Difference between revisions of "Philosophy:Free Will/2"
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(Original Author: Dr. Shira Weiss) |
(Original Author: Dr. Shira Weiss) |
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<approaches> | <approaches> | ||
<category name="">Determinism | <category name="">Determinism | ||
| − | <mekorot><multilink><aht | + | <mekorot><multilink><a href="OhrHashem1" data-aht="source">R. Chasdai Crescas</a><a href="OhrHashem1" data-aht="source">Ohr Hashem - Need Source</a><a href="R. Chasdai Crescas" data-aht="parshan">About R. Chasdai Crescas</a></multilink></mekorot> |
<p>Human actions are determined, and not free.</p> | <p>Human actions are determined, and not free.</p> | ||
| − | <point><b>Divine omniscience</b> – Crescas maintains divine omniscience (over universals and particulars) and argues that while theoretically there is free choice, in reality all actions are caused. | + | <point><b>Divine omniscience</b> – Crescas maintains divine omniscience (over universals and particulars) and argues that while theoretically there is free choice, in reality all actions are caused. In other words, while it is theoretically possible for one to choose to do anything, all sorts of influences cause an individual to choose one option over others.</point> |
| − | <point><b>Moral responsibility</b> – Crescas is considered a soft determinist since he maintains moral responsibility by distinguishing between causation and compulsion. | + | <point><b>Moral responsibility</b> – Crescas is considered a soft determinist since he maintains moral responsibility by distinguishing between causation and compulsion. Rewards/punishments are earned by those who act as a result of causal necessity, not compulsion. One whose acts are caused takes joy in his actions and is rewarded/punished, while one who is compelled does not take joy since it is done against his will.</point> |
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
</category> | </category> | ||
<category name="">Libertarianism | <category name="">Libertarianism | ||
| − | <mekorot><multilink><aht | + | <mekorot><multilink><a href="RalbagShemot1M1" data-aht="source">Ralbag</a><a href="RalbagShemot1M1" data-aht="source">Need Source</a><a href="Ralbag" data-aht="parshan">About R. Levi b. Gershon</a></multilink></mekorot> |
<p>Human actions are free, and not determined.</p> | <p>Human actions are free, and not determined.</p> | ||
| − | <point><b>Divine omniscience</b> – Gersonides asserts human free will. | + | <point><b>Divine omniscience</b> – Gersonides asserts human free will. He maintains divine omniscience, but defines it as that which is knowable to God (only that which is universal/necessary/unchanging). Thus, God does not know human choices because they are constantly changing.</point> |
<point><b>Moral responsibility</b> – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.</point> | <point><b>Moral responsibility</b> – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.</point> | ||
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
</category> | </category> | ||
<category name="">Compatibilism | <category name="">Compatibilism | ||
| − | <mekorot><multilink>< | + | <mekorot><multilink><a href="RambamMoreh3-46" data-aht="source">Rambam</a><a href="RambamMoreh3-46" data-aht="source">Moreh Nevukhim - Need Source</a><a href="Rambam" data-aht="parshan">About R. Moshe Maimonides</a></multilink></mekorot> |
<p>Human actions are determined and also free.</p> | <p>Human actions are determined and also free.</p> | ||
| − | <point><b>Divine omniscience</b> – Rambam maintains human free will and Divine omniscience over universals and particulars. | + | <point><b>Divine omniscience</b> – Rambam maintains human free will and Divine omniscience over universals and particulars. He reconciles this seeming contradiction by arguing that man is unable to understand the nature of God's knowledge (God's knowledge is a priori - His knowledge is perfect and unchanging from the beginning, nothing is added to His knowledge, events transpire in accordance with His antecedent knowledge. Whereas human knowledge is a posteriori - man learns through observation after the event and is constantly adding to his knowledge) and therefore, cannot comprehend how God can have perfect foreknowledge of how man will act, yet man still acts freely.</point> |
<point><b>Moral responsibility</b> – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.</point> | <point><b>Moral responsibility</b> – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.</point> | ||
<point><b></b> – </point> | <point><b></b> – </point> | ||
Version as of 18:47, 11 August 2014
Free Will1
Exegetical Approaches
Overview
Determinism
Sources:R. Chasdai Crescas
Human actions are determined, and not free.
Divine omniscience – Crescas maintains divine omniscience (over universals and particulars) and argues that while theoretically there is free choice, in reality all actions are caused. In other words, while it is theoretically possible for one to choose to do anything, all sorts of influences cause an individual to choose one option over others.
Moral responsibility – Crescas is considered a soft determinist since he maintains moral responsibility by distinguishing between causation and compulsion. Rewards/punishments are earned by those who act as a result of causal necessity, not compulsion. One whose acts are caused takes joy in his actions and is rewarded/punished, while one who is compelled does not take joy since it is done against his will.
–
Libertarianism
Sources:Ralbag
Human actions are free, and not determined.
Divine omniscience – Gersonides asserts human free will. He maintains divine omniscience, but defines it as that which is knowable to God (only that which is universal/necessary/unchanging). Thus, God does not know human choices because they are constantly changing.
Moral responsibility – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.
–
Compatibilism
Sources:Rambam
Human actions are determined and also free.
Divine omniscience – Rambam maintains human free will and Divine omniscience over universals and particulars. He reconciles this seeming contradiction by arguing that man is unable to understand the nature of God's knowledge (God's knowledge is a priori - His knowledge is perfect and unchanging from the beginning, nothing is added to His knowledge, events transpire in accordance with His antecedent knowledge. Whereas human knowledge is a posteriori - man learns through observation after the event and is constantly adding to his knowledge) and therefore, cannot comprehend how God can have perfect foreknowledge of how man will act, yet man still acts freely.
Moral responsibility – Man is morally responsible because he acts freely.
–
