Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak/2/en

Purpose of Akeidat Yitzchak

Exegetical Approaches

Overview

In confronting the various issues raised by the Akeidah, many commentators reexamine assumptions relating to some of our core theological beliefs and perceptions.  Thus, Ralbag challenges the commonly held notions that Hashem must be completely omniscient and that Divine assurances are not retractable.  Taking the text at face value, he asserts that, until the Akeidah, Hashem was truly unsure of the extent of Avraham's devotion, and that it was still uncertain that the chosen line would go through Yitzchak.

Others question our perspectives on the lives of the Patriarchs.  Thus, Rashbam rejects the view that the Akeidah marked the pinnacle of Avraham's career, asserting instead that it was actually a punishment.  Shadal's approach similarly causes us to reappraise whether the value system of the Avot always matched that which was later set forth in the Torah or only developed over time.  According to him, the entire world, Avraham included, originally viewed child sacrifice as the highest form of devotion to God.  It was only through the story of the Akeidah itself that Hashem taught the monotheistic world that the practice was, in fact, immoral and repugnant.

Finally, R. D"Z Hoffmann and others reject the idea that there is an human moral ethic independent of Hashem's will.  In their eyes, the Akeidah taught that one must be willing to sacrifice one's entire being to God, including one's perceived values of right and wrong, in the recognition that it is only Hashem's word which defines and determines morality.

For Hashem: Evaluating Avraham

Hashem needed to test Avraham in order to evaluate the extent of his faith as, until the Akeidah, Hashem did not know the extent of Avraham's devotion to Him.

Sources:RalbagBereshit Beur HaMilot 22:1Bereshit Beur HaParashah 22:1-5, 7-8, 10-13Bereshit Toalot 22About R. Levi b. Gershom

Hashem's knowledge – Ralbag rejects the standard assumption that Hashem had foreknowledge of Avraham's course of action.  According to Ralbag, while Hashem knows all the choices available to a person and what they are likely to do, He has no advance knowledge of which path the individual will ultimately choose to follow, as such prescience would preclude man's exercise of free will.¹ As such, Hashem truly did not know whether or not Avraham would acquiesce to sacrifice Yitzchak.²

Meaning of "נִסָּה" – Ralbag understands the word to refer to a literal "test".  Hashem was examining Avraham in order to gauge his level of reverence and obedience.³

"עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה" – Ralbag is able to explain also this verse according to its simple sense; only "now" ("עַתָּה"), after the trial, did Hashem know with certainty how God-fearing Avraham really was.⁴

Retracted promises and recycled rewards? According to Ralbag, all Divine promises are implicitly dependent on the continued righteous behavior of the recipient.⁵  Thus, Avraham and his descendants needed to continue to fulfill Hashem's expectations in order to merit His continued blessings.  In light of this, Ralbag explains that the promise of "כִּי בְיִצְחָק יִקָּרֵא לְךָ זָרַע" was not a lifetime guarantee, and would not have necessarily been a contradiction to the command to sacrifice Yitzchak.  Similarly, the blessings following the Akeidah did not necessarily chart any new ground, but were merely a reaffirmation of Avraham and Yitzchak's continued merits.

Ambiguity of "וְהַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה" – Ralbag asserts that Hashem intentionally worded His directive ambiguously⁶ so that it could be understood as either to sacrifice Yitzchak as an Olah offering, or, alternatively, to bring Yitzchak along in order to sacrifice an Olah.⁷ Since the second, less obvious, understanding is one which a person would consider only if they found the first and simpler reading to be objectionable, Hashem was testing to see if Avraham was so willing to abide by Hashem's word that he would not even contemplate following the alternative understanding.⁸

Avraham's emotions – Ralbag presents an Avraham whose love for Hashem and desire to obey Him was so strong that all else paled in comparison, enabling him to be at ease even with sacrificing a beloved son.⁹  Avraham's eagerness to comply with Hashem's words is demonstrated by his rising early to do God's bidding and his refraining from questioning the Divine command.¹⁰ Ralbag further claims that the fact that Avraham achieved prophecy while awake proves that, even in the moment of the actual slaughter, he was neither anxious nor sad about the act.¹¹

"אֱלֹהִים יִרְאֶה לּוֹ הַשֶּׂה לְעֹלָה בְּנִי" – Ralbag maintains that these words of Avraham constitute a prayer¹² that Hashem's command to him would ultimately turn out to mean¹³ that a sheep (and not Yitzchak) would become the burnt offering.  Ralbag, thus suggests that Avraham recognized that there was a second way to comprehend Hashem's words, but that, nonetheless, he was unwilling to act upon it without a direct clarification by Hashem.

How can Hashem command murder? According to Ralbag, Hashem had never intended for Avraham to actually sacrifice Yitzchak,¹⁴ which is why He worded the command in a way which allowed for the second (and ultimately correct) possibility that Yitzchak was brought to the mountain only to witness an Olah offering.  As such, Hashem had never commanded an immoral act.  Ralbag's reconstruction is nonetheless difficult, since if Hashem had intended that Avraham understand that he was to sacrifice his child (as Ralbag maintains), then the morality of the command and Avraham's ready agreement is still in question.

For Avraham

Avraham, rather than Hashem, was supposed to learn from the experience. This position subdivides regarding whether the test was beneficial or punitive in nature:

Punishment

The experience was meant to punish Avraham for having made a covenant with the Philistines.

