Difference between revisions of "Injury to Bystanders and the Meaning of "יהיה אסון"/2"

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<p>The text speaks of an&#160;"אָסוֹן" that happened to the pregnant woman.&#160; Since even a viable fetus does not have equal status to an already born person, only when an "אָסוֹן" befalls the pregnant woman and not her fetus, is the attacker fully culpable and deserving of the punishment of "נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" ("a soul for a soul").&#160; If only a fetus is killed, a lesser fine is incurred.</p>
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<p>The text speaks of an&#160;"אָסוֹן" that happened to the pregnant woman.&#160; Since even a viable fetus does not have equal status to an already born person, only when an "אָסוֹן" befalls the pregnant woman and she dies, is the attacker fully culpable and deserving of the punishment of "נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" ("a soul for a soul").&#160; If only a fetus is killed, a lesser fine is incurred.</p>
 
<mekorot><multilink><a href="JosephusAntiquities4-8-33" data-aht="source">Josephus</a><a href="JosephusAntiquities4-8-33" data-aht="source">Antiquities 4:8:33</a><a href="Josephus" data-aht="parshan">About Josephus</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="MekhiltaDeRabbiYishmaelNezikin8" data-aht="source">Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael</a><a href="MekhiltaDeRabbiYishmaelNezikin8" data-aht="source">Nezikin 8</a><a href="Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael Shemot" data-aht="parshan">About Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael Shemot</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="BavliSanhedrin78b-79b" data-aht="source">Bavli Sanhedrin</a><a href="BavliSanhedrin78b-79b" data-aht="source">Sanhedrin 78b-79b</a><a href="Talmud Bavli" data-aht="parshan">About the Bavli</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="TargumPseudo-JonathanShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Targum Pseudo-Jonathan</a><a href="TargumPseudo-JonathanShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="Targum Pseudo-Jonathan" data-aht="parshan">About Targum Pseudo-Jonathan</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RashiShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Rashi</a><a href="RashiShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Shelomo Yitzchaki (Rashi)" data-aht="parshan">About R. Shelomo Yitzchaki</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RashbamShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Rashbam</a><a href="RashbamShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Shemuel b. Meir (Rashbam)" data-aht="parshan">About R. Shemuel b. Meir</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="IbnEzraShemotLongCommentary21-22-23" data-aht="source">Ibn Ezra</a><a href="IbnEzraShemotLongCommentary21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot Long Commentary 21:22-23</a><a href="IbnEzraShemotShortCommentary21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot Short Commentary 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Avraham ibn Ezra" data-aht="parshan">About R. Avraham ibn Ezra</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RYosefBekhorShorShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">R. Yosef Bekhor Shor</a><a href="RYosefBekhorShorShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Yosef Bekhor Shor" data-aht="parshan">About R. Yosef Bekhor Shor</a></multilink>,&#160;<multilink><a href="ShadalShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shadal</a><a href="ShadalShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Shemuel David Luzzatto (Shadal)" data-aht="parshan">About R. Shemuel David Luzzatto</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RDavidZviHoffmannShemot21-18" data-aht="source">R. David Zvi Hoffmann</a><a href="RDavidZviHoffmannShemot21-18" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:18</a><a href="R. David Zvi Hoffmann" data-aht="parshan">About R. David Zvi Hoffmann</a></multilink>, and many others</mekorot>
 
