramban points out the difficulty with Ibn Ezra's interpretation in that the verse does not differentiate between the second, third, and fourth generations, implying that all might be punished. Ramban and Seforno maintain, like Ibn Ezra, that the parents themselves are not punished, but they contend that each of the subsequent generations are sometimes punished.

¹³³ This is consistent with the position of most of these commentators that the punishment is saved up for the fourth or final generation. According to Pesikta DeRav Kahana, it would appear that all four generations die out at once. Rashbam, Ramban, and Seforno point to Bereshit 15:16 which describes the elimination of the Amorites at the time of the fourth generation. Seforno also cites the various instances from the book of Melakhim in which entire dynasties are wiped out.

¹³⁴ This is consistent with their position that the punishment is visited upon all four generations.

¹³⁵ Radak notes that minors also share in their parents' reward, even if they have no merits of their own.

¹³⁶ Radak would need to maintain that the first three generations also received punishment for their sins, even though the full penalty was given only to the fourth.

¹³⁷ The Sifra, Bavli, and Rashi also restrict the punishment to afflictions rather than death. See also Bavli Sanhedrin and Shevuot which limit collective punishment to cases where a person had knowledge of the sinner's conduct and bears responsibility for not protesting or preventing the sin.

¹³⁸ See the notes in the Introduction for a full list.

¹³⁹ This approach works particularly well for the verses which speak of the sins of both parents and children.

¹⁴⁰ This is consistent with the Bavli's explanation of "רשע וטוב לו" and can work with the interpretation of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" that Hashem defers the punishment of evildoers in this world.

¹⁴¹ It is unclear whether Rashbam is saying that the sinner himself is punished, or merely that he witnesses his descendants being punished.

¹⁴² This would appear to contradict Ibn Ezra's position in Shemot that Hashem does not punish the sinner himself.

¹⁴³ This would work well for Radak and R"Y Nachmiash who maintain that the sinner himself is always punished.

¹⁴⁴ This is also the opinion of Abba Chanan in the Sifre DevarimDevarim 94About Sifre Devarim who cites it as a source for innocent children of an עיר הנדחת not being punished. R. Saadia notes that vicarious punishment is the norm among some Arabian tribes, and thus the Torah needed to emphasize that this is prohibited. See also Seforno that it was a common practice of kings to eliminate the descendants of potential threats to the throne. Other commentators, though, explain that it was simply necessary to emphasize that human courts function differently than the heavenly court. See R. YonahSanhedrin 27bAbout R. Yonah and RanSanhedrin 27bAbout R. Nissim Gerondi that humans have no way of properly judging whether the sinner is אוחז במעשי אבותיו.

¹⁴⁵ In contrast to most medieval exegetes (see Ibn Kaspi above), the Bavli and Pesikta DeRav Kahana do not distinguish between the simple (קל) form "יָמוּת" and the הפעל form of "יוּמָת". For more, see מות.

¹⁴⁶ See R. YonahSanhedrin 27bAbout R. Yonah for further discussion of the Bavli's position.

¹⁴⁷ See Akhan's Children.

¹⁴⁸ He adds that minor children were killed as they were considered Akhan's possessions.

¹⁴⁹ Radak limits the punishment to the sons of Geichazi alive at the time, despite the verse saying "וּבְזַרְעֲךָ לְעוֹלָם". See Geichazi's Punishment.

¹⁵⁰ R. Saadia's interpretation is cited by R. Shemuel b. Yitzchak HaSefaradi (fragments published by G. Margoliouth in JQR 10 (1898): 385-403 and translated into Hebrew by R"Y Kapach in an appendix to his translation of R. Saadia's Tafsir: 200-202).

¹⁵¹ In suggesting that Shaul's descendants participated in the killing of the Givonim, R. Saadia struggles to overcome various chronological difficulties. R. Saadia (and Radak below) also suggests that Mephiboshet was spared not just because of David's covenant with Yonatan, but because he was righteous (according to R. Saadia he could have been no more than a very young child when the Givonim were killed).

