Difference between revisions of "Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak/1/en"

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<h1>Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak</h1>
 
<h1>Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak</h1>
 
<div><b><center><span class="highlighted-notice">This topic has not yet undergone editorial review</span></center></b></div>
 
<div><b><center><span class="highlighted-notice">This topic has not yet undergone editorial review</span></center></b></div>
<h2>Changing Questions</h2>
 
<p>Bereshit 22, the story of <i>Akeidat Yitzchak</i>, is one of the most well known narratives in Torah, but also one of the most troubling.&#160; The chapter tells of Hashem's command to sacrifice Yitzchak, Avraham's readiness to comply, and climaxes with the angel's prevention of the deed. Throughout the ages, commentators have grappled with various theological issues raised by the verses, raising questions about Hashem's omniscience, the immutability of God's word, and the apparent unethical nature of the command. Interestingly, the issues which are burning questions for one generation of commentators do not necessarily bother another.&#160; Cultural, historical, and polemical factors all influence not only how we understand a story but even the very questions we assume lie at its basis.</p>
 
 
 
<h2>A Test for Whom?</h2>
 
<h2>A Test for Whom?</h2>
Perhaps the most basic question raised by the <i>akeidah</i> relates to the purpose of the event; what was the goal of the whole experience?&#160; The chapter defines the episode as a test (וְהָאֱלֹהִים נִסָּה אֶת אַבְרָהָם), and the declaration at the end of the trial, "<b>Now</b> I know that you are God-fearing" would seem to support such a reading.&#160; Yet, given an omniscient God, is it really possible to say that Avraham needed to undergo the binding of Yitzchak in order for Hashem to recognize the extent of his awe? Moreover, had Avraham not already proven his dedication and loyalty, regardless of this new test?&#160; What prompted the need for a further demonstration right now? If the test was not for Hashem, though, for whom was it meant?&#160; What lessons were Avraham, Yitzchak, or any outsiders supposed to gain from it?
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<p>Bereshit 22, the story of Akeidat Yitzchak, is one of the most well known narratives in Torah, but also one of the most troubling. The chapter tells of Hashem's command to sacrifice Yitzchak, Avraham's readiness to comply, and climaxes with the angel's prevention of the deed.&#160; What, though, was the goal of the whole experience?&#160;</p>
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<p>The chapter defines the episode as a test (וְהָאֱלֹהִים נִסָּה אֶת אַבְרָהָם), and the declaration at the end of the trial, "<b>Now</b> I know that you are God-fearing" would seem to support such a reading.&#160; Yet, given an omniscient God, is it really possible to say that Avraham needed to undergo the binding of Yitzchak in order for Hashem to recognize the extent of his awe? Moreover, had Avraham not already proven his dedication and loyalty, regardless of this new test?&#160; What prompted the need for a further demonstration right now? If the test was not for Hashem, though, for whom was it meant?&#160; What lessons were Avraham, Yitzchak, or any outsiders supposed to gain from it?</p>
  
 
<h2>Can Hashem Go Back on His Word?</h2>
 
<h2>Can Hashem Go Back on His Word?</h2>
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<h2>What about "לא תרצח"?</h2>
 
