Prophetic Actions Without Explicit Divine Sanction/2

Prophetic Actions Without Explicit Divine Sanction

Exegetical Approaches

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Overview

Commentators disagree regarding how much prophetic autonomy Hashem's messengers have.  On one side of the spectrum, R. Saadia limits their authority, claiming that even when no Divine directive appears explicitly in the text, it can be assumed that a prophet is acting under Divine guidance.  Miraculous wonders are prescribed by Hashem, not the prophet. R"Y Albo, in contrast, asserts that prophets have both the ability and responsibility to act on their own initiative and even to perform supernatural phenomena when called for.  A prophet who waits to consult with Hashem when he can deal with a crisis on his own is sinful.

A middle position is charted by Akeidat Yitzchak and Abarbanel. They claim that though Hashem fulfills the words of his prophets, allowing them to declare miracles on their own, such declarations should really be viewed as prayer.  There is always a slight risk that Hashem will not accede to the request, and, as such, it is preferred that a prophet act only via Hashem's words.  Practically, though, with the exception of Moshe, prophets are limited in that they do not always have access to Hashem's desires and thus have no choice but to act independently.

All Divinely Commanded

All of the miracles and deeds performed by a prophet are Divinely commanded.  Even if Hashem's instructions are not explicitly mentioned, it can be assumed that they were communicated to the prophet before he acted.

Sources:Josephus8 13:2-4About Josephus Antiquities of the Jews, YerushalmiTaanit 2:8Megillah 1:11About the Yerushalmi,  Vayikra Rabbah22:9About Vayikra Rabbah, R. Saadia GaonIbn Balaam Bemidbar 16:4R. Avraham b. Shelomo Melakhim I 17:1,  R. Yehuda ibn BalaamBemidbar 16:4About R. Yehuda ibn Balaam, RashbamShemot 11:1Bemidbar 16:4Bemidbar 16:28-29About R. Shemuel b. Meir, TosafotSanhedrin 89bAbout Ba'alei HaTosafot, Radak #2Melakhim I 18:21Melakhim I 18:36Melakhim II 4:16About R. David Kimchi,¹ Ramban #2Shemot 10:2Shemot 11:1Shemot 14:15Shemot 16:4Shemot 32:27Vayikra 9:2Vayikra 10:3Bemidbar 16:5Bemidbar 17:6About R. Moshe b. Nachman,² R. Yosef ibn KaspiMelakhim I 17:1About R. Yosef ibn Kaspi, NetzivShemot 16:6-8Shemot 16:16Shemot 16:23Shemot 16:34Shemot 32:27Vayikra 10:3Bemidbar 16:4, 17Bemidbar 16:28, 30About R. Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin

Prophetic autonomy – According to this approach, prophets do not have the power to change nature on their own. Thus, anytime a prophet decrees that a miracle is to occur, it must be assumed that Hashem shared this beforehand.³ It is possible to go even further and suggest that, even in the natural realm, prophets do not have the autonomy to make any significant decisions except with Divine guidance.⁴

Poetic license – Dunash. b. LabratSefat Yeter 84⁵ limits a prophet's autonomy even further, claiming that even the words used by a prophet are all chosen by Hashem.

Biblical cases – This position attempts to explain all cases where a prophet seems to be acting independently:

• Moshe's actions
• Ending plagues⁶ – According to this approach, despite the silence in the text, Moshe had been given permission beforehand to tell Paroh to set a time for the plague to end, and could thus expect that Hashem would indeed remove it at that time.⁷
• Promising meat – These sources could explain, as do R. Yosef Bekhor ShorShemot 16:11,23About R. Yosef Bekhor Shor and R. D"Z HoffmannShemot 16:12, 15, 23About R. David Zvi Hoffmann, that Hashem's command in Shemot 16:12, where He explicitly mentions meat, is achronological and actually preceded Moshe's announcement.⁸ Thus, Moshe did not on his own decree that Hashem would feed the people meat.⁹
• Incense test – Many of these sources¹⁰ understand Moshe's falling on his face after Korach's initial complaint as a sign of prophetic communication and suggest that at this juncture, Hashem told him how to proceed during the rebellion and directed him to propose the incense test.  The test, thus, was not Moshe's own invention. Rashbam adds that Moshe's later words "בְּזֹאת תֵּדְעוּן כִּי י"י שְׁלָחַנִי לַעֲשׂוֹת אֵת כׇּל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הָאֵלֶּה"‎¹¹ refer specifically to his hope that the nation will recognize that the test was devised by Hashem, and not himself.¹²
• Earth opening – Ramban maintains that Hashem hinted that the earth was to swallow the leaders when He said, "הֵעָלוּ מִסָּבִיב לְמִשְׁכַּן קֹרַח דָּתָן וַאֲבִירָם." So here, too, Moshe was not declaring a miracle on his own.¹³
• The petition of the 2 1/2 tribes – Ramban points to the tribes' words "אֵת אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר י"י אֶל עֲבָדֶיךָ כֵּן נַעֲשֶׂה" at the conclusion of the negotiations as proof that Moshe had not independently decided that they could settle the eastern bank.
• Yehoshua, Shemuel and Natan
• Yehoshua and the sun – These sources could explain that Yehoshua was not decreeing that the sun stand still, but rather praying to Hashem for aid, hoping that He would acquiesce to perform a miracle.¹⁴  However, the fact that he does so publicly, ("וַיֹּאמֶר לְעֵינֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל") is difficult for he could not be certain that Hashem would agree. Alternatively, this position might suggest that this was a unique case, as the verse itself suggests when it declares, "וְלֹא הָיָה כַּיּוֹם הַהוּא לְפָנָיו וְאַחֲרָיו לִשְׁמֹעַ י"י בְּקוֹל אִישׁ".
• Shemuel bringing rain – This approach would likely explain that, despite the text's silence, Shemuel had been told beforehand to bring rain as a sign for the people. He nonetheless prayed that the rain come, not because he doubted it, but to ensure that the people recognized that the rain was indeed coming from Hashem and not coincidental.
• Natan and the Mikdash – In this case, Natan clearly speaks against Hashem's wishes when he permits David to build the Mikdash, so it is impossible to suggest that Natan had been told previously what to say.  This approach could suggest that Natan was not acting in the role of prophet when he responded to David, but only as a royal advisor.¹⁵ 
• Eliyahu and Elisha
• Declaration of drought and Contest on Mt. Carmel – Several sources¹⁶ point to Eliyahu's statement on Mt. Carmel that  "הַיּוֹם יִוָּדַע כִּי... אֲנִי עַבְדֶּךָ [וּבִדְבָרְךָ] (ובדבריך) עָשִׂיתִי אֵת כׇּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה"‎¹⁷ as proof that Eliyahu's actions were all done at Hashem's behest.¹⁸  It is ambiguous, though, if the words "כׇּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה" refer just to the events on Mt. Carmel, or also to the initial declaration of drought. These sources would likely say that even if it refers only to the former, one can deduce from here that the rest of Eliyahu's miracles were also performed by the word of God.  
• Eliyahu and the pitcher of flour – The text itself states that this miracle occurred by the word of Hashem: "כִּדְבַר י"י אֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר בְּיַד אֵלִיָּהוּ".
• Eliyahu and officers of fifty – These sources might suggest that just as the text attests to the fact that an angel told Eliyahu not to kill the third officer and his men, Hashem had previously told him that He would release fire on the others.¹⁹
• Elisha's miracles²⁰ – By two of Elisha's miracles (the sweetening of waters and giving of bread) the text allude to Hashem's having directed that the miracle would occur.²¹ This approach would suggest that, despite the silence in the text, the other miracles happened in the same manner.

Acting against the Torah – According to this approach, a prophet can only act against the Torah via Divine command.  Thus, R. Simlai²² asserts that Eliyahu's building of the altar on Mt. Carmel in a period when private altars were banned is not problematic since, as Eliyahu points out, this was not his own decision, but rather that of Hashem: "בִדְבָרְךָ  עָשִׂיתִי".

Why is Hashem's command not stated? As seen above, in several cases there is some allusion in the text to a command of Hashem, though this is not always explicit. In other cases, Hashem's role is totally absent.  Ramban explains that it is the way of Tanakh to be brief in one place and lengthy in another. Instead of tediously repeating both a command and its fulfillment, sometimes the Torah brings one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both.  However, the reasoning behind the choice of when to share each component is not always clear.²³

"מֵקִים דְּבַר עַבְדּוֹ" – This verse, in context, says nothing about Hashem fulfilling the independent decrees of his prophets.  Rather, it refers to Hashem keeping His own promises as expressed via the prophecies of His loyal messengers. Hashem is contrasting the speech of "imposters" ("בַּדִּים") and "diviners" ("קֹסְמִים"), whose words are not trustworthy, with that of His prophets, whose predictions are reliable precisely because they speak the word of God.²⁴

"וְתִגְזַר אֹמֶר וְיָקׇם לָךְ" – These words of Elifaz to Iyyov are also unrelated to the concept of Hashem fulfilling the decrees of his prophets and simply mean that Hashem cares for the righteous and helps them succeed in their chosen paths.

Prophetic fallibility – Since a prophet has no autonomy to act on his own, there is no room to err.²⁵

Speaking / Acting in Hashem's name when not directed – If a prophet cannot act on his own initiative at all, all the more so that he cannot speak or act in the name of Hashem if he did not receive any Divine communication.  Thus, any place where a prophet attributes his words or deeds to Hashem's command, it must be assumed that he received Divine instructions, even if they are not found in the text.  For a full discussion of this issue, see Invoking Hashem's Name Without Explicit Divine Sanction.

Moshe vs. other prophets – These sources do not distinguish between Moshe and other prophets with regards to the level of autonomy granted to each.

What's better: obedience or innovation? According to this approach, the greatness of a prophet lies in his strict obedience to the word of God.  The fact that his autonomy is limited helps ensure that the Divine Hand and Word are recognized as such and not confused with that of the prophet.

Prophet's Own Initiative

A prophet is granted the ability by Hashem to act and perform wonders at his own discretion.

Sources:Seder Eliyahu Rabbah, Ramban #1Bemidbar 16:5Bemidbar 17:6About R. Moshe b. Nachman,²⁶ ChizkuniShemot 10:3Shemot 11:4Bemidbar 30:2About R. Chizkiyah b. Manoach, R. Yosef AlboR. Yosef Albo Sefer HaIkkarim 4:22About R. Yosef Albo, R. Avraham b. ShelomoMelakhim I 17:1, MalbimMelakhim I 17:1Melakhim I 17:14Yeshayahu Beur HaInyan 44:26Iyyov 22:28About R. Meir Leibush Weiser

Prophetic autonomy – According to this position, a prophet has a significant degree of autonomy.  He is able not only to determine his own course of action without Hashem's prior approval, but also to invoke supernatural means to do so:

• R. Yosef Albo explains that when someone has reached a certain level of righteousness and belief in Hashem,²⁷ he is able to control nature through his speech.²⁸  If a miracle is needed, not only need he not first seek Hashem's agreement to act, it is even preferable that he perform the deed on his own.²⁹
• R. Avraham b. Shelomo suggests that a prophet can act on his own only because he is so in tune with Hashem's thoughts and will that he can intuit what Hashem would want done.  As such, it is as if Hashem has communicated with him. 

Poetic license – Just as a prophet can decide the best course of action needed to fulfill the larger mission sent to him by Hashem, the prophet is also allowed to choose the words he thinks will best get across Hashem's messages.  He need not merely play back words recorded by Hashem, but has the freedom to create his own analogies and speeches.³⁰

Acting against the Torah – This approach could agree with TosafotYevamot 90bSanhedrin 89bAbout Ba'alei HaTosafot, that, when necessary, a prophet is even allowed to decide on his own to act against a particular aspect of the Torah (הוראת שעה).  As evidence, Tosafot point to Eliyahu who independently decides to sacrifice on an altar on Mt. Carmel despite the ban against private altars in his era.