¹⁵² R. Saadia GaonCommentary Shemot 30:11-15About R. Saadia Gaon claims that the people were killed because of their own sins, and David only mistakenly shouldered the blame. See Census and Plague.

¹⁵³ Radak says that the punishment did not apply to righteous descendants, but that Hashem knew that there would not be any. Radak also notes that the punishment for Eli's household was eternal because of the desecration of Hashem's name which was involved in their sin. See also R"Y Nachmiash and Eli's Punishment.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. R. Saadia above. Radak also notes that this was done according to Divine instructions.

¹⁵⁵ Radak explains that in all of these cases, had the descendants been righteous they would not have been punished.

¹⁵⁶ See Radak and R"Y Nachmiash above.

¹⁵⁷ Rashi is following the Tanchuma Korach 3.

¹⁵⁸ From Bemidbar 16:27, however, it would appear that Datan and Aviram had both older children ("וּבְנֵיהֶם") and younger children ("וְטַפָּם"). It is possible that the younger children of Datan and Aviram perished along with their parents, their older children died because they participated in the sin, while Korach's older children survived because they were not part of the sin.

¹⁵⁹ See also the brief remarks of Ibn Ezra that Yechezkel is speaking of children who do not follow in their parents ways.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Malbim's position discussed above.

¹⁶¹ According to Radak, Yechezkel is prophesying that after the destruction, the nation will complain that they were unjustly punished for the sins of their forefathers. This is similar to the approach of R. Eliezer of BeaugencyYechezkel 18:2-23About R. Eliezer of Beaugency (in his first interpretation) and Ibn Kaspi above, who differ only in that they say this was the nation's complaint already before the destruction (when they heard the prophetic predictions of impending doom). Cf. the variation of Shadal above that the nation is despairing of the possibility that repentance will help.

In contrast, Rashi, R. Yosef Kara, and the second interpretation of R"E of Beaugency all explain that the nation is saying that they can sin and not suffer any consequences, just like their ancestors. This interpretation assumes that the first three generations of sinners are not punished. Radak, however, who maintains that every sinner is punished, and that Menashe was also punished for his own sins, could not have interpreted like this. The disagreement between the commentators may be fueled by the fact that the books of Melakhim and Divrei HaYamim present differing portrayals of Menashe's reign.

¹⁶² Cf. Ibn Kaspi above. While Ibn Kaspi subscribes to the complete vicarious punishment theory and thinks that Menashe's actions would have resulted in at least partial punishment for future generations even had they been completely righteous, Radak disagrees and says that righteous people would not have been punished at all for the sins of others.

Radak also makes it clear that since the people did not repent, Menashe's sins were added to the punishment of future generations, despite the righteousness of Yoshiyahu in the interim. Radak must maintain either that only Yoshiyahu but not his generation was righteous (see Radak Yirmeyahu 3:6), or that the demerits of fathers add to the punishment of subsequent generations even if there is no continuous chain of four wicked generations. This latter option would seem to be contrary to the Mekhilta and Pesikta DeRav Kahana, and is explicitly against the position of R"Y Nachmiash who writes "ואם לא יהיו הד' דורות רצופים אלא שיהיה אחד מהם צדיק, הצדיק ההוא יפסיק אותה פקידה, ואפי' יהיה בנו רשע אין מזכירין עם עונותיו עונות זקנו הרשע".

¹⁶³ Radak points to Menashe's imprisonment described in Divrei HaYamim. Cf. R"E Beaugency and Ibn Kaspi who use Menashe as an example of a king who was not fully punished for his sins and Yoshiyahu as a king who died in battle despite his virtues, and see above regarding the differing portrait in the book of Melakhim.

¹⁶⁴ See the formulation of R"Y Nachmiash cited above. In these cases, the special additional levels of punishment and reward of "לְשֹׂנְאָי" and "לְאֹהֲבַי" apply.

¹⁶⁵ The Mekhilta refers to this as "מסורגין". In these cases, only the simple rule of "הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַחֹטֵאת הִיא תָמוּת" applies and not "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת".

