Adding and Subtracting from Torah/2

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Adding and Detracting from Torah

Exegetical Approaches

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Limited to Specific Mitzvot

The prohibition of "not adding or detracting" is limited in scope and is relevant only in the realm of religious worship.

The exact prohibition – Both these sources agree that the prohibition forbids adopting Canaanite practices into one's worship of Hashem, but they offer two variations of the specific actions which are being forbidden:
  • Idolatry – Chizkuni on Devarim 2 asserts that the prohibitions pertain to idolatry, warning both against worshiping additional gods and detracting from the worship of Hashem.1
  • Sacrifices – R"Y Kara (and Chizkuni on Devarim 13),2 instead, suggest that the prohibitions relate to the sacrificial service. The verses mandate that one bring sacrifices only from animals or birds, rather than from humans or from nothing at all.  One should not "add" and sacrifice also children, or "detract" and spare the animals.
Context – The two readings are supported by the context of the prohibition:
  • Chizkuni notes that the command appears twice in Torah, both times in the context of idolatry.3 4
  • R"Y Kara looks to the broader context of Devarim 13:1, to Chapter 12 as a whole,5 which discusses centralization of worship and proper sacrifices.6
Purpose and necessity of law – Considering that warnings against both idolatry in general and child sacrifice in particular exist elsewhere, one might question what is added by this prohibition.  These sources might agree that there is no new content being introduced and suggest that the verses simply provide yet another warning due to the severity of the crime.
Biblical cases – Given the limited parameters of the law,  none of the Biblical characters who enacted their own decrees,7 temporarily suspended8 or adjusted existing laws,9 were in violation of "לֹא תֹסֵף".
What about rabbinic laws? As the prohibition of adding / detracting is limited to the realm of cultic practice, it does not forbid adding to other existing laws or even instituting an entirely new one. Chizkuni, thus, emphasizes that Hashem never prohibited adding safeguards to ensure proper observance of His laws. Though Chizkuni does not say so, according to his reading, it would appear that even those without rabbinic authority should be allowed to do so.
Other potential cases of "לֹא תֹסֵף" – According to this approach, observing a mitzvah outside of its mandated time,10 performing it multiple times, or voluntarily taking on a mitzvah from which one is exempt would not be a violation of "לֹא תֹסֵף".
Polemics – Chizkuni is explicitly polemical in his comments, opening by saying, "תשובה למיני ישראל שפקרו על התלמוד".  He might be referring to the Karaites who reject the Oral law and Rabbinic decrees, pointing to the prohibition of "do not add" as proof that these are invalid.11  In limiting the scope of the law, Chizkuni renders their arguments baseless.
Relationship between "לֹא תֹסֵף" and "לֹא תִגְרַע" – According to this approach, the two statements constitute two distinct prohibitions, each the flip side of the other.
Relationship between Devarim 4 and 13 – This approach could say12 that each verse prohibits additions to a distinct mitzvah: one warns against worshiping additional gods and the other against adding to the list of permitted sacrificial items.

Applicable Only to the Masses

The directive is aimed only at the masses.  Leaders such as prophets or judges are given the right to add to or detract from the Torah's commandments.

Textual evidence that leaders may "add" and "detract" – These sources bring several verses as proof that leaders have the right to enact new laws (and, thus, that "לֹא תֹסֵף" does not apply to them):
  • The Kuzari points to Devarim 17:9-11 or Devarim 18:18-19 which dictate that one must act according to what is directed by the priest, prophet or judge, implying that they have the authority to make new decrees.13  
  • Hoil Moshe also points to Bemidbar 15:23 "אֵת כׇּל אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה י״י אֲלֵיכֶם בְּיַד מֹשֶׁה מִן הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה י״י וָהָלְאָה לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם" as proof that, even after Moshe, laws can change (in accordance with what Hashem commands his prophets).
Why are leaders exempt from "לֹא תֹסֵף"?
  • Unlikely to err – R. Yehuda HaLevi  explains that since these leaders are close to the Divine Presence, are blessed in both natural and acquired wisdom, often have some prophetic ability, and are checked by their peers, they are very unlikely to err.14 One cannot say the same about the masses.
  • Oral tradition – Hoil Moshe suggests that already when given, many laws might have been accompanied by conditions and secret instructions which allowed for adaptation.15  These were relayed to the leaders of the time so that laws could be changed later when a future era necessitated or allowed for it.16 In other words, many later changes might be rooted in an oral tradition going back all the way to Moshe.
Limits to leaders' authority – Hoil Moshe places one limit on the ability of prophets and sages to innovate laws – that such laws do not affect the principles of faith or fundamentals of Torah.  However, he does not explain how one is to know what is included in such "principles" or who has the right to determine what these comprise.
Purpose of the law – These sources imply that the purpose of the law is to ensure that those who do not have sufficient knowledge do not make changes to the Torah which are not in line with Hashem's wishes.
Expansion of "לֹא תֹסֵף" – Although the Kuzari limits the audience addressed by the prohibition of "do not add" to the masses, he simultaneously expands the scope of the laws covered, suggesting that the prohibition applies not only to laws relayed by Hashem, but also to laws relayed by any of their leaders.17  A layman cannot add or detract from even Rabbinic law.
Biblical cases – The Kuzari points to adjustments and new laws made by David, Shelomo and Ezra as evidence that such changes are permitted.
Rabbinic laws – This approach clearly allows for rabbinic decrees, and does not limit these to those which are meant to safeguard existing commandments.  Any innovation which accords with the fundamentals of Torah is allowed.
Other potential cases of "לֹא תֹסֵף"
  • Adding to existing laws – This approach might suggest that leaders are even allowed to change the form of an existing law (like adding a species to lulav) or to mandate observing a law outside of its specified time (taking a lulav on the eighth day).18
  • Voluntary performance of a mitzvah – According to this approach, it would seem that if a layman on his/her own decides to take upon themselves an extra obligation, this might be considered a violation of "do not add".19  However, if the Sages allow for such voluntary performance, it would be permissible.
Fluidity of Torah – Hoil Moshe views Torah law as fluid and open to change, as long as such changes are made by Sages who ensure that Torah's foundations remain intact. He notes that as people and times change, adaptations to the law become necessary. One generation might need a harsher penal code, while another might not yet be ready for certain laws.20
Context – The law is found both at the beginning of Moshe' legal speech, an appropriate place to discuss who and who does not have the authority to make or change laws, and at the conclusion to Devarim 12, which speaks of the laws of "the place which Hashem shall choose".  As the Kuzari views this as the center of the nation's leadership, emphasizing that specifically those whose authority stems from there, alone have the ability to enact laws, it is logical that the law is mentioned in this context.
Polemics – R. Yehuda HaLevi mentions the Karaites explicitly and most of his comments appear to be directed at them.  He, thus, goes out of his way to both validate Rabbinic authority (which they reject) and to invalidate individual innovations or interpretations (a hallmark of Karaite commentary),21 especially those which affect the law.22
Theological questions – This approach raises important theological questions:
  • Replacing Torah? – If prophets are allowed to make or suspend laws at will, what is to stop an individual in the future from claiming prophetic authority and simply doing away with all of Torah?23  This question might be what leads the Kuzari to consistently speak only of those leaders who are centered "בַּמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה" and the Hoil Moshe to emphasize that all adjustments to Torah law must be in accordance with its fundamental principles.
  • Can prophets and judges err?  If one assumes that they can, how is one to trust their innovations?24 Moreover, how is one to even know who is a true or false prophet, worthy of being listened to?25
  • Is not Torah eternal?  Does not claiming that Torah law is fluid and that changes are allowed imply that the Torah is neither eternal nor perfect? Hoil Moshe might respond that additions to or detraction from Torah do not imply a lack of perfection in the Torah but rather in people. Though Hashem Himself does not change, people do, and it is they that necessitate change.26

Limited to Mitzvah Details

The prohibition refers only to adding to or subtracting from the form or details of an already existing mitzvah, not to instituting new commands.