<mekorot><multilink><a href="JosephusAntiquities4-8-33" data-aht="source">Josephus</a><a href="JosephusAntiquities4-8-33" data-aht="source">Antiquities 4:8:33</a><a href="Josephus" data-aht="parshan">About Josephus</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="MekhiltaDeRabbiYishmaelNezikin8" data-aht="source">Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael</a><a href="MekhiltaDeRabbiYishmaelNezikin8" data-aht="source">Nezikin 8</a><a href="Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael Shemot" data-aht="parshan">About Mekhilta DeRabbi Yishmael Shemot</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="BavliSanhedrin78b-79b" data-aht="source">Bavli Sanhedrin</a><a href="BavliSanhedrin78b-79b" data-aht="source">Sanhedrin 78b-79b</a><a href="Talmud Bavli" data-aht="parshan">About the Bavli</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="TargumPseudo-JonathanShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Targum Pseudo-Jonathan</a><a href="TargumPseudo-JonathanShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="Targum Pseudo-Jonathan" data-aht="parshan">About Targum Pseudo-Jonathan</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RashiShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Rashi</a><a href="RashiShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Shelomo Yitzchaki (Rashi)" data-aht="parshan">About R. Shelomo Yitzchaki</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RashbamShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Rashbam</a><a href="RashbamShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Shemuel b. Meir (Rashbam)" data-aht="parshan">About R. Shemuel b. Meir</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="IbnEzraShemotLongCommentary21-22-23" data-aht="source">Ibn Ezra</a><a href="IbnEzraShemotLongCommentary21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot Long Commentary 21:22-23</a><a href="IbnEzraShemotShortCommentary21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot Short Commentary 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Avraham ibn Ezra" data-aht="parshan">About R. Avraham ibn Ezra</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RYosefBekhorShorShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">R. Yosef Bekhor Shor</a><a href="RYosefBekhorShorShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Yosef Bekhor Shor" data-aht="parshan">About R. Yosef Bekhor Shor</a></multilink>,&#160;<multilink><a href="ShadalShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shadal</a><a href="ShadalShemot21-22-23" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:22-23</a><a href="R. Shemuel David Luzzatto (Shadal)" data-aht="parshan">About R. Shemuel David Luzzatto</a></multilink>, <multilink><a href="RDavidZviHoffmannShemot21-18" data-aht="source">R. David Zvi Hoffmann</a><a href="RDavidZviHoffmannShemot21-18" data-aht="source">Shemot 21:18</a><a href="R. David Zvi Hoffmann" data-aht="parshan">About R. David Zvi Hoffmann</a></multilink>, and many others</mekorot>
 
<point><b>נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה</b> – These sources disagree whether one is liable for death in such a case:<br/>
 
<point><b>נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה</b> – These sources disagree whether one is liable for death in such a case:<br/>
 
<ul>
 
<ul>
<li><b>Capital punishment</b> – The first opinion in Mishnah Sanhedrin and the Mekhilta and Rabbanan in Bavli Sanhedrin all read "וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" literally to mean that the assailant incurs the death penalty for killing the woman, despite not having targeted her originally.<fn><sup id="reffn15" class="fnRef mceNonEditable"><a class="ahtNonEditable" href="#fn15">15</a></sup></fn>&#160; Since the man had intent to kill, this cannot be considered inadvertent murder.&#160; Ibn Ezra supports this read by pointing out that had the men just been culpable of a fine, why distinguish the case of the fetus dying from that of the mother if the law is the same?&#160; Moreover, why would the Torah use different language for each?</li>
+
<li><b>Capital punishment</b> – The first opinion in Mishnah Sanhedrin and the Mekhilta and Rabbanan in Bavli Sanhedrin all read "וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" literally to mean that the assailant incurs the death penalty for killing the woman, despite not having targeted her originally.<fn>See also Josephus, Ibn Ezra Short Commentary, R" Bekhor Shor, and Shadal.</fn>&#160; Since the man had intent to kill, this cannot be considered inadvertent murder.&#160; Ibn Ezra supports this read by pointing out that had the men just been culpable of a fine, why distinguish the case of the fetus dying from that of the mother if the law is the same?&#160; Moreover, why would the Torah use different language for each?</li>
<li><b>Monetary compensation</b> – R. Shimon in Mishnah Sanhedrin<fn><sup id="reffn16" class="fnRef mceNonEditable"><a class="ahtNonEditable" href="#fn16">16</a></sup></fn> and Rebbbe in the Mekhilta disagree, asserting that "a soul for a soul" is metaphoric and refers only to monetary payment.&#160; They equate the language of "giving" (וְנָתַן בִּפְלִלִים) in verse 22 which clearly refers to a fine, and the language of "giving" (נָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ) in verse 23, and suggest that one can learn from one case to another.</li>
+
<li><b>Monetary compensation</b> – R. Shimon in Mishnah Sanhedrin<fn>In the mishnah, R. Shimon only states that one who intended to kill a certain person but killed another is exempt. It is the gemara that adds that he must be reading the verse like Rebbe.</fn> and Rebbbe in the Mekhilta disagree, asserting that "a soul for a soul" is metaphoric and refers only to monetary payment.&#160; They equate the language of "giving" (וְנָתַן בִּפְלִלִים) in verse 22 which clearly refers to a fine, and the language of "giving" (נָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ) in verse 23, and suggest that one can learn from one case to another.</li>
 