¹⁶⁶ These commentators might maintain that Yechezkel's prophecy reflects a change in Divine justice to become sterner – see discussion of Bavli Makkot below. If so, they might interpret like Rashi, R. Yosef Kara, and the second interpretation of R"E of Beaugency that the nation is saying that they can sin and not suffer any consequences, just like their ancestors, and Yechezkel is informing them that the rules of the game have now changed.

It is also possible that these commentators could explain that the verses in Yechezkel are describing the appropriate way for humans to judge (in contrast to the people's corrupt ways of justice until that time – see 18:25,29), even though Hashem Himself is more merciful. Note that Yechezkel 18:13 reads "מוֹת יוּמָת דָּמָיו בּוֹ" (which implies that the person should be put to death) rather than the simple קל form of "מות ימות".

¹⁶⁷ Ramban notes that the standard meaning of the idiom "פֹּקֵד... עַל" is to take revenge or punish.

¹⁶⁸ This is in accordance with R. Saadia's position that the virtues of the children can reduce the punishment of the parents.

¹⁶⁹ R"Y Nachmiash points to Bemidbar 31:49.

¹⁷⁰ However, if so, it is unclear what the basis would be for limiting the scope of the verse. R. D"Z Hoffmann attempts to answer that Midrashic derivations sometimes restrict the application of a verse to a particular scenario, even when the limitation has no textual hook.

¹⁷¹ See above for the formulation that the verse is speaking only of a צדיק בן צדיק. R"Y Nachmiash cites the Sifre DevarimDevarim 329About Sifre Devarim that there is no free lunch for the wicked person. Cf. Mekhilta DeRashbi and Mishnat R. Eliezer below.

¹⁷² R. Saadia, in fact, relates to this possibility, but rules (regarding punishment, at least) that the parent is held responsible for the deeds of his descendants only if he neglected their education.

¹⁷³ In the case of the Patriarchs, it is very possible that their main reward was fulfilled only when their descendants multiplied and conquered the land of Israel. See also Ohr HaChayyim Shemot 20:5.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Ibn Kaspi above.

¹⁷⁵ R"Y Nachmiash, himself, adopts Radak's alternative that the sin of Eli's sons involved a desecration of Hashem's name. See also Sefer Chasidim 164 who says that Eli's sons sinned repeatedly.

¹⁷⁶ The Mekhilta explains that this is why Moshe immediately prostrated himself upon hearing these words. However, see R. Saadia and Ibn Ezra who offer alternatives as to when and why Moshe did so.

¹⁷⁷ This approach adopts the simple reading of Devarim 24:16 and Yechezkel 18. Accordingly, all verses which might imply otherwise were either previously retracted or need to be reinterpreted.

¹⁷⁸ Shadal published his Ohev Ger in 1830. In Bikkurei HaIttim HaChadashim (1846) pp. 6b-8a, Shadal offers a new position (later incorporated in HaMishtadel and his commentary on the Torah), and in his HaMishtadel (published in 1847, and later incorporated into his Torah commentary), Shadal explicitly retracts what he wrote in Ohev Ger and embraces the vicarious punishment position analyzed above. By then, his earlier interpretation had already been adopted and expounded on by R. Y"S Reggio.

¹⁷⁹ R. Reggio's approach in his article in Bikkurei HaIttim differs from the approach he takes in various places in his Torah commentary (Shemot 20:5, 34:7, Devarim 7:10). In his commentary on the Torah which was published in 1821, R. Reggio adopts the position of the Bavli BerakhotBerakhot 7aSanhedrin 27bAbout the Bavli above. R. Reggio's 1846 article reflects his updated thoughts on the entire subject in the aftermath of the publication of Shadal's Ohev Ger in 1830 and Shadal's new interpretation on the previous pages of the 1846 issue of Bikkurei HaIttim. Interestingly, both Reggio and Shadal changed their positions over time.

¹⁸⁰ R. Reggio argues that if human courts are forbidden to punish children for parents' sins, then by a kal vachomer, Hashem would not do so either.

