Difference between revisions of "Injury to Bystanders and the Meaning of "יהיה אסון"/2"
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<p>Commentators differ regarding the circumstances of the two scenarios of "וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" and "וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה".  Several commentators assume that the text focuses on the fate of the fetus.  Karaite exegetes assert that the Torah is contrasting a case in which the blow causes only a premature birth with one which results in a miscarriage, while the Septuagint distinguishes between the death of an early term fetus and a viable one.  According to both, the first case incurs a fine while the latter results in death.  Their reading leads to the conclusion that the Torah views at least a viable fetus as having full human status and that one who intends to kill one person but accidentally kills another is nonetheless culpable of murder.</p> | <p>Commentators differ regarding the circumstances of the two scenarios of "וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" and "וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה".  Several commentators assume that the text focuses on the fate of the fetus.  Karaite exegetes assert that the Torah is contrasting a case in which the blow causes only a premature birth with one which results in a miscarriage, while the Septuagint distinguishes between the death of an early term fetus and a viable one.  According to both, the first case incurs a fine while the latter results in death.  Their reading leads to the conclusion that the Torah views at least a viable fetus as having full human status and that one who intends to kill one person but accidentally kills another is nonetheless culpable of murder.</p> | ||
− | <p>In contrast, Rabbinic literature and most commentators assert that the passage revolves around the fate of the pregnant woman.  Only if she dies is there the full penalty of "a soul for a soul", while the death of her fetus results in only a fine.  Accordingly, they assert that the Torah views even a viable fetus as not having | + | <p>In contrast, Rabbinic literature and most commentators assert that the passage revolves around the fate of the pregnant woman.  Only if she dies is there the full penalty of "a soul for a soul", while the death of her fetus results in only a fine.  Accordingly, they assert that the Torah views even a viable fetus as not yet having the full status of a person.  Within this position, there is disagreement regarding the meaning of "a soul for a soul", and thus regarding the penalty for one who inadvertently kills a non-targeted bystander.  Finally, Rambam assumes that the Torah is contrasting a case in which the combatant is unharmed from his foe's blow while a third party is injured, with a case in which the combatant himself is also killed.  This reading allows him to maintain that, in general, when someone intends to kill but hits the wrong target, capital punishment is not implemented.</p></div> |
<approaches> | <approaches> |
Version as of 10:46, 7 February 2016
Injury to Bystanders and the Meaning of "יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן"
Exegetical Approaches
Overview
Commentators differ regarding the circumstances of the two scenarios of "וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" and "וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה". Several commentators assume that the text focuses on the fate of the fetus. Karaite exegetes assert that the Torah is contrasting a case in which the blow causes only a premature birth with one which results in a miscarriage, while the Septuagint distinguishes between the death of an early term fetus and a viable one. According to both, the first case incurs a fine while the latter results in death. Their reading leads to the conclusion that the Torah views at least a viable fetus as having full human status and that one who intends to kill one person but accidentally kills another is nonetheless culpable of murder.
In contrast, Rabbinic literature and most commentators assert that the passage revolves around the fate of the pregnant woman. Only if she dies is there the full penalty of "a soul for a soul", while the death of her fetus results in only a fine. Accordingly, they assert that the Torah views even a viable fetus as not yet having the full status of a person. Within this position, there is disagreement regarding the meaning of "a soul for a soul", and thus regarding the penalty for one who inadvertently kills a non-targeted bystander. Finally, Rambam assumes that the Torah is contrasting a case in which the combatant is unharmed from his foe's blow while a third party is injured, with a case in which the combatant himself is also killed. This reading allows him to maintain that, in general, when someone intends to kill but hits the wrong target, capital punishment is not implemented.
To the Fetus
The "אָסוֹן" spoken of in the verses refers to the fate of the fetus. Since the fetus (at least once it is viable) is considered an independent entity, causing its death (in the "וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה" situation) incurs the same punishment as is received for killing an adult. This approach subdivides regarding the exact circumstances of the opposite case in which there is no "אָסוֹן":
Fetus Survived
The "לֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" scenario describes an incident in which the baby is born alive, though prematurely. Since there is no fatality, only monetary compensation is necessary.
- Death – The Karaite commentator, Y. Hadassi, and Cassuto understand "אָסוֹן" to refer to death.1 The Torah teaches that if despite the preterm delivery, neither the mother nor her child die, the assailant only pays a monetary fine. However, if either the mother or child dies, he pays a "soul for a soul". According to this reading, it is not clear why the Torah then continues with a list of penalties for other bodily injuries (an "eye for an eye" etc.) which are unrelated to the case at hand.
- Injury – Alternatively, it is possible that "אָסוֹן" refers to any injury2 and the Torah is contrasting a case in which neither mother nor child suffered any physical harm from the accidental strike, with a case in which any damage, from loss of limb to death, occurred. As such, it is obvious why the Torah does not suffice with mentioning the penalty of "soul for soul", but continues with an "eye for an eye...", accounting for a variety of potential injuries.
- "אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ" –The Karaites understand the prohibition in Vayikra 22 to kill an animal "with its son" to refer to a pregnant animal; this is worse than killing a lone animal, since both mother and fetus have independent status.
- "שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ" – This position could read this verse as does R. Yishmael in Bavli Sanhedrin, to mean "one who spills the blood of man [which is] in another man [i.e. a fetus], his blood shall be spilled."
- Death – The Karaites understand "and you shall give a soul for a soul" literally, and punish this crime with death. Apparently, although there is an unintentional aspect to the act, since there is still both intent to kill and a death, the perpetrator is considered no different than any other intentional murderer.
- Monetary fine – Cassuto, in contrast, asserts that the phrase "a soul for a soul" (like the term "an eye for an eye" and those which follow) should not be taken literally and merely means that one must pay the value of the life lost.6 It is possible that he thinks that since the woman was not the target of the strike, the killer should not be viewed with the same severity as a full fledged murderer.7
Unformed Fetus
The "לֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" scenario speaks of a case in which the fetus was not yet full formed when the blow caused the miscarriage. Since it was not yet viable, the penalty is only a monetary one.
- Unintended target – The Septuagint apparently understands that the man accidentally hit the woman instead of his foe.
- Intended target – Philo, in contrast, assumes that the assailant attacked the pregnant woman intentionally.8 It is possible that according to him, the case is one in which the woman is related to one of the quarreling men and intervenes in the skirmish.9
- "אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ" – According to Philo, this verse prohibits killing and sacrificing a pregnant animal, since here, too, the Torah views "the animals which are still in the womb as equal to what has just been born". Philo explains that for this reason, too, if a pregnant woman is deserving of capital punishment, one may not execute her until after she gives birth.
- According to the Septuagint, this law teaches that one who meant to kill one person but killed another is fully culpable. The fact that the man missed his intended target does not diminish his guilt and he must give a "soul for a soul".
- According to Philo, who assumes that the pregnant woman was struck intentionally, the verse is not speaking of such a case at all, allowing for the possibility that killing an unintended target is not a capital crime.13
To the Woman
The text speaks of an "אָסוֹן" that happened to the pregnant woman. Since even a viable fetus does not have equal status to an already born person, only when an "אָסוֹן" befalls the pregnant woman and she dies, is the attacker fully culpable and deserving of the punishment of "נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" ("a soul for a soul"). If only a fetus is killed, a lesser fine is incurred.
- Capital punishment – The first opinion in Mishna Sanhedrin and the Mekhilta and the Rabbis in Bavli Sanhedrin all read "נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" literally to mean that the assailant incurs the death penalty for killing the woman, despite not having targeted her originally.14 Since the man had intent to kill, this cannot be considered inadvertent murder. Ibn Ezra supports this read by pointing out that had the men just been culpable of a fine, why distinguish the case of the fetus dying from that of the mother if the law is the same? Moreover, why would the Torah use different language for each?
- Monetary compensation – R. Shimon in Mishna Sanhedrin15 and R. Yehuda HaNasi in the Mekhilta disagree, asserting that "a soul for a soul" is metaphoric and refers only to monetary payment. They equate the language of "giving" ("וְנָתַן בִּפְלִלִים") in verse 22 which clearly refers to a fine, and the language of "giving" ("וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ") in verse 23, and suggest that one can learn from one case to another.
- Yehuda and Tamar – R. Yaakov b. Ephraim points to Yehuda's instructions to burn the pregnant Tamar as evidence that a fetus is not considered a distinct being. If it had been, Yehuda would have stayed Tamar's execution until after the birth.16
- "אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ" – These sources assume that this verse is prohibiting the killing of an animal and her already born child rather than a pregnant animal. See Ibn Ezra who asserts that the verse is not even limited to a mother, but refers to a father as well.
To the Man
The "אָסוֹן" mentioned in the passage relates to the death of one of the combatants, as there is capital punishment only in a case where the intended target is killed. Violence which causes the death of an unintended bystander is punished only by financial compensation.