<h2>What about "לא תרצח"?</h2>
A final question relates to the (im)morality of the command, an issue which is hinted to already in Midrashic literature,<fn>See&#160;<multilink><a href="BereshitRabbah56-4" data-aht="source">Bereshit Rabbah</a><a href="BereshitRabbah56-4" data-aht="source">56:4</a><a href="Bereshit Rabbah" data-aht="parshan">About Bereshit Rabbah</a></multilink> (and in more detail in <a href="Tanchuma4" data-aht="source">Tanchuma 4</a>), which presents the Satan questioning Avraham, "אָמַר לוֹ לְמָחָר אוֹמֵר לְךָ שׁוֹפֵךְ דָּם אַתְּ חַיָּב שֶׁשָּׁפַכְתָּ דָּמוֹ שֶׁל בִּנְךָ".</fn> but only began to take center stage in discussions of the story in the last couple of centuries.<fn>Many medieval commentaries, in contrast, appear to ignore the question completely.&#160; It is possible that the difference in outlook stems from different attitudes towards martyrdom. In medieval times, many were forced to martyr either themselves or their children; as such they were not bothered by how Avraham could comply with Hashem's request, and in</fn>&#160; How can a just and ethical God, who later in the Torah Himself prohibits murder and child sacrifice, demand of someone that they kill their child? Furthermore, why did Avraham comply without questioning the directive, as he had done when troubled by Hashem's decision regarding Sedom?&#160; Or, in more general terms, when human conceptions of morality, and especially when the Torah's own ethical system, conflict with a Divine command, what is one to do?
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A final question relates to the morality of the command, an issue which is hinted to already in Midrashic literature,<fn>See&#160;<multilink><a href="BereshitRabbah56-4" data-aht="source">Bereshit Rabbah</a><a href="BereshitRabbah56-4" data-aht="source">56:4</a><a href="Bereshit Rabbah" data-aht="parshan">About Bereshit Rabbah</a></multilink> (and in more detail in <a href="Tanchuma4" data-aht="source">Tanchuma 4</a>), which presents the Satan questioning Avraham, "אָמַר לוֹ לְמָחָר אוֹמֵר לְךָ שׁוֹפֵךְ דָּם אַתְּ חַיָּב שֶׁשָּׁפַכְתָּ דָּמוֹ שֶׁל בִּנְךָ".</fn> but only began to take center stage in discussions of the story in the last couple of centuries.<fn>Many medieval commentaries, in contrast, appear to ignore the question completely.&#160; It is possible that the difference in outlook stems from different attitudes towards martyrdom. In medieval times, many were forced to martyr either themselves or their children; as such they were not bothered by how Avraham could comply with Hashem's request, and definitely did not view the directive as resembling murder.&#160; In fact, they even questioned why they were not perceived as more God-fearing than Avraham, for after all Avraham in the end only brought Yitzchak as an offering, while they actually sacrificed their loved ones. <br/>A second possible explanation for the difference in focus might relate to varying conceptions of morality in medieval and contemporary times.&#160; The concept of "individual morality" is a fairly modern one.&#160; In medieval times, it was probably much more accepted that there was no independent ethic outside of religion, and thus more obvious that whatever God declared must be just. This explanation, however, would not account for why many medievals do not address the question of how Hashem can command something which He himself later declares unethical.</fn>&#160; How can a just and ethical God, who later in the Torah Himself prohibits murder and child sacrifice, demand of someone that they kill their child? Furthermore, why did Avraham comply without questioning the directive, as he had done when troubled by Hashem's decision regarding Sedom?&#160; In more general terms the story makes one ask: when human conceptions of morality, and especially when the Torah's own ethical system conflict with a Divine command, what is one to do?
  
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<h2>Additional Questions</h2>
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<ul>
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<li>וַיְהִי אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה</li>
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</ul>
  
 
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Version as of 13:16, 17 September 2017

Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak

Introduction

This topic has not yet undergone editorial review

A Test for Whom?

Bereshit 22, the story of Akeidat Yitzchak, is one of the most well known narratives in Torah, but also one of the most troubling. The chapter tells of Hashem's command to sacrifice Yitzchak, Avraham's readiness to comply, and climaxes with the angel's prevention of the deed.  What, though, was the goal of the whole experience? 

The chapter defines the episode as a test (וְהָאֱלֹהִים נִסָּה אֶת אַבְרָהָם), and the declaration at the end of the trial, "Now I know that you are God-fearing" would seem to support such a reading.  Yet, given an omniscient God, is it really possible to say that Avraham needed to undergo the binding of Yitzchak in order for Hashem to recognize the extent of his awe? Moreover, had Avraham not already proven his dedication and loyalty, regardless of this new test?  What prompted the need for a further demonstration right now? If the test was not for Hashem, though, for whom was it meant?  What lessons were Avraham, Yitzchak, or any outsiders supposed to gain from it?

Can Hashem Go Back on His Word?

Many medieval commentators are troubled by a second theological question: How can Hashem command Avraham to do one thing, and a few days later, direct him to do the exact opposite?1  Is it possible for Hashem to retract a command?  Does not doing so pave the way for people to dismiss all Divine directives as being fickle, or to suggest, as Moslems did, that the Torah is not eternally binding and that Hashem can replace it with a new one?

What about "לא תרצח"?

A final question relates to the morality of the command, an issue which is hinted to already in Midrashic literature,2 but only began to take center stage in discussions of the story in the last couple of centuries.3  How can a just and ethical God, who later in the Torah Himself prohibits murder and child sacrifice, demand of someone that they kill their child? Furthermore, why did Avraham comply without questioning the directive, as he had done when troubled by Hashem's decision regarding Sedom?  In more general terms the story makes one ask: when human conceptions of morality, and especially when the Torah's own ethical system conflict with a Divine command, what is one to do?

Additional Questions

  • וַיְהִי אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה