Difference between revisions of ""עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן" – An Eye for an Eye/2"

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<h1>"עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן" – An Eye for an Eye</h1>
 
<h1>"עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן" – An Eye for an Eye</h1>
  
<div><b><center>THIS TOPIC IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND, IY"H, WILL BE UPDATED SOON</center></b></div>
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<div><b><center>THIS TOPIC IS STILL BEING DEVELOPED AND UPDATED</center></b></div>
 
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<h2>Overview</h2>
 
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<point><b>"An eye for an eye"</b> – The verses which speak of an "eye for an eye" are not meant to be understood literally and are rather a metaphoric way of saying that one must compensate for the damaged body part with the equivalent monetary payment.  Rambam suggests that the present formulation is meant to teach the perpetrator that he really does deserve to be punished corporeally, measure for measure, even though that is not the actual chosen punishment.</point>
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<point><b>"Life for life" </b> – These commentators disagree if the laws regarding murder are to be understood in the same manner as the laws concerning other bodily damage:
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<ul>
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<li><b>Physical retribution</b> – Most of these commentators assert that the two halves of Shemot 21:22 refer to different types of punishments. While for inflicting other damages, the criminal is fined, for taking a life, he is indeed punished measure for measure.<fn>R. Yosef Bekhor Shor explains the rationale behind the different punishments, pointing out that if a person killed you can't compensate him for his life and thus a different punishment is needed.</fn> This is a somewhat difficult position for it assumes that part of the verse is understood literally and the rest is not, even though the same exact language is used throughout.</li>
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<li><b>Monetary compensation</b> – Rabbi in Mekhilta and Rabbi in Bavli maintain that the punishment for killing is also monetary.  This position, is thus consistent in its understanding of the entire verse.<fn>Cassuto attempts to prove this through logic. The verse speaks of a person who has killed botha women and a baby.  Since he obviously can't be punished by death twice, the verse must not be referring to capital punishment but rather to payment.</fn>  Mekhilta DeRashbi and Sifra, though, question the approach from Bemidbar 35:30-31 which explicitly prohibits taking a monetary redemption instead of a life.  Abarbanel differentiates between the cases, suggesting that the verses in Bemidbar refer to an intentional killer, while Shemot does not.<fn>He says that Shemot is an exceptional case which speaks of a person who is neither an accidental killer nor an intentional murderer.  The killer did intend to kill someone, but ended up killing another.  He, thus, is neither killed nor sent to a city of refuge but instead is given a monetary punishment.</fn></li>
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</ul>
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</point>
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<point><b>Judicial theory</b> – This approach highlights the compensatory aspect of justice. R. Yehuda Halevy emphasizes that harming the perpetrator serves no purpose for the victim so punishment should focus less on hurting the wrongdoer and more on compensating the one wronged.</point>
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<point><b>Morality</b> – </point>
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<point><b>Problematic verses:</b>
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<ul>
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<li><b>"כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ"</b> – R. Saadya Gaon and R. Chananel compare this formulation to the similar ones in Shofetim 15:11 and Ovadiah1:15-16, where it is clear that it does not refer to exact measure for measure punishment but rather to general compensation.</li>
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<li><b>"כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ"</b> – The word "בּו" in this verse is difficult for this position as it suggests that something is physically being done to the perpetrator.  R. Saadya Gaon asserts that בּוֹ can be the equivalent of "עליו" and the verse is saying that if one inflicts a blemish upon another, a fine will be imposed upon him.  The Bavli further suggests that the language of "יִנָּתֶן" hints to something that can be given from hand to hand, like money.</li>
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</ul>
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</point>
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<point><b>Supporting verses:</b>
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<ul>
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<li><b>"רַק שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא"</b> – In these verses, it is explicit that a man who wounds another man must pay a fine.  If the verses are to be consistent, then,"חַבּוּרָה תַּחַת חַבּוּרָה" (and by extension the rest of the verse) must also refer to some sort of monetary compensation.<fn>See Mekhilta DeRashbi, R. Chananel, R. Yosef Bekhor Shor, Rambam, and Ralbag who all bring this proof.  R. Chananel also questions,  if the criminal himself is to lose a limb, what is the justice in him also having to pay the medical costs of the victim?</fn></li>
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<li><b>"וּמַכֵּה בְהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה"</b> – Some of these commentators<fn> See  R. Yishmael in Mekhilta, Sifra, Bavli Bava Kama, R. Yosef Bekhor Shor, and Ralbag.</fn>  equate the laws of injury to people with the laws of injury to animals where the verse explicitly mentions monetary compensation.</li>
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<li><b>"וְלֹא תִקְחוּ כֹפֶר לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵח"</b> – Mekhilta DeRashbi and others point out that this verse appears to single out murder as the only exception to the concept of accepting a monetary ransom.  As such it appears to support the idea that in other cases of corporeal punishment, a ransom is an option.</li>
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</ul>
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</point>
 