Sources:RashbamBereshit 22:1Bereshit 22:12About R. Shemuel b. Meir

"וַיְהִי אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה" – Rashbam maintains that these words serve to connect our unit with the immediately preceding one, and are one of the Torah's ways of linking two stories.¹⁵  The opening, thus, suggests that Avraham's making of a treaty with Avimelekh is what prompted the command to sacrifice Yitzchak.¹⁶ Hashem was upset that Avraham made peace with the Philistines since their land was included in His promise to Avraham, and thus the prohibition "לֹא תְחַיֶּה כׇּל נְשָׁמָה" applied to them as well.

Meaning of "נִסָּה" – According to Rashbam, the word "נִסָּה" in our verse means "to distress" or "provoke" rather than "to test".¹⁷ Since Avraham's interactions with the Philistines went against Hashem's will, Hashem punished Avraham by commanding that he sacrifice his son.  Rashbam presents the trial, as a "measure for measure" punishment, having Hashem say: "You were proud of your son, making a pact between him and Avimelekh's descendants, now go and sacrifice him, and see what is to become of such a treaty!"¹⁸

Akeidah is not the pinnacle of Avraham's career – While Ralbag above challenges our assumptions regarding Hashem's knowledge, Rashbam slaughters a different sacred cow.  He challenges the regnant assumption¹⁹ that the Akeidah was the capstone of Avraham's career, viewing it instead as merely a self-inflicted injury caused by flawed conduct.²⁰

Hashem's knowledge – Rashbam's understanding that the story is not a test at all eliminates the question of why Hashem, in His omniscience, would need to test someone in order to know how they will act.

Avraham rewarded – The fact that Avraham is rewarded and deemed to be "God-fearing" at the end of the experience is hard to reconcile with the view that the whole ordeal was a punishment. However, it is possible to suggest²¹ that the Akeidah served not only as a punishment for Avraham, but also as an opportunity for him to correct his mistakes.²²  If the pact with Avimelekh demonstrated a lack of obedience to Hashem's will, Avraham's utter submission during the Akeidah proved that he was once again God-fearing and, thus, deserving of reward.²³

"כִּי עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה" – According to this approach,²⁴ Hashem might be speaking of His own knowledge. Earlier, in his interactions with the Philistines, Avraham had not acted in a God-fearing manner, but now, Avraham's obedience is recognized by Hashem.²⁵ This avoids the philosophical conundrum of Hashem's omniscience, since according to this reading, Hashem did not lack knowledge which was then supplied, but rather Avraham lacked fear of God which he then acquired.

How can Hashem command murder? According to this approach, Hashem had never intended to allow Avraham to carry though with the plan,²⁶ but He intentionally gave Avraham an overly harsh command so that he would suffer as a result.  It remains unclear, though, why Avraham did not argue with Hashem over the directive.

Polemical motivations – It is possible that Rashbam's interpretation is at least partially polemically motivated:

• As Christians viewed the Akeidah as a prefiguration of Jesus's death on the cross, Rashbam might have wanted to cast the story in a much more negative light, suggesting that it is not the epitome of Avraham's relationship with Hashem, but rather the result of a sin.
• Y. Bin-Nun²⁷ alternatively suggests that Rashbam might be combating the idealization of the Akeidah common among those in the Middle Ages who were forced to martyr their children for God, and looked to Avraham's action as a model to emulate.²⁸

Reward

Acting on Hashem's directives brought Avraham to new levels of faith, and merited him rewards that he would not have received had he not been tested by Hashem.

Sources:R. Saadia GaonCommentary Bereshit 22:1-2About R. Saadia Gaon,²⁹ Ibn EzraBereshit First Commentary 22:1About R. Avraham ibn Ezra, RambanBereshit 22:1Bereshit 22:12Bereshit 22:16About R. Moshe b. Nachman, RanBereshit 22About R. Nissim Gerondi, Sefer HaIkkarim4:13About R. Yosef Albo, SefornoBereshit 22:1-12About R. Ovadyah Seforno, BiurBereshit 22:1About the Biur (Netivot HaShalom)

Meaning of "נִסָּה" – These commentators differ in their understandings of the word:

• Tested – R. Saadia and Ramban maintain that the word "נִסָּה" means tested, but that a test need not be for the tester.  It is the person being tested who gains from the experience.³⁰
• Trained – On the other hand, according to R"Y Albo and the Biur, the root "נסה" means trained or accustomed.³¹  By commanding Avraham to sacrifice his son, Hashem trained his heart towards proper fear and service of God.³²

Hashem's foreknowledge – As these sources all agree that Hashem gained no new knowledge from the test, the verses pose no theological issue regarding Hashem's omniscience and foreknowledge.

What did Avraham gain from the trial? Most of these sources assert that the point of the experience was for Avraham to actualize his potential, changing his thoughts into actions.³³  This accomplished two things:

• Self-development – Ran, R"Y Albo, and the Biur explain that acting on a belief serves to strengthen that belief.³⁴ Though Avraham's willingness to do Hashem's bidding and sacrifice his son was not in question, having to actively bind Yitzchak and raise the knife raised his fear of God to new levels. Undergoing a trial changes a person in a way that merely thinking can never do.³⁵
• Increased reward – Ramban and R"Y Albo³⁶ maintain that, after the trial, Avraham merited a reward not only for his good intentions, but also for his positive actions. R. Saadia points out that Hashem often presents the righteous with many trials in this world in order to later merit them with redoubled rewards.³⁷

"וַיְהִי אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה" – According to R. Saadia, the "things" mentioned refer to all of the previous trials that Avraham had undergone, with the Akeidah being their culmination.  He³⁸ claims that Hashem tests only a person who has proven that he will not fail.³⁹ As such, the increased trials can lead only to reward.