¹⁸¹ For other versions of this motif, see Devarim Rabbah Shofetim 5:13 and Shemot Rabbah 19:3.

¹⁸² The Bavli's version is a much bolder formulation. A literal interpretation of it would mean that there was vicarious punishment until the time of Yechezkel, and would also raise questions of how Yechezkel could have had either the authority or capability of altering the Divine attributes. In addition, one must consider the relationship of this passage in Bavli Makkot to the text from Talmud BavliBerakhot 7aSanhedrin 27bAbout the Bavli discussed above. Do these two texts present competing or complementary positions?

1. The simplest reading is to view the Bavli Makkot as a totally independent approach from Bavli Berakhot. The two texts, in fact, have totally different points of departure and solutions. The Talmudic commentators cited below, however, attempt to harmonize the two texts.
2. The Maharsha maintains that the two passages in the Bavli work together. According to him, Bavli Berakhot presents the original limitation of the verse to case where children follow in their parents' sinful ways, and Bavli Makkot describes how Yechezkel then came and eliminated even this limited application.
3. The Arukh LaNer, however, contends that Yechezkel was not abolishing Moshe's words, but merely interpreting them to be speaking only of a case where the children copy their parents' sins. What results, according to him, is that the two texts in the Bavli are essentially synchronized, with the Bavli Makkot simply saying that Yechezkel was the first to present the interpretation and limitation of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" which is found in Bavli Berakhot.
4. MalbimYechezkel 18:2-3About R. Meir Leibush Weiser (cited above) also views the texts of the Bavli as complementary, but as speaking about two different tracks of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת". Taking a middle position between the Maharsha and the Arukh LaNer, he posits that the Bavli Berakhot's application of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" to cases of children following in their parents' footsteps is still in effect today. The Bavli Makkot, in contrast, is referring to the elimination of idolatry in Yechezkel's time, which consequently removed the threat of "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת" unique to idolatry.

¹⁸³ R. Reggio attempts to support this claim with examples of similar phrases from both Hebrew and other languages, in which the second word of the phrase describes the first rather than being the subject of the first.

¹⁸⁴ R. Reggio notes that according to this reading, our verse would be consistent with the many other verses in Tanakh which contrast Hashem's capabilities with the impotence of idols.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. the position of R. Natan in the Mekhilta DeRabbi YishmaelYitro BaChodesh 6About Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael.

¹⁸⁶ According to him, this verse has no connection to Hashem's covenant with the Patriarchs or merits of ancestors.

¹⁸⁷ R. Reggio does admit, however, that the verses which speak of a Divine oath to the Patriarchs that He will bless their descendants are an example of vicarious reward.

¹⁸⁸ R. Reggio thinks that the meaning of family is a later expansion of the semantic range of the word. Cf. R"Y Bekhor Shor below.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. R. Reggio in his commentary on Vayikra 26:39 who (following the Biur) explains like Ralbag above that the sins of the parents are mentioned because of the natural consequences their punishment has for their children.

¹⁹⁰ See the notes in the Introduction for a full list.

¹⁹¹ Shadal rejects this attempted solution, and notes that even poetry conforms to the accepted morals of the time. Thus, he argues that if Biblical poetry implies that the existence of vicarious or collective punishment, this must have been the accepted dogma. Alternatively, R. Reggio could have explained that these verses too are referring to sins learned from parents.

¹⁹² R. Reggio adds that these variations are all for the benefit of the sinner.

¹⁹³ See, however, his commentary on Devarim 24:16 where he takes the opposite position.

¹⁹⁴ In his Torah commentary, R. Reggio says that this verse is speaking of human implementation, and he contrasts human courts with Divine justice. However, see above that his Torah commentary was written earlier than and adopts a different approach from his article in Bikkurei HaIttim.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Mishnat R. Eliezer's attempt above to explain Chizkiyahu's punishment.