</ul></point>
 
</ul></point>
 
<point><b>Status of unborn fetus</b> – R. Yitzchak in the Mekhilta explains that the fetus is not considered a viable human being, and thus killing it cannot be a capital crime.&#160; R. Yaakov b. Efraim adds that it and the mother are viewed as one being and not two distinct entities. As such, one might view the death of the fetus as injury to the woman, but not as murder.</point>
 
<point><b>Status of unborn fetus</b> – R. Yitzchak in the Mekhilta explains that the fetus is not considered a viable human being, and thus killing it cannot be a capital crime.&#160; R. Yaakov b. Efraim adds that it and the mother are viewed as one being and not two distinct entities. As such, one might view the death of the fetus as injury to the woman, but not as murder.</point>
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<point><b>"וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ"</b> – Rambam asserts that the blow caused a miscarriage.</point>
 
<point><b>"וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ"</b> – Rambam asserts that the blow caused a miscarriage.</point>
 
<point><b>Definition of "אָסוֹן"</b> – Rambam understands "אָסוֹן" to refer to the death of one of the assailants.</point>
 
<point><b>Definition of "אָסוֹן"</b> – Rambam understands "אָסוֹן" to refer to the death of one of the assailants.</point>
 +
<point><b>נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה</b> – According to Rambam, one who meant to kill one person but killed another is not liable. This position is likely what motivates him to read the case as one which is speaking only about the death of the intended assailant (and fetus) and not the pregnant lady. One advantage of this reading is that it enables him to maintain the literal understanding of "וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ".&#8206;<fn>Cf. the opinions above who try to reread it as referring to money.&#160; Rambam is more similar to the reading offered by Philo, who also maintains that the case is one of intentional killing ad not about hitting the wrong target.</fn></point>
 
<point><b>Status of unborn fetus</b> – Like Chazal, Rambam maintains that the unborn fetus does not have the same status as a regular person and thus his death only incurs a fine.</point>
 
<point><b>Status of unborn fetus</b> – Like Chazal, Rambam maintains that the unborn fetus does not have the same status as a regular person and thus his death only incurs a fine.</point>
<point><b>נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה</b> – According to Rambam, one who meant to kill one person but killed another is not liable. This position is likely what motivates him to read the case as one which is speaking only about the death of the intended assailant (and fetus) and not the pregnant lady. One advantage of this reading is that it enables him to maintain the literal understanding of "וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ".&#8206;<fn>Cf. the opinions above who try to reread it as referring to money.&#160; Rambam is more similar to the reading offered by Philo, who also maintains that the case is one of intentional killing ad not about hitting the wrong target.</fn></point>
 
 
<point><b>Purpose of the case</b> – According to Rambam, the Torah would seem not to be teaching anything new in this law, as it has previously been taught that the punishment for intentional killing is death. He explains that really the Torah is coming to teach the principle of "קים ליה בדרבה מיניה".&#160; If in one action someone commits two crimes, he is only punished for the more severe one.&#160; Thus, in a case where one of the combatants is killed, the assailant incurs the death penalty but does not also have to pay a fine for the death of the fetus.</point>
 