Avraham's emotions en route – R. Soloveitchik⁴⁰ portrays an Avraham who is filled with dread and suffering while en route to fulfill Hashem's command. It was this suffering, he claims, which was crucial for Avraham's growth.  If he was to strengthen his connection to Hashem, Avraham needed to feel the anguish of self-sacrifice.

"עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה" – These sources differ in how they understand the verse:

• Was known – Ramban turns the verb "יָדַעְתִּי" into the passive, "נודעה". Now that Avraham had actualized his potential, his awe of God was known in practice.‎⁴¹
• Words of the spokesperson – Seforno, instead, claims that it is the angel speaking in his own name who declares, "now I know that you are more God-fearing [than me, the angel]."⁴²

Immutability of the Divine word? These sources explain that Hashem did not go back on His word:

• The text prefaces that this was a test – Ibn Ezra asserts that this is not the only place where Hashem appears to have changed His mind, pointing to the replacement of the firstborns with the Levites as another example.  Nonetheless, he explains that in this story, the fact that the narrative opens with the words "And Hashem tested Avraham" proves that, from the outset, Hashem never intended that Avraham should actually slaughter his son.
• Hashem never really commanded a sacrifice – R. Saadia deals with this question at length, offering four possible explanations of how Hashem did not really go back on His word. Some of these are somewhat similar to Ralbag's reading above, and posit some ambiguity in the wording of the original command,⁴³ which allows for the possibility that Hashem never really asked that Yitzchak be sacrificed.⁴⁴  R. Saadia's comments are explicitly polemical, responding to Moslem claims that if God can command one thing and then retract it, it is also possible that He can command the Torah and then replace it.⁴⁵  In his reply, R. Saadia distinguishes between Hashem's private instructions to Avraham and the Torah's mitzvot which were explicitly given to be permanent.

Morality of the command and Avraham's agreement – Most of these sources do not explicitly address this issue, but may assume that, by definition, any command of Hashem must be moral.  Avraham recognized this, and thus did not question the command even though he did not understand how a directive to perform child sacrifice could possibly be ethical.⁴⁶

For Others

The primary objective of the trial was not for its actual participants, but to teach others looking in from the outside enduring lessons about Hashem's ways and/or worship.

Explanation of Choice of Avraham

The Akeidah was meant to demonstrate Avraham's worthiness and why he merited to be selected by Hashem to be the father of the chosen nation.

Sources:Jubilees17:19-2518About Jubilees, Pseudo-Philo32:3About Pseudo-Philo, Bavli SanhedrinSanhedrin 89bAbout the Bavli, Bereshit Rabbah55:1-656:7About Bereshit Rabbah, R. Saadia GaonCommentary Bereshit 22:1-2About R. Saadia Gaon,⁴⁷ RashiBereshit 22:1-2, 6, 8, 12About R. Shelomo Yitzchaki, Lekach TovBereshit 22:2Bereshit 22:12About R. Toviah b. Eliezer, R. Yosef Bekhor ShorBereshit 22:1-2, 12About R. Yosef Bekhor Shor, Rambam3 24About Rambam Moreh Nevukhim, RadakBereshit 22:1Bereshit 22:12About R. David Kimchi, Keli YekarBereshit 22:12About R. Shelomo Ephraim Luntschitz, ShadalBereshit 22:1About R. Shemuel David Luzzatto

Meaning of "נִסָּה"

• Test – Most of these sources understand the word according to its simple sense, to mean "to test" or "try", but claim that a test is sometimes aimed not at the tester, or even at the one tested, but rather at the audience who watches or hears of the trial.⁴⁸
• Raise as a banner – Bereshit Rabbah, the gloss in R"Y Bekhor Shor, AbarbanelBereshit 22:3About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel, and the Keli Yekar go a step further in asserting that the word "נִסָּה" is related to the word "נס", or banner. Through the Akeidah, Hashem set up Avraham as a signpost for others to emulate.

"כִּי עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה" – According to Bereshit Rabbah, R. Saadia, Lekach Tov, Rambam, and Keli Yekar,⁴⁹ Hashem is not saying, "now I know" but rather "now I have made Avraham's fear of God known to others."  R"Y Bekhor Shor, instead, claims that Hashem simply spoke in common parlance ("דברה תורה בלשון בני אדם"), acting as if He had not known Avraham's extraordinary faith and obedience until Avraham passed the test, even though He had known of it all along.

Hashem's knowledge – This approach can maintain Hashem's perfect knowledge since it does not assume that He learned anything new from the experience.

What was the public supposed to learn? Though these sources agree that the Akeidah was supposed to demonstrate Avraham's worthiness, they disagree regarding the specific message it was supposed to impart:

• Avraham's unconditional fear and obedience – Most of these sources claim that the trial was meant to prove to all the extent of Avraham's love of and obedience to God.  Avraham's willingness to sacrifice his only, beloved child at Hashem's behest, proved why Avraham merited to be Hashem's choice.
• Avraham worthy despite not practicing child sacrifice – Shadal, in contrast, suggests that, through the Akeidah, Hashem wanted to make clear to the entire world that the fact that the Children of Israel do not practice child sacrifice is not a sign of lack of devotion to God.  Thus, Avraham's readiness to sacrifice Yitzchak demonstrated that had Hashem so desired, he, too, would have been willing to sacrifice his loved ones.  Hashem, though, has no desire for child offerings.  As such, Israel has no reason to feel inferior, and pagan nations should not view themselves as superior.