¹⁹⁶ R. Eliezer of BeaugencyYechezkel 18:2-23About R. Eliezer of Beaugency suggests that until the Babylonian Exile, Hashem deferred punishment out of concern for the desecration of His name and the devastating impact it would have on the Jewish nation. A similar concept is expressed in Rashi Zekhariah 5:3. In contrast, see the note above for the commentators who reject the possibility that Hashem's way of administering justice changed, and instead attempt to reinterpret the Bavli.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Shadal who disagrees regarding both.

¹⁹⁸ Thus, he tries to explain why by sin the Torah specifies four generations, while by reward it speaks of eternity, even though Hashem judges both in the same way. According to R. Reggio's reading, if anyone is getting extra punishment, it is the father, not the son. He receives a punishment for his own actions and then he is punished again by seeing his descendants suffer because they learned from his sins.

¹⁹⁹ R. Reggio cites a prooftext from Tehillim 105:8.

²⁰⁰ This is apparently how the Meiri interprets the Bavli BerakhotBerakhot 7aSanhedrin 27bAbout the Bavli's position – see above.

²⁰¹ The Meiri adds that collective punishment is reserved for cases of "שהיה בידם למחות", as per the Bavli Sanhedrin.

²⁰² R"Y Bekhor Shor notes that three consecutive wicked generations create a presumption or a חזקה that the fourth will be no better. Thus, when the fourth then sins, Hashem punishes him immediately and does not wait to see if he will repent. According to these opinions, "רִבֵּעִים" refers to the fourth generation including the original sinner, and not to the fourth after him – see the discussion of Ibn Ezra's position above.

²⁰³ R"Y Nachmiash above disagrees, citing the Sifre DevarimDevarim 329About Sifre Devarim that Avraham's merits could not save Yishmael. While it is possible that the Sifre differs from the Mekhilta DeRashbi, it is also possible that it is speaking only of punishment in the World to Come. See also Mishnat R. Eliezer's citation of it below.

²⁰⁴ Cf. the opposite position of Mishnat R. Eliezer below that when there are consecutive generations of sinners, the first generation is punished.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Ibn Ezra's position above who agrees that only the fourth generation is punished, but says that he is punished also for the sins of his ancestors.

²⁰⁶ See R"Y Bekhor Shor that Hashem is emphasizing that one should not be misled (by a sinner not receiving punishment) into thinking that Hashem forgot about the sin, and cf. Ibn Kaspi above.

²⁰⁷ Cf. Akeidat Yitzchak above and Mishnat R. Eliezer below.

²⁰⁸ Thus, it is critical that this punishment be applied only as a last resort, after all hopes of repentance and righteous offspring have been exhausted. Cf. the Akeidat Yitzchak above.

²⁰⁹ See below for his explanation of the difference in the number of generations.

²¹⁰ While according to R"Y Bekhor Shor, having a righteous father would prevent a sinner from being punished (see above), the sinner would not receive any additional Divine kindness or "חֶסֶד".

²¹¹ R"Y Bekhor Shor cites Targum Onkelos as support for this position. Cf. R. Reggio above.

²¹² See the notes in the Introduction for a full list.

²¹³ This is how Mekhilta DeRashbi reads the verse in Eikhah 5:7.

²¹⁴ He cites it in his comments to both Shemot 20:5 and Devarim 7:10 in describing Hashem's methods of justice.

²¹⁵ See the note above regarding the Bavli's similar position.

²¹⁶ While the simple reading of the verse appears to be that this is a reward for Yehu's virtuous actions, Mekhilta DeRashbi and R"Y Bekhor Shor link the use of "רְבִעִים" there to the "רִבֵּעִים" in the Torah who are punished for the sins of their ancestors. It is possible that they understand the verse to be saying that Yehu himself is considered righteous because of his actions, and the count of four consecutive sinners will thus begin only with his son. This would also resolve the discrepancy between there being four generations who reigned after Yehu and the Mekhilta DeRashbi and R"Y Bekhor Shor's position that the fourth generation is the one punished (and not the fifth).

²¹⁷ Mekhilta DeRashbi cites this verse from Yechezkel.

²¹⁸ See the note above on the Pesikta and R. Saadia for the possibilities of how to account for this discrepancy.