<point><b>Purpose of the case</b> – According to Rambam, the Torah would seem not to be teaching anything new in this law, as it has previously been taught that the punishment for intentional killing is death. He explains that really the Torah is coming to teach the principle of "קים ליה בדרבה מיניה".&#160; If in one action someone commits two crimes, he is only punished for the more severe one.&#160; Thus, in a case where one of the combatants is killed, the assailant incurs the death penalty but does not also have to pay a fine for the death of the fetus.</point>
 
</category>
 
</category>

Version as of 03:27, 5 February 2016

Injury to Bystanders and the Meaning of "יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן"

Exegetical Approaches

This topic has not yet undergone editorial review

Overview

Commentators differ in their understanding of the details of the case described in Shemot 21:22-23 and thus in its legal ramifications.  Several commentators assume that the text focuses on the fate of the fetus.  Karaitic exegetes assert that the Torah is contrasting a case in which the blow causes a premature birth and one which results in a miscarriage, while Philo has it distinguish between the death of a non-fully formed fetus and a viable one. The first case incurs a fine while the latter results in death.  Their reading leads to the conclusion that the Torah views at least a viable fetus as having full human status and that one who intends to kill one person but accidentally kills another is nonetheless culpable of murder.

Rabbinic literature and most commentators assert instead that the passage revolves around the fate of the pregnant woman.  Only when she dies is there the full penalty of "you shall give a soul for a soul."  However, if she is unscathed and only the fetus dies, there is a lesser fine.  Accordingly, they assert that the Torah views even a viable fetus as not having independent status.  Within this position there is disagreement regarding the meaning of "a soul for a soul " and thus regarding the penalty for one who kills an non-targeted bystander.

Finally, Rambam assumes that the Torah is contrasting a case in which the combatant is unharmed from his foe's blow while another is injured, with a case in which the combatant himself is also killed. This reading allows him to suggest that the case is not one in which there is unintentional killing at all, and that in general when someone intends to kill but hits the wrong target he is not liable for death.

To the Fetus

The "אָסוֹן" spoken of in the verses refers to the fate of the fetus.  Since the fetus (at least once it is viable) is considered an independent entity, causing its death (in the "וְאִם אָסוֹן יִהְיֶה" situation) incurs the same punishment as is received for killing an adult.  This approach subdivides regarding the exact circumstances of the opposite case in which there is no "אָסוֹן":

Fetus Survived

The "לֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" scenario describes an incident in which the baby is born alive, though prematurely.  Since there is no fatality, only monetary compensation is necessary.

The case – "וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה" – Cassuto explains that the Torah describes a brawl between two men during which one man meant to hit the other, but accidentally struck a pregnant lady instead.
"וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" – According to these sources, this phrase refers to a premature birth, not to a miscarriage.  It might be equivalent to the similar phrase in Bereshit 38, "זֶה יָצָא"‎, which refers to a live birth.
Definition of "אָסוֹן" – This position could understand the word in one of two ways:
  • Death – Y. Hadassi the Karaite and Cassuto understand "אָסוֹן" to refer to death.1 The Torah teaches that if despite the early delivery, neither the mother nor her child die, the assailant only pays a monetary fine.  However, if either mother or child dies, he pays a "soul for a soul".  According to this read, it is not clear why the Torah then continues with a list of penalties for other bodily injuries (an "eye for an eye" etc.) which are unrelated to the case at hand.
  • Injury – Alternatively, it is possible that "אָסוֹן" refers to any injury2 and the Torah is contrasting a case in which neither mother nor child suffered any physical harm from the accidental strike, with a case in which any damage, from loss of a tooth to death, occurred.  As such, it is obvious why the Torah does not suffice with mentioning the penalty of "soul for soul" but continues with an "eye for an eye", accounting for a variety of potential injuries.
Relationship between the phrases "וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" and "וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" – According to this position, these two phrases reinforce each other, with both stressing how the victims were not unduly harmed.3
Why pay a monetary fine? If both mother and fetus survive intact, it is not clear why there should be a monetary fine at all:
  • According to Aharon b. Eliyahu the karaite, the attacker is paying for the woman's suffering ("צער"), rather than for bodily damage.4 
  • Cassuto, in contrast, suggests that though no one died, there might have been other damage to the victims which needs compensation.5
Status of unborn fetus – This position views the fetus as having its own independent status, equivalent to any other person, as Y. Hadassi the Karaite writes, "אפילו העובר אשר במעיים כי גם הוא אדם".  As such, causing his death constitutes murder.
Biblical parallels
  • "אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ"  –The Karaites understand the prohibition in Vayikra 22 to kill an animal "with its son" to refer to a pregnant animal; this is worse than killing a lone animal since both mother and fetus have independent status.
  • "שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ" – This position could read this verse as does R. Yishmael in Bavli Sanhedrin, to mean "one who spills the blood of man [which is] in another man [i.e.a fetus], his blood shall be spilled."
נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה – These sources disagree regarding the penalty of one who meant to kill one person but killed another:
  • Death – The Karaites understand "and you shall give a soul for a soul" literally and punish this crime with death.  Apparently, although there is an unintentional aspect to the act, since there is still both intent to kill and a death, the perpetrator is considered no different than any other intentional murderer.
  • Monetary fine – Cassuto, in contrast, asserts that the phrase "a soul for a soul" (like the term "an eye for an eye" and those that follow) should not be taken literally and merely means that one must pay the value of the life lost.6  It is possible that he thinks that since the woman was not the target of the strike, the killer should not be viewed with the same severity as a full murderer.7 