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Version as of 13:14, 22 January 2014

"עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן" – An Eye for an Eye

Exegetical Approaches

THIS TOPIC IS STILL BEING DEVELOPED AND UPDATED

Overview

Commentators disagree over whether the literal talionic meaning of "עַיִן תַּחַת עַיִן" is also the simple meaning of the verse when viewed in context. While early sources going back to the time of the second Beit HaMikdash, such as Jubilees and Philo, render the verse literally, later Rabbinic sources almost unanimously reject this option and interpret the verse metaphorically. This leads medieval and modern exegetes to struggle valiantly to reduce the tension between the literal retributive understanding of the verse and its Rabbinic interpretation. Some, like R. Saadia, go to great lengths to demonstrate how the Midrash is really the verse's simple meaning. Others, like Ibn Ezra and the Rambam view the verse as presenting an ideal which must be converted and translated when applied to real life. Finally, the Hoil Moshe differentiates between the generation of former slaves to which the Torah was originally given and future, more civilized, generations.

Physical Punishment

Monetary Compensation

"An eye for an eye" – The verses which speak of an "eye for an eye" are not meant to be understood literally and are rather a metaphoric way of saying that one must compensate for the damaged body part with the equivalent monetary payment. Rambam suggests that the present formulation is meant to teach the perpetrator that he really does deserve to be punished corporeally, measure for measure, even though that is not the actual chosen punishment.
"Life for life" – These commentators disagree if the laws regarding murder are to be understood in the same manner as the laws concerning other bodily damage:
  • Physical retribution – Most of these commentators assert that the two halves of Shemot 21:22 refer to different types of punishments. While for inflicting other damages, the criminal is fined, for taking a life, he is indeed punished measure for measure.2 This is a somewhat difficult position for it assumes that part of the verse is understood literally and the rest is not, even though the same exact language is used throughout.
  • Monetary compensation – Rabbi in Mekhilta and Rabbi in Bavli maintain that the punishment for killing is also monetary. This position, is thus consistent in its understanding of the entire verse.3 Mekhilta DeRashbi and Sifra, though, question the approach from Bemidbar 35:30-31 which explicitly prohibits taking a monetary redemption instead of a life. Abarbanel differentiates between the cases, suggesting that the verses in Bemidbar refer to an intentional killer, while Shemot does not.4
Judicial theory – This approach highlights the compensatory aspect of justice. R. Yehuda Halevy emphasizes that harming the perpetrator serves no purpose for the victim so punishment should focus less on hurting the wrongdoer and more on compensating the one wronged.
Morality
Problematic verses:
  • "כַּאֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כֵּן יֵעָשֶׂה לּוֹ" – R. Saadya Gaon and R. Chananel compare this formulation to the similar ones in Shofetim 15:11 and Ovadiah1:15-16, where it is clear that it does not refer to exact measure for measure punishment but rather to general compensation.
  • "כֵּן יִנָּתֶן בּוֹ" – The word "בּו" in this verse is difficult for this position as it suggests that something is physically being done to the perpetrator. R. Saadya Gaon asserts that בּוֹ can be the equivalent of "עליו" and the verse is saying that if one inflicts a blemish upon another, a fine will be imposed upon him. The Bavli further suggests that the language of "יִנָּתֶן" hints to something that can be given from hand to hand, like money.
Supporting verses:
  • "רַק שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא" – In these verses, it is explicit that a man who wounds another man must pay a fine. If the verses are to be consistent, then,"חַבּוּרָה תַּחַת חַבּוּרָה" (and by extension the rest of the verse) must also refer to some sort of monetary compensation.5
  • "וּמַכֵּה בְהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה" – Some of these commentators6 equate the laws of injury to people with the laws of injury to animals where the verse explicitly mentions monetary compensation.
  • "וְלֹא תִקְחוּ כֹפֶר לְנֶפֶשׁ רֹצֵח" – Mekhilta DeRashbi and others point out that this verse appears to single out murder as the only exception to the concept of accepting a monetary ransom. As such it appears to support the idea that in other cases of corporeal punishment, a ransom is an option.

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