²¹⁹ R"Y Bekhor Shor emphasizes that Hashem is saying that He will not forget the sins.

²²⁰ See Enelau's notes on Mishnat R. Eliezer (p.128) that this passage is also misattributed to Midrash HashkemOtzar HaMidrashim (Eisenstein) p.139About Midrash Hashkem. For two different ways of understanding the relationship between this position of Mishnat R. Eliezer and its seemingly conflicting first interpretation, see the note above.

²²¹ See the note above on the discussion of the relationship between the different sections of Mishnat R. Eliezer, as to whether the child is not punished for the sins of parents also in this world or only in the World to Come.

²²² In contrast to most other sources for whom a person's lineage has some degree of impact on how (or, at least, when) a person is judged, Mishnat R. Eliezer says that a person can be judged based on his future impact, but not on what came before him, over which he has no control. For R. Saadia's fusing of Mishnat R. Eliezer's position with that of the Bavli Berakhot, see above.

²²³ As support for his position, Mishnat R. Eliezer cites a verse from the Korach story which will be discussed below, a verse in Shemuel I 12:15 "וְאִם לֹא תִשְׁמְעוּ בְּקוֹל ה' וּמְרִיתֶם אֶת פִּי ה' וְהָיְתָה יַד ה' בָּכֶם וּבַאֲבֹתֵיכֶם" (cf. Bavli Yevamot 63b, Rashi, and Radak), and a verse from Mishlei 29:17 "יַסֵּר בִּנְךָ וִינִיחֶךָ וְיִתֵּן מַעֲדַנִּים לְנַפְשֶׁךָ". The verse from Shemuel would imply that a righteous person with wicked descendants is penalized for their conduct, but Mishnat R. Eliezer seems to limit this to a case where the ancestors had sinned and their judgment was pending. See above for the sources R. Saadia cites and for his discussion of these issues.

²²⁴ According to Mishnat R. Eliezer there is a continuous cycle with the judgment of each and every generation being held in abeyance pending the actions of its descendants.

²²⁵ To a great extent, Mishnat R. Eliezer is the flip side of Mekhilta DeRashbi. While both maintain that there need to be four (or five) consecutive generations of sinners for punishment to be inflicted, according to Mekhilta DeRashbi it is the last generation which is punished, while Mishnat R. Eliezer says that it is the first generation which is punished.

²²⁶ Cf. R"Y Bekhor Shor and Akeidat Yitzchak above.

²²⁷ Mishnat R. Eliezer brings a variety of evidence to support this position: a homiletical interpretation of "וְזֶה כָּל פְּרִי הָסִר חַטָּאתוֹ" in Yeshayahu 27:9, the fact that Achaz did not lose his share in the World to Come, an a fortiori derivation from the sending away of the mother bird, and the case of David's infant son discussed below. A similar notion is expressed by R. Yehuda in Yerushalmi SanhedrinSanhedrin 10:1About the Yerushalmi, Bavli SotahSotah 48b-49aAbout the Bavli (and Rashi), and Kohelet Rabbah4:1About Kohelet Rabbah. Mishnat R. Eliezer explains that the afflictions the parent suffers from the death of the child serve to atone, but it is unclear how he explains the apparent injustice to the child. It is possible that he would agree with the Rambam's position above that minor children are considered to be their parents' possessions.

²²⁸ Mishnat R. Eliezer links "וּפְקֻדַּת כָּל הָאָדָם יִפָּקֵד עֲלֵיהֶם" in Moshe's request of Hashem to "פֹּקֵד עֲוֹן אָבוֹת עַל בָּנִים" (which he interprets as Hashem suspending punishment because of righteous descendants). [Mishnat R. Eliezer assumes that Korach was swallowed up by the earth together with Datan and Aviram, as part of the punishment described in these verses.]

²²⁹ He might similarly explain the deaths of Chiel Beit HaEli's sons.

²³⁰ See the Introduction for a list of some of them.

²³¹ See the notes in the Introduction for a full list.

²³² See the note above on the Pesikta and R. Saadia for the possibilities of how to account for this discrepancy.