Unformed Fetus

The "לֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" scenario speaks of a case in which the fetus was not yet full formed when the blow caused the miscarriage.  Since it was not yet viable, the penalty is only a monetary one.

The case – "וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה"
  • Unintended target – The Septuagint apparently understands that the man accidentally hit the woman instead of his foe.
  • Intended target – Philo, in contrast, assumes that the assailant attacked the pregnant woman intentionally.8   It is possible that according to him, the case is one in which the woman is related to one of the quarreling men and actively involved in the skirmish.9
"וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" – These sources understand this to mean that the woman miscarried her infant.
Definition of "אָסוֹן" – It is unclear how these sources would translate the word as they only give a general interpretation of the verse.10  Since they maintain that according to both scenarios the infant died, they would have to ascribe a different definition to the word "אָסוֹן".  According to them it could mean tragedy,11 and the verse would be saying that when the fetus is as of yet unformed, and thus there is no tragedy, there is only a fine, but when it is fully formed and there is a tragedy, then the act is considered a capital crime.
Relationship between the phrases "וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" and "וְלֹא/ יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" – These sources read the term "וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" as a heading which then subdivides into two potential scenarios regarding the stillbirth: either the fetus was not yet formed, or it was fully formed.
Status of unborn fetus – These sources distinguish the status of a fully fashioned fetus from one which is still unformed.  Killing the former is a capital offense, as Philo explains, "for such a creature as that is a man". Once the baby is formed it has full human status.12
Biblical parallels
  • "אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ" – According to Philo, this verse prohibits killing and sacrificing a pregnant animal, since here, too, the Torah views "the animals which are still in the womb as equal to what has just been born".  Philo explains that for this reason, too, if a pregnant woman is deserving of capital punishment, one may not execute her until after she gives birth.
נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה
  • According to the Septuagint, this law teaches that one who meant to kill one person but killed another is fully culpable. The fact that the woman missed his intended target does not diminish his guilt and he must give a "soul for a soul".
  • According to Philo who assumes that the pregnant woman was struck intentionally, the verse is not speaking of such a case at all, allowing for the possibility that killing an unintended target is not a capital crime.13

To the Woman

The text speaks of an "אָסוֹן" that happened to the pregnant woman.  Since even a viable fetus does not have equal status to an already born person, only when an "אָסוֹן" befalls the pregnant woman and she dies, is the attacker fully culpable and deserving of the punishment of "נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" ("a soul for a soul").  If only a fetus is killed, a lesser fine is incurred.

נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה – These sources disagree whether one is liable for death in such a case:
  • Capital punishment – The first opinion in Mishnah Sanhedrin and the Mekhilta and Rabbanan in Bavli Sanhedrin all read "וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ" literally to mean that the assailant incurs the death penalty for killing the woman, despite not having targeted her originally.14  Since the man had intent to kill, this cannot be considered inadvertent murder.  Ibn Ezra supports this read by pointing out that had the men just been culpable of a fine, why distinguish the case of the fetus dying from that of the mother if the law is the same?  Moreover, why would the Torah use different language for each?
  • Monetary compensation – R. Shimon in Mishnah Sanhedrin15 and Rebbbe in the Mekhilta disagree, asserting that "a soul for a soul" is metaphoric and refers only to monetary payment.  They equate the language of "giving" (וְנָתַן בִּפְלִלִים) in verse 22 which clearly refers to a fine, and the language of "giving" (נָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ) in verse 23, and suggest that one can learn from one case to another.
Status of unborn fetus – R. Yitzchak in the Mekhilta explains that the fetus is not considered a viable human being, and thus killing it cannot be a capital crime.  R. Yaakov b. Efraim adds that it and the mother are viewed as one being and not two distinct entities. As such, one might view the death of the fetus as injury to the woman, but not as murder.
Biblical cases
  • Yehuda and Tamar – R. Yaakov b. Efraim points to Yehuda's decision to burn the pregnant Tamar as evidence that a fetus is not considered a distinct being.  If it had been, Yehuda would not have asked that Tamar be executed until after the child's birth.16
  • "אֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ" – These sources assume that this verse is prohibiting the killing of a parent animal and her child rather than a pregnant animal.  See Ibn Ezra who asserts that the verse is not even limited to a mother, but refers to a father as well.
The case – "וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה" – According to this position the Torah speaks of a fight between two men during which one attempts to strike the other but unintentionally hits a pregnant bystander instead.
"וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" – These sources maintain that the phrase connotes a miscarriage.
Definition of "אָסוֹן" – These commentators all assert that "אָסוֹן" refers to death.  The Mekhilta writes that even though there is no solid proof for this definition, there is a hint to it from Yaakov's concerns regarding Binyamin, "פֶּן יִקְרָאֶנּוּ אָסוֹן", which it understands to mean "lest he die".
Relationship between the phrases "וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" and "וְלֹא יִהְיֶה אָסוֹן" – This position reads the two phrases as standing in contrast to one another.  Though the fetus was aborted and died, the mother did not.

To the Man

The "אָסוֹן" mentioned in the passage relates to the death of one of the combatants, as there is capital punishment only in a case where the intended target is killed.  Violence which causes the death of an unintended bystander is punished only by monetary compensation.

The case – "וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים וְנָגְפוּ אִשָּׁה הָרָה" – According to the Rambam, the assailant hit his combatant, who in turn collided with a pregnant woman. In contrast to most of the other commentators, he does not view this as a case in which an innocent bystander is hit instead of the intended target, but that in which both are hit with the same blow.
"וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ" – Rambam asserts that the blow caused a miscarriage.
Definition of "אָסוֹן" – Rambam understands "אָסוֹן" to refer to the death of one of the assailants.
נתכוון להרוג את זה והרג את זה – According to Rambam, one who meant to kill one person but killed another is not liable. This position is likely what motivates him to read the case as one which is speaking only about the death of the intended assailant (and fetus) and not the pregnant lady. One advantage of this reading is that it enables him to maintain the literal understanding of "וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ".‎18
Status of unborn fetus – Like Chazal, Rambam maintains that the unborn fetus does not have the same status as a regular person and thus his death only incurs a fine.
Purpose of the case – According to Rambam, the Torah would seem not to be teaching anything new in this law, as it has previously been taught that the punishment for intentional killing is death. He explains that really the Torah is coming to teach the principle of "קים ליה בדרבה מיניה".  If in one action someone commits two crimes, he is only punished for the more severe one.  Thus, in a case where one of the combatants is killed, the assailant incurs the death penalty but does not also have to pay a fine for the death of the fetus.