How can Hashem command murder? How can Avraham comply? According to Shadal's understanding of the story,⁵⁰ the whole trial was set up with the purpose of teaching both Avraham and the world at large that child sacrifice was immoral. Until then, the practice was viewed as as the epitome of spiritual worship,⁵¹ so that no one, Avraham included, would have thought to question it.  It is precisely because of the messages learned from the Akeidah, that today we not only find the act abominable, but go so far as to question how Hashem could command such a thing.  In fact, though, it turns out that Hashem's seemingly "immoral" directive was a lesson in morality.

What made Avraham's sacrifice so special? Philo raises the following question: If many people in Avraham's day practiced child sacrifice, why did Avraham's actions prove him to be any more worthy than them?

• Avraham not unique – For Shadal, this is not a question, as he does not suggest that the story's goal is to show Avraham's uniqueness, but only that he is no less devoted than others.
• Dissonance with prior value system – Alternatively, according to those who disagree with Shadal, the difficulty of the test for Avraham might have been precisely because he had grown away from pagan norms and had a different understanding of both God and what that God stood for.⁵² To heed Hashem's word, he had to struggle with a value system, instilled in him by God Himself, which called child sacrifice "murder".⁵³
• No ulterior motive – Philo On AbrahamAbout Philoasserts that most people who offer their children in sacrifice do so with an ulterior motive in mind, stemming either from a desire for glory or out of fear or hopes of preventing some catastrophe.⁵⁴  Avraham, though, had neither purpose in mind, only the desire to do Hashem's bidding.⁵⁵

For whom? Ibn Ezra questions this entire approach on the grounds that no one but Avraham and Yitzchak were present at the event.  As such, how could these sources claim that it was intended for others?

• Satan and other angels – Jubilees, Pseudo-Philo, Bavli, Bereshit Rabbah, Rashi, and R"Y Bekhor Shor suggest that the test was aimed at the Satan and/or other angels who had questioned Avraham's loyalty and obedience to Hashem.⁵⁶  Such beings need not have been physically present to see the event.
• Other people – Most of the other sources more simply suggest that the lesson was for the other nations (or, according to Shadal, Israel as well) living in or after Avraham's generation who had heard of (even if they did not witness) the event.⁵⁷  Radak points out that word of the experience spread due to its being recounted in the Torah.⁵⁸

Can Hashem change His word? To lessen this theological difficulty, many of these sources⁵⁹ suggest that there was an ambiguity in Hashem's command.  Thus, Bereshit Rabbah suggests that Hashem says "וְהַעֲלֵהוּ", but not "שחטהו", and, as such, Hashem had never commanded that Yitzchak be slaughtered to begin with.

"וַיְהִי אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה"

• According to the Bavli,⁶⁰ the verse is referring to events not recorded in the Torah, which led to the need to demonstrate Avraham's righteousness to the world.⁶¹
• Alternatively, this approach could say that the phrase serves to link the Akeidah to the previous chapter's description of the miraculous birth of Yitzchak and the promise "כִּי בְיִצְחָק יִקָּרֵא לְךָ זָרַע", both of which contributed to the difficulty of the trial.

Model of How to Worship Hashem

The episode teaches how to properly serve God and about the need to completely submit ourselves to His will.

Sources:R. David Zvi HoffmannBereshit 22 IntroductionAbout R. David Zvi Hoffmann, R. S.R. HirschBereshit 22About R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, R. K. ShapiraAish Kodesh, p. 68, modern scholars⁶²

Meaning of "נִסָּה" and Hashem's knowledge – This position posits that the test was not for Hashem, whose knowledge is complete, but for those who heard about it.

What lessons were to be learned? These sources all suggest that the episode taught important lessons about the proper service of Hashem, but they differ in the details:

• Willingness to sacrifice for God – R. D"Z Hoffmann asserts that the Akeidah teaches that when asked, one must be ready to sacrifice one's self (or, what is even more difficult, one's child) for Hashem.  Though Hashem does not demand this all the time, and has no need for pointless sacrifices of the self, there are certain circumstances when martyrdom is expected of an individual. Proper service of Hashem entails a constant recognition of that fact.  Thus, every time an individual offers an animal sacrifice for Hashem, he makes the same declaration as Avraham that he is submitting and surrendering his entire being to God, and that the animal is serving as a substitute for the person himself.⁶³
• Priority of Divine will over human ethics – In a similar vein,⁶⁴ many modern scholars suggest that the point of the Akeidah was to teach that when human ethics seem to conflict with the Divine will, priority must be given to Hashem's command.⁶⁵ There is no such thing as an independent human morality.⁶⁶  In the words of the Aish Kodesh: "The nations of the world think that truth exists in and of itself and that God commanded truth because it was of itself true... not so the nation of Israel who say... all truth that is in the world is only because God commanded it."⁶⁷

How can Hashem command murder? According to R. Hoffmann, the assumption that Hashem cannot demand human sacrifice is simply wrong. Though Hashem prohibits such sacrifice as a consistent mode of worship, that does not make such individual demands unethical.  Moreover, if Hashem's word defines morality, whatever He commands must be just.  As R. Shapira writes, "When Hashem commanded Avraham our forefather that he bind his son Yitzchak, it was true to bind him, and had He not said "do not do unto him anything" it would have been true to slaughter him."

