Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak/1/en
Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak
Introduction
Changing Questions
Bereshit 22, the story of Akeidat Yitzchak, is one of the most well known narratives in Torah, but also one of the most troubling. The chapter tells of Hashem's command to sacrifice Yitzchak, Avraham's readiness to comply, and climaxes with the angel's prevention of the deed. Throughout the ages, commentators have grappled with various theological issues raised by the verses, raising questions about Hashem's omniscience, the immutability of God's word, and the apparent unethical nature of the command. Interestingly, the issues which are burning questions for one generation of commentators do not necessarily bother another. Cultural, historical, and polemical factors all influence not only how we understand a story but even the very questions we assume lie at its basis.
A Test for Whom?
Perhaps the most basic question raised by the akeidah relates to the purpose of the event; what was the goal of the whole experience? The chapter defines the episode as a test (וְהָאֱלֹהִים נִסָּה אֶת אַבְרָהָם), and the declaration at the end of the trial, "Now I know that you are God-fearing" would seem to support such a reading. Yet, given an omniscient God, is it really possible to say that Avraham needed to undergo the binding of Yitzchak in order for Hashem to recognize the extent of his awe? Moreover, had Avraham not already proven his dedication and loyalty, regardless of this new test? What prompted the need for a further demonstration right now? If the test was not for Hashem, though, for whom was it meant? What lessons were Avraham, Yitzchak, or any outsiders supposed to gain from it?
Can Hashem Go Back on His Word?
Many medieval commentators are troubled by a second theological question: How can Hashem command Avraham to do one thing, and a few days later, direct him to do the exact opposite?1 Is it possible for Hashem to retract a command? Does not doing so pave the way for people to dismiss all Divine directives as being fickle, or to suggest, as Moslems did, that the Torah is not eternally binding and that Hashem can replace it with a new one?
What about "לא תרצח"?
A final question relates to the (im)morality of the command, an issue which is hinted to already in Midrashic literature,2 but only began to take center stage in discussions of the story in the last couple of centuries.3 How can a just and ethical God, who later in the Torah Himself prohibits murder and child sacrifice, demand of someone that they kill their child? Furthermore, why did Avraham comply without questioning the directive, as he had done when troubled by Hashem's decision regarding Sedom? Or, in more general terms, when human conceptions of morality, and especially when the Torah's own ethical system, conflict with a Divine command, what is one to do?
