Difference between revisions of "Philosophy:Free Will/2"
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
(Original Author: Dr. Shira Weiss) |
|||
| Line 3: | Line 3: | ||
<page type="Approaches"> | <page type="Approaches"> | ||
<h1>Free Will<fn>This topic has been contributed by Dr. Shira Weiss.</fn></h1> | <h1>Free Will<fn>This topic has been contributed by Dr. Shira Weiss.</fn></h1> | ||
| − | |||
<div class="overview"> | <div class="overview"> | ||
<h2>Overview</h2> | <h2>Overview</h2> | ||
<p></p> | <p></p> | ||
</div> | </div> | ||
| − | |||
<approaches> | <approaches> | ||
| − | |||
<category name="">Determinism | <category name="">Determinism | ||
<mekorot><multilink><aht source="OhrHashem1">R. Chasdai Crescas</aht><aht source="OhrHashem1">Ohr Hashem - Need Source</aht><aht parshan="R. Chasdai Crescas" /></multilink></mekorot> | <mekorot><multilink><aht source="OhrHashem1">R. Chasdai Crescas</aht><aht source="OhrHashem1">Ohr Hashem - Need Source</aht><aht parshan="R. Chasdai Crescas" /></multilink></mekorot> | ||
| Line 18: | Line 15: | ||
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
</category> | </category> | ||
| − | |||
<category name="">Libertarianism | <category name="">Libertarianism | ||
<mekorot><multilink><aht source="RalbagShemot1M1">Ralbag</aht><aht source="RalbagShemot1M1">Need Source</aht><aht parshan="Ralbag">About R. Levi b. Gershon</aht></multilink></mekorot> | <mekorot><multilink><aht source="RalbagShemot1M1">Ralbag</aht><aht source="RalbagShemot1M1">Need Source</aht><aht parshan="Ralbag">About R. Levi b. Gershon</aht></multilink></mekorot> | ||
| Line 26: | Line 22: | ||
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
</category> | </category> | ||
| − | |||
<category name="">Compatibilism | <category name="">Compatibilism | ||
<mekorot><multilink><aht source="RambamMoreh3-46">Rambam</aht><aht source="RambamMoreh3-46">Moreh Nevukhim - Need Source</aht><aht parshan="Rambam">About R. Moshe Maimonides</aht></multilink></mekorot> | <mekorot><multilink><aht source="RambamMoreh3-46">Rambam</aht><aht source="RambamMoreh3-46">Moreh Nevukhim - Need Source</aht><aht parshan="Rambam">About R. Moshe Maimonides</aht></multilink></mekorot> | ||
| Line 34: | Line 29: | ||
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
</category> | </category> | ||
| − | |||
<!-- | <!-- | ||
<category name=""> | <category name=""> | ||
| Line 45: | Line 39: | ||
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
</opinion> | </opinion> | ||
| − | |||
<opinion name=""> | <opinion name=""> | ||
<mekorot></mekorot> | <mekorot></mekorot> | ||
| Line 55: | Line 48: | ||
</opinion> | </opinion> | ||
</category> | </category> | ||
| − | |||
<category name=""> | <category name=""> | ||
<opinion name=""> – <span class="unbold">There are two variations of this possibility:</span> | <opinion name=""> – <span class="unbold">There are two variations of this possibility:</span> | ||
| Line 66: | Line 58: | ||
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
</subopinion> | </subopinion> | ||
| − | |||
<subopinion name=""> | <subopinion name=""> | ||
<mekorot></mekorot> | <mekorot></mekorot> | ||
| Line 78: | Line 69: | ||
</category> | </category> | ||
--> | --> | ||
| − | |||
</approaches> | </approaches> | ||
| − | |||
<!-- | <!-- | ||
<point><b></b> – | <point><b></b> – | ||
| Line 90: | Line 79: | ||
</point> | </point> | ||
--> | --> | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
</page> | </page> | ||
</aht-xml> | </aht-xml> | ||
Version as of 23:08, 25 June 2014
Free Will1
Exegetical Approaches
Overview
Determinism
Sources:R. Chasdai Crescas
Human actions are determined, and not free.
Divine omniscience – Crescas maintains divine omniscience (over universals and particulars) and argues that while theoretically there is free choice, in reality all actions are caused. In other words, while it is theoretically possible for one to choose to do anything, all sorts of influences cause an individual to choose one option over others.
Moral responsibility – Crescas is considered a soft determinist since he maintains moral responsibility by distinguishing between causation and compulsion. Rewards/punishments are earned by those who act as a result of causal necessity, not compulsion. One whose acts are caused takes joy in his actions and is rewarded/punished, while one who is compelled does not take joy since it is done against his will.
–
Libertarianism
Sources:Ralbag
Human actions are free, and not determined.
Divine omniscience – Gersonides asserts human free will. He maintains divine omniscience, but defines it as that which is knowable to God (only that which is universal/necessary/unchanging). Thus, God does not know human choices because they are constantly changing.
Moral responsibility – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.
–
Compatibilism
Sources:Rambam
Human actions are determined and also free.
Divine omniscience – Rambam maintains human free will and Divine omniscience over universals and particulars. He reconciles this seeming contradiction by arguing that man is unable to understand the nature of God's knowledge (God's knowledge is a priori - His knowledge is perfect and unchanging from the beginning, nothing is added to His knowledge, events transpire in accordance with His antecedent knowledge. Whereas human knowledge is a posteriori - man learns through observation after the event and is constantly adding to his knowledge) and therefore, cannot comprehend how God can have perfect foreknowledge of how man will act, yet man still acts freely.
Moral responsibility – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.
–