The immutability of the Divine word – According to this position, there is absolutely no problem with Hashem changing His word. The concept of a "הוראת שעה" (a teaching or command for a specific time), suggests that it is possible that in one situation Hashem can prohibit a certain act, and in another situation command the very same deed, and both directives will still be ethical.

"עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה" – This position might understand the phrase "יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים" to mean ethical rather than God-fearing.⁶⁸  Through Avraham's willingness to sacrifice Yitzchak, he made it known that true ethical behavior means abiding by Hashem's will, and not one's own moral compass.⁶⁹

¹ According to Ralbag, Hashem's lack of foreknowledge of what people will choose to do is necessary in order for man to have free will. Ralbag also maintains that this limitation of God's knowledge is not an imperfection, since what is impossible does not constitute a deficiency. For more about Ralbag's understanding of God's omniscience, see Ralbag and Free Will.

² Cf. Ibn KaspiTirat Kesef 1:30About R. Yosef ibn Kaspi who suggests that the Torah uses the term "נסה" since that is the "language of men" (דברה תורה בלשון בני אדם), but really Hashem's testing of a person and human testing are distinct, since Hashem, as opposed to humans, does know in advance what a person is thinking and willing to do.  Nonetheless, Ibn Kaspi, similar to Ralbag, simultaneously implies that perhaps Hashem's knowledge is not complete. He asserts that Hashem had "theoretical knowledge" (ידיעה שכלית) regarding the extent of Avraham's fear of God, but not "practical knowledge" (ידיעת ניסיון) thereof. He writes, "אע"פ שה' ידע ידיעת שכל טרם זה המעשה שאברהם היה ירא ה' הנה עתה רצה לדעת זה ידיעת ניסיון".

³ Ralbag is not consistent in explaining the root "נסה" in this manner.  In Shemot 20:16 and in one explanation of Shemot 15:25, he instead says that it means "lifted up or exalted", as if the word were written "נשא".

⁴ One might question how it is possible that Hashem gained new understanding; does that not mean that Hashem changed?  Ralbag, though, does not find this problematic. From his perspective, since Hashem had always known that Avraham's choice was a possibility, this had always been a part of His knowledge.

⁵ Ralbag here references his fuller discussion of this subject in his commentary on Bereshit 32:8Bereshit Beur HaParashah 32:8About R. Levi b. Gershom.

⁶ Cf. Bereshit Rabbah56:7About Bereshit Rabbah, R. Saadia GaonCommentary Bereshit 22:1-2HaEmunot VeHaDeiot 5:2-3About R. Saadia Gaon, Ibn JanachSefer HaRikmah Gate 6About R. Yonah ibn Janach, RashiBereshit 22:1-2, 6, 8, 12About R. Shelomo Yitzchaki, Rashbam according to the TurLong Commentary Bereshit 22:1About R. Yaakov b. Asher, R"Y Bekhor ShorBereshit 22:1-2, 12About R. Yosef Bekhor Shor, Abarbanel, and MalbimBereshit 22:1-2About R. Meir Leibush Weiser who all suggest that Hashem's words were ambiguous (though they differ regarding the details). While Ralbag explicitly states that Hashem intended for Avraham to misconstrue his words, according to Ibn Janach and Malbim, it is unclear if that was God's intent, or if Avraham simply erred. If so, the problem of how Hashem could command murder is easily solved (He had not), but Avraham's actions in the story no longer make sense.  If Avraham misunderstood Hashem's request, how did he pass the test, and why did Hashem not correct his misconception?

⁷ The למ"ד of "לְעֹלָה" can be understood to mean either "as" or "for the purpose of".

⁸ In other words, Hashem tested Avraham to see if he was willing to abide by the more obviously intended command, despite having an alternative, but more dubious, understanding to fall back upon as an excuse.

⁹ He points out that one who is able to cleave to Hashem in the manner of Avraham will never miss other worldly benefits, because the good achieved through clinging to Hashem and following in His path far surpasses all else.  This idea has been used to understand the theological problem posed by the suffering of the righteous.  The truly righteous never suffer, since the benefits gained by their love of Hashem are so great that all else is as if nothing. See Theodicy – צדיק ורע לו for more.

¹⁰ Ralbag points out that Avraham did not even question Hashem's previous promises that Yitzchak would carry on Avraham's line.  See above that Ralbag suggests that Avraham recognized that Hashem's promises are always contingent on continued merit, and therefore it is always possible that they might no longer be deserved.

¹¹ Otherwise, he would not have been in a state fit for prophecy. Ralbag (following Bavli Shabbat 30bShabbat 30bAbout the Bavli) points to Elisha's request, "וְעַתָּה קְחוּ לִי מְנַגֵּן וְהָיָה כְּנַגֵּן הַמְנַגֵּן וַתְּהִי עָלָיו יַד י"י" (Melakhim II 3:15) as proof that distress prevents one from receiving prophecy.

¹² Thus, Avraham was not lying to Yitzchak or misleading him.

¹³ Ralbag claims that the word "יִרְאֶה" is related to understanding (rather than showing), as in the verse "וְלִבִּי רָאָה הַרְבֵּה חׇכְמָה וָדָעַת" (Kohelet 1:16).