Specifics of prohibition – Raavad asserts that the prohibition of "לֹא תֹסֵף" refers only to adding to existing positive commands.  One may not add or detract from the proscribed method of performing any positive directive.  He cites examples from the Sifre such as not adding or subtracting from the four species of the lulav,28 four strands of tzitzit, or three priestly blessings.
Purpose of the law – Sefer HaChinukh asserts that one cannot change the form of Hashem's laws since they are complete and perfect as commanded.  Shadal elaborates that just because someone thinks an action will be pleasing to Hashem does not make it so, and thus one cannot decide on one's own to add to Hashem's command.  Moreover, innocent additions often unintentionally lead to problematic ones.29
Relationship between "לֹא תֹסֵף" and "לֹא תִגְרַע"
  • Elaboration – It is possible that these are not two distinct prohibitions but rather that the second phrase (לֹא תִגְרַע) comes to explain the first:
    • R"Y Bekhor Shor asserts that the words "לֹא תִגְרַע" teach that it is prohibited to add to a law only if doing so will detract30 from its intended observance.31
    • Sefer HaChinukh, in contrast, implies that the verse is saying that due to the perfection of Hashem's laws' all additions to a mitzvah are by definition a detraction.32 [See below for the legal ramifications of these different readings.]
  • Distinct prohibitions – This position could alternatively explain that each prohibition is distinct and simply the inverse of the other.  Just as one cannot add details, one cannot omit or lessen them.
What about rabbinic laws? As "לֹא תֹסֵף" does not relate to enacting new laws and prohibitions, only to changing existing ones, rabbinic decrees are not problematic. Adding prohibitions to safeguard the Torah is permitted33 and even instituting new laws such as washing hands or making the holiday of Purim would not constitute a violation.34
Other potential cases of "לֹא תֹסֵף"
  • Performing a mitzvah multiple times – As repeatedly performing a mitzvah does not alter Hashem's original command, this would not be considered problematic.35
  • Extending the time frame of a mitzvah – According to R"Y Bekhor, since observing a mitzvah not in its proper time has no effect on and does not nullify the manner of the original observance, this would not be problematic.36  According to Sefer HaChinukh, in contrast, any change to the mitzvah lessens it and so this, too, would be problematic.37
  • Voluntary performance of a mitzvah – Since observing a command from which one is exempt does not change the nature of the law, this would not be a violation.38
  • Implying that a Rabbinic law is of Torah origin (or vice versa) – Raavad explicitly states that this is allowed.39
Biblical Cases – ‏This position must explain several cases in Tanakh in which Biblical figures appear to add to or detract from existing positive commandments:40
  • Ezra's 1/3 shekel – This position might explain, as does RalbagNechemyah 10:33About R. Levi b. Gershom, that due to changes in currency, in Ezra's time a third of a shekel was equivalent in value to a Biblical half shekel and thus there was no change at all in the law.
  • Shelomo's 14 day holiday – RashiMelakhim I 8:65About R. Shelomo Yitzchaki asserts that Shelomo did not celebrate Sukkot for two weeks, but celebrated the dedication of the Mikdash for seven days and the festival for seven says. This is supported by the description in Divrei HaYamim II 7:8 which mentions that the festival was observed for just seven days.41
  • Extra lamps and tables in Mikdash – These sources might suggest that Torah speaks only of the vessels of the Tabernacle and nowhere mandates that the vessels of the Mikdash need be the same number or size.
Context – R"Y Albo suggests that, in context (Devarim 12-13),42 the prohibition constitutes a warning against adding Canaanite practices to one's worship of Hashem.43 This, though, is simply a prototype laying out the nature of the law, which is understood to also apply to any similar case of adding to an existing practice.44
Relationship between Devarim 4 and 13 – This position does not distinguish between the two.
Fluidity of Torah – R"Y Albo asserts that Hashem sometimes changes laws in accordance with the nation's needs, as evidenced within Torah itself. However, once the Torah was given through Moshe it has and will remain static, unless there is another Divine revelation as great as that at Mt. Sinai.

Includes Also Adding Mitzvot

The prohibition includes both adding to the details of a mitzvah and creating an entirely new one.

Relationship between Devarim 4 and 13 – According to many of these sources,45 each verse is the source for a different aspect of the prohibition:
  • The Gr"A notes that the context of the prohibition in Devarim 4 is the directive to observe all the Torah's "laws and statutes".  Thus, the ensuing language of "לֹא תֹסִפוּ" refers to not adding another law to these.  In contrast, Devarim 13:1 opens, "אֵת כׇּל הַדָּבָר... אֹתוֹ תִשְׁמְרוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת", focusing on each individual commandment, teaching that every law must be observed in its proper manner, with no additions or subtractions.46
  • Rambam appears to learn out the laws in the opposite direction47 but does not explain the choice.48
What about rabbinic laws? As these sources assume that this verse prohibits enacting new laws, they must explain the many rabbinic decrees which appear to do exactly that:
  • Ramban explains that Rabbinic safeguards are exceptional because the Torah itself commands that one put such fences in place.49 New laws which are not meant to protect Torah law, however, might indeed be problematic.  Thus, for example, had the Sages not found a source for Purim in the Torah,50 its institution would have been a violation of "do not add."51
  • Rambam, in contrast, asserts that the prohibition of "לֹא תֹסֵף" does not apply to Rabbinic enactments, be they either safeguards or simple additions.  These are both permitted by Torah's directive to listen to Rabbinic authority (Devarim 17:11).  The prohibition of "לֹא תֹסֵף" forbids only presenting such decrees as Torah law and Divinely given.52 Purim, thus, is not problematic as it is clearly presented as a Rabbinically ordained holiday.
  • Ralbag53 learns that Rabbinic decrees are allowed from our verse itself. He suggests that the words "לֹא תֹסִפוּ... לִשְׁמֹר אֶת מִצְוֺת י״י" betray the goal of the law – to ensure proper observance.  As such, it is implied that any decrees made by the Sages in an effort to either safeguard Torah or to preserve Torah values54 are allowed.
Other potential cases of "לֹא תֹסֵף"
  • Performing a mitzvah multiple times – This position might agree with RashbaRosh HaShanah 16aAbout R. Shelomo b. Aderet that fundamentally this, too, is a transgression of "do not add", as it is similar to adding a new command.55  However, in cases where the extra performance is mandated by the Sages as a safeguard or from doubt, there would be no violation.56
  • Observing a law outside of its mandated time – Ramban claims that lessening or extending the time frame of a mitzvah also falls under the prohibition57 (if the individual was doing the act with the intent of observing a mitzvah).58
  • Voluntary performance of a mitzvah – This position might view this as a violation of the prohibition, especially if the individual viewed their performance as an actual obligation.  See R. Yeshaya of Trani who states that though a woman may blow shofar, she may not do so with a blessing, as making a blessing indicates that she views this as an obligation and turns the action into a violation of "do not add."59
Biblical Cases – These sources must explain the various Biblical cases in which someone either changes the form of  a command, suspends a law, or enacts a new one.
  • Changes to a law – These sources could explain Shelomo's adding to the number of vessels in the Mikdash and Ezra's command to give a 1/3 shekel like the approach above.
  • Suspending a law – Eliyahu's building of a private altar in an era when these were banned would be understood as a "הוראת שעה" rather than the annulment of a law.
  • Enacting new laws – See the discussion above regarding Esther's instituting of Purim.
Purpose of the law – Ralbag explains that without the prohibition, it would be possible for the entire Torah to be lost.  If anyone can change, annul, or add laws as wished, the original Torah would no longer be recognizable. R. Hirsch adds that adjusting laws lessens the Divinity of Torah, turning it into a "forgery" as it moves from being a work of Divine perfection to one limited by human knowledge.
Context – R. Hirsch suggests that the context of the prohibition is a discussion of idolatry, to teach that subjectivity in observance, whereby one in effect equates one's own personal desires and decision making with God's commands, is equivalent to idolatry.
Fluidity of Torah – Rambam emphasizes the eternal and unchanging nature of Torah, pointing to the prohibitions of "לֹא תֹסֵף" as evidence. The perfection of Torah dictates that no additions or changes are ever necessary.60
Polemics – Rav Hirsch's equating of subjective observance with idolatry might be a reaction the Reform movement of his time.

Non Legal in Nature

Moshe's words comprise general advice and rebuke rather than a legal ruling.