¹⁴ Cf. Bavli Taanit 4a which also suggests that Hashem never meant for Yitzchak to be sacrificed: "אשר לא צויתי ולא דברתי ולא עלתה על לבי... ולא עלתה על לבי זה יצחק בן אברהם."

¹⁵ He claims that every time that the phrase "וַיְהִי אַחַר הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה" appears, it serves a similar purpose.  For example, the similar opening in Bereshit 15 links Hashem reassurance to Avraham, "אַל תִּירָא אַבְרָם," with his war against the four kings described in the previous chapter.

¹⁶ See Y. Bin-Nun, "עקידת יצחק: עונש או ניסיון" in "פרקי האבות : עיונים בפרשיות האבות בספר בראשית", (Jerusalem, 2003): 100-119, who points to several other points of contact between the Avimelekh stories and the Akeidah:

• In Bereshit 20, we are told "וַיַּשְׁכֵּם אֲבִימֶלֶךְ בַּבֹּקֶר", matching Bereshit 22:3, "וַיַּשְׁכֵּם אַבְרָהָם בַּבֹּקֶר."
• Avimelekh asks Avraham, "מָה רָאִיתָ כִּי עָשִׂיתָ אֶת הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה", while the angel later tells Avraham, "יַעַן אֲשֶׁר עָשִׂיתָ אֶת הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה".
• Hashem tells Avimelekh, "גַּם אָנֹכִי יָדַעְתִּי כִּי בְתׇם לְבָבְךָ עָשִׂיתָ זֹּאת וָאֶחְשֹׂךְ גַּם אָנֹכִי אוֹתְךָ מֵחֲטוֹ לִי".  Hashem uses similar language when speaking to Avraham, "כִּי עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה וְלֹא חָשַׂכְתָּ אֶת בִּנְךָ אֶת יְחִידְךָ מִמֶּנִּי".
• When in Philistine territory, Avraham feared a lack of "יִרְאַת אֱלֹהִים".  After the Akeidah, Hashem says of Avraham "כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה".

¹⁷ As evidence of such a usage he points to Iyyov 4:2, "הֲנִסָּה דָבָר אֵלֶיךָ תִּלְאֶה", and Shemot 17:7, "עַל רִיב בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְעַל נַסֹּתָם אֶת י"י" where the root is connected to weariness and strife.

¹⁸ Hagi Ben-Artzi, in מבט חדש על העקידה, elaborates on Rashbam's approach and suggests that in making an oath and covenant with Avimelekh, Avraham had nullified the covenants of "land" and "seed" promised him by Hashem.  As such, Hashem demanded that he return the "seed" that was given him, Yitzchak.  See also R"Y Medan, "כי קרוב אליך" (Tel Aviv, 2014): 139-140, who explains similarly.

¹⁹ Cf. R. Saadia below who notes that the Akeidah came after Avraham had successfully passed all previous tests with flying colors.

²⁰ For other instances where commentators differ in their assessment of the conduct of the Patriarchs, see Endangering Sarai in Egypt, Sarah's Treatment of Hagar, Yaakov's Taking of the Blessing, Rachel's Stealing of the Terafim, and Avot and Mitzvot.

²¹ Rashbam, however, does not say this.

²² R"Y Medan (see above note) suggests that Hashem's forgiveness of Avraham on Mt. Moriah points to the future role of the altar to be built there – atonement for sin and Hashem's granting of mercy rather than justice.

²³ H. Ben-Artzi (see note above) explains that with Avraham's obeisance to Hashem's directive, Hashem was able to renew the covenants that had been nullified.  He thus blessed him once again with seed and conquest.  Ben-Artzi suggests that it is Yitzchak who serves to totally correct his father's deeds when he insists on living and working specifically on Philistine land, despite their attempts to chase him away.

²⁴ Rashbam himself does not say this but rather understands the verse to mean that, after the event, Avraham's fear of God became public knowledge, apparent to the entire world.  It was not Hashem who gained new knowledge, but rather the public.

²⁵ This approach would understand the words of the verse as if they were reversed, reading it as "כִּי יָדַעְתִּי כִּי עַתָּה יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה".

²⁶ According to H. Ben-Artzi (see above note), in contrast, Hashem might originally have in fact intended that Yitzchak be killed, and thus given back to Hashem.  Since Avraham broke his covenant with Hashem, Hashem planned to retract his side, the gift of Yitzchak and blessing of progeny.  It is not clear, however, why Hashem would need Avraham to be the instrument through which Yitzchak was returned to Hashem.

²⁷ See above note.

²⁸ See S. Spiegel, "מאגדות העקידה: פיוט על שחיטת יצחק ותחייתו לר' אפרים מבונא" in "ספר היובל לכבוד אלכסנדר מארכס" (New York, 1950): 471-547, who discusses various pieces from aggadic literature which present Yitzchak as actually dying during the Akeidah (and later being resurrected), and how these were adapted by people and poets during the Crusader period who attempted to come to terms with the mass martyrdom in their communities.

²⁹ R. Saadia combines this approach with the next one, suggesting that in addition to increasing Avraham's reward, the test served to demonstrate Avraham's worthiness to the rest of the world.

³⁰ Hashem, in contrast, knew all along what was to happen.

³¹ For other verses where the word might take on this meaning, see Shemot 20:16 and Shemuel I 17:39.  See also RashbamShemot 16:4About R. Shemuel b. Meir on Shemot 16:4.

³² Cf. R. Hirsch who connects the word "נסה" to the root "נשא" but also suggests that the verse means that Hashem brought Avraham up to a higher level.  By being given this task Avraham's spiritual level was raised.

³³ Or, in the words of these sources: "להוציא דבר מן הכח אל הפועל".

³⁴ This fits the idea that "אחרי הפעולות נמשכים הלבבות".

³⁵ In contrast to these exegetes, R. Y.D. Soloveitchik (see דברי השקפה, ed. M. Krone, (Jerusalem, 1992): 254-255) focuses not on how thoughts must be actualized, but simply on what the act of self sacrifice does for man. He asserts that every religious act must begin with the sacrifice of the self, and claims that this must be filled with suffering and anguish.  It is this suffering which helps man grow.

³⁶ R. Saadia and Ibn Ezra agree that the point of the trial was to reward Avraham, but they do not speak of the difference in reward for positive intentions and actual deeds.

³⁷ Both R. Saadia and R"Y Albo suggest that this, in part, explains the phenomenon of "צדיק ורע לו".  See Theodicy – צדיק ורע לו for more.  Rambam3 24About Rambam Moreh Nevukhim attacks this position, finding it unjust that someone who did not sin should suffer, only so as to get a reward later.  He claims that despite the fact that many assume this notion to be true, it has no basis in Torah.

³⁸ See Ramban as well.

³⁹ As proof that Hashem only tries the righteous, he points to the verse, "י"י צַדִּיק יִבְחָן " (Tehillim 11:5).  The negative parallel to the rest of the verse, "וְרָשָׁע וְאֹהֵב חָמָס שָׂנְאָה נַפְשׁוֹ" further suggests that the test of the righteous is a test of love, meant to reward and not punish.  [The word "test" is set in opposition to the word "hate", suggesting that the test is an example of ייסורין של אהבה.]

⁴⁰ See above note.

⁴¹ R. Saadia similarly rereads the word, suggesting that it should be understood as if written: "והודעתי".  R. Saadia thinks that the Akeidah served two purposes, not only to increase Avraham's rewards but also to teach others why he was chosen.

⁴² In order to have the angel speak in his own name, Seforno is forced to play with the syntax of the verse.  According to him, the word "מִמֶּנִּי" is not attached to the phrase "וְלֹא חָשַׂכְתָּ אֶת בִּנְךָ אֶת יְחִידְךָ" (which would imply that the angel is speaking in Hashem's name), but rather to the phrase "עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה".  The verse then reads as if written, "עַתָּה יָדַעְתִּי כִּי יְרֵא אֱלֹהִים אַתָּה [מִמֶּנִּי] וְלֹא חָשַׂכְתָּ אֶת בִּנְךָ אֶת יְחִידְךָ".

⁴³ Thus, he suggests that one can read "וְהַעֲלֵהוּ... עַל אַחַד הֶהָרִים אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיךָ" to mean "and offer him on one of the mountains if I tell you".  Alternatively, he suggests that "וְהַעֲלֵהוּ" refer to an unnamed subject, and not Yitzchak.

⁴⁴ R. Saadia adds that precisely because this was a test, Hashem had to allow Avraham to think He meant one thing when He intended another and therefore could not have explicitly revealed his true intentions.

⁴⁵ See R. Saadia's discussion in HaEmunot VeHaDeiot 3:9 as well.

⁴⁶ See R. Y.D. Soloveitchik, Abraham's Journey, (New York, 2008): 190.  He speaks of Avraham as "suspending judgement" (as opposed to Kierkegaard's suspension of the ethical, discussed below).  Though Avraham could not himself understand how the command was ethical, he suspended his own judgement, knowing that Hashem is a moral God and therefore all His directives must be moral as well.

⁴⁷ R. Saadia also claims that the trial was intended to increase the rewards designated to Avraham.

⁴⁸ Thus, Hashem learned nothing from the trial, but rather taught others.

⁴⁹ He also raises the possibility that the verse should be read as if it says "הנה ידעתי" rather than "עתה ידעתי".  Hashem, thus, is declaring, "Behold, I always knew that you were God fearing..."

⁵⁰ Cf. Ibn Kaspi who says this explicitly. He thinks that animal sacrifice is only a concession to humans and not ultimately the desired form of worship. He, thus, points out that it is Avraham on his own, and not via Divine command, who decides to replace Yitzchak with the ram. For more on his understanding of sacrifices, see Purpose of the Sacrifices.

⁵¹ This demonstrates exactly why it is difficult to say that there are "absolutes" in morality.  Not in every generation and every culture is it agreed under which circumstances killing another is "murder" and when it is an act to be lauded.

⁵² See R. Aviner, Tal Chermon (Jerusalem, 1995): 49-50, who writes: "הצו האלוקי לעקד את יצחק ממוטט את אשר ידע אברהם בחייו ואת כל אשר לימד אחרים. הוא, הלוחם הגדול בעבודה זרה ובהקרבת אדם, איש המוסר והחסד הגדול, הולך כעת לרצוח את בנו... אברהם צריך היה לוותר על כל המורגש והמובן לו כאדם, ואפילו כאדם עילאי, למחוק את כל מחשבותיו והשגותיו, את כל הרגשת הטוב שבו, כדי למלא אחר צו ה'. ללמדך בצורה הדרסטית ביותר, שאת מצוות ה' איננו מקיימים מפני שכך טוב לנו, מפני שאנו מבינים אותה, או מפני שאנו מרגישים נועם בקיומה, אלא מפני שהיא מצוות ה".

⁵³ Moreover, he was led to question whether Hashem keeps His promises, and what was to become of the blessing: "כִּי בְיִצְחָק יִקָּרֵא לְךָ זָרַע".

⁵⁴ Thus, Mesha, the king of Moav offers his first born as a sacrifice only when he fears defeat in war. (Melakhim II 3).

⁵⁵ Moreover, Avraham was not offering any child, but his beloved, only child, who had been granted to him miraculously in his old age This is why the verse emphasizes "קַח נָא אֶת בִּנְךָ אֶת יְחִידְךָ אֲשֶׁר אָהַבְתָּ אֶת יִצְחָק".
Rambam adds that the fact that Avraham first bound Yitzchak three days after receiving the Divine directive means that he was not acting in a state of shock or bewilderment in which he could not think through the action's consequences, but rather with full cognizance of the meaning of the deed.

⁵⁶ R"Y Bekhor Shor has the angels echo the complaints that Satan had made regarding Iyyov.  They question why Avraham's fear of God is considered so special; after all if he was protected by God and admired by others, what reason had he not to be God-fearing?!

⁵⁷ For Shadal, the fact that there were no witnesses to the event is somewhat difficult.  If the trial was intended to prove to the pagans that Avraham, too, was ready to sacrifice his son, hearsay regarding the event should not have sufficed.

⁵⁸ He, therefore, suggests that the main target was future generations rather than Avraham's own generation.

⁵⁹ See Bereshit Rabbah, R. Saadia Gaon, Rashi, Lekach Tov, and R. Yosef Bekhor Shor.  See above points regarding the polemical motivations for suggesting this.

⁶⁰ See also Bereshit Rabbah and Rashi.

⁶¹ R. Yochanan suggests that the phrase refers to the complaints of the Satan who tried to cast doubt on Avraham's love of Hashem by pointing out that at the party in honor of Yitzchak's weaning, Avraham did not think to honor Hashem through a sacrifice. In response, Hashem showed the Satan that Avraham would be willing to offer him even his son. 
R. Levi, in contrast, suggests the phrase refers to Yishmael's claims that he was more worthy than Yitzchak.  Yishmael gloated that he was at a higher level since he consented to be circumcised, while Yitzchak had no choice. Yitzchak responded that he would be willing to give not just one limb, but even his whole being, if asked.

⁶² For a review of some of the literature and variations of this approach, see A. Sagi, יהדות: בין דת למוסר (Tel Aviv, 1998): 257-26 and M. Navon, The Binding of Isaac, Hakirah 17 (2014): 233-256.

⁶³ He, thus, suggests that the animals that are chosen as sacrifices are those which can most closely represent humans.  For elaboration on R. Hoffmann's understanding of the sacrificial system and how it relates to the Akeidah, see Purpose of the Sacrifices.

⁶⁴ They, too, speak of surrender of the self, but of one's thoughts and values rather than one's life.  Thus, they do not limit the lesson to one of martyrdom.

⁶⁵ This, of course, is contingent on being certain that it is Hashem's word which one is heeding. The Rambam3 24About Rambam Moreh Nevukhim, in fact, claims that one of the messages of the narrative of the Akeidah is that true prophets have no doubts at all as to the veracity of their prophecies. Avraham knew with certainty that it was Hashem speaking to him, or he would never have performed the deed.
Cf. I. Kant, in The Conflict of the Faculties (Nebraska,1992) whose position diametrically opposes the one presented here.  He claims that in face of a conflict between individual morality and the voice of God, one must listen to the self.  That murder is wrong is a certainty; whether one has truly heard the word of God is in doubt.  He, thus, concludes that Avraham failed the test, a conclusion which obviously does not match the simple sense of Bereshit 22.

⁶⁶ This was expressed by Kierkegaard in his work, Fear and Trembling, as "the suspension of the ethical".  Cf. R. Hirsch who writes similarly: "Saying, 'הנני', saying "we would serve God" implies completely giving up all one's own ideas, one's own will, and without any further ado placing all one's powers at the disposable of God's insight..."

⁶⁷ See A. Sagi, יהדות: בין דת למוסר (Tel Aviv, 1998): 257-267 who suggests that R. Shapira's approach is his attempt to justify Hashem in face of the atrocities of the Shoah.  R. Shapira viewed his generation as modern day Yitzchaks who were slaughtered according to the Divine will.

⁶⁸ For other places in Tanakh where this connotation might be implied see Bereshit 20:11, Shemot 1:17, Vayikra 19:32, Vayikra 25:17, and Devarim 25:18. See N. Leibowitz, Iyyunim Chadashim BeSefer Shemot (Jerusalem, 1970): 32-33 and N. Sarna, Exploring Exodus (New York, 1986): 25-26, 120-121 who elaborate on this point.

⁶⁹ Alternatively, it might translate כִּי as "despite" and understand the phrase as saying "even though you have such a strong ethical consciousness, nevertheless you did not refuse to sacrifice your son when directly commanded."  However, such a reading would require one to posit that the וי"ו of "וְלֹא חָשַׂכְתָּ אֶת בִּנְךָ" is extraneous.