Divine providence – Both R"Y Albo and Malbim connect a prophet's ability to act supernaturally with the concept of Divine providence.  Since Hashem watches over the righteous, if their honor is at stake, Hashem will ensure that their words are fulfilled lest they be considered liars.  Similarly, if they are in danger, they are even able to overturn nature to protect themselves.

"מֵקִים דְּבַר עַבְדּוֹ" and "וְתִגְזַר אֹמֶר וְיָקׇם לָךְ" – These two verses serve as proof that whatever a prophet decrees will be fulfilled by Hashem.

Biblical cases – As proof of their position, these sources point to the many cases in Tanakh where a prophet acts/ brings miracles without first consulting with Hashem.  Moshe's decrees during Korach's rebellion, Yehoshua's stopping of the sun, Shemuel's bringing of rain, and many of Eliyahu and Elisha's miracles are all depicted as originating from them alone and are not prefaced by Divine commands.³¹

Why pray? If prophets can indeed perform supernatural phenomenon on their own, it is not clear why in several of the above cases³² the prophet felt the need to pray to Hashem so that He fulfill the decree.  In certain instances, such as Moshe's ending of the plagues, Shemuel's bringing of rain, and Eliyahu's actions at Mt Carmel, it is possible that the point of the miracle was specifically to highlight Hashem's power.  The prayer, then, is for the audience and not the prophet.

"וְלֹא הָיָה כַּיּוֹם הַהוּא לְפָנָיו וְאַחֲרָיו לִשְׁמֹעַ י"י בְּקוֹל אִישׁ" – This verse is problematic for this approach as it suggests that Yehoshua's deed was unique, and that it was the only case in which Hashem fulfilled the decree of a prophet. ³³

"וּבִדְבָרְךָ עָשִׂיתִי אֵת כׇּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה" – Contrary to this approach, this verse suggests that Eliyahu was not acting on his own initiative, but rather via Divine command.  These sources would respond that Eliyahu did not mean to say that he was acting literally by the word of God, but rather that all he did was according to the will of Hashem.³⁴

Speaking / acting in Hashem's name when not directed – These sources divide on this issue:

• Seder Eliyahu Rabbah and Chizkuni³⁵ assert that not only is a prophet able to act on his own, he is even able to attribute that action to Hashem.³⁶ This fits with R. Avraham b. Shelomo's understanding of prophetic autonomy.  If a prophet is simply intuiting Hashem's desires, then in effect every action he carries out is as if Divinely commanded, so there is no reason not to declare it in His name.
• Ramban, on the other hand, claims that whenever a prophet speaks in Hashem's name, we must assume that he is following orders. Though there is prophetic autonomy, that is not accompanied by a license to attribute one's own decisions to Hashem.  See Invoking Hashem's Name Without Explicit Divine Sanction for more.

Prophetic fallibility

• No possibility of error – According to R. Avraham b. Shelomo, the only individuals who can independently bring miracles are those who are completely in line with Hashem's thoughts and desires.  If so, it would seem that a prophet can not err or act against Hashem's wishes.
• Possibility of error – According to the other sources, however, it would seem that prophetic autonomy leaves room for a prophet to make mistakes.  Moreover,  it would also seem to allow a prophet to "force Hashem's hand" even against His will. See below that Abarbanel, in fact, suggests that Eliyahu acted against Hashem's desires and was therefore punished.

What's better: obedience or innovation? According to R"Y Albo, the best leaders are those who do not wait to consult with Hashem, but, when necessary, take the initiative to act on their own.  The ability of a prophet to act independently is one of the fundamentals of belief, and a prophet who does not exercise that ability is sinful.³⁷

Prophetic Prayer

When a prophet independently declares that a miracle is to happen, he is in effect praying that Hashem will fulfill his words and risks the possibility that Hashem will not accede to his request.

Sources: R. Yosef KaraYehoshua 10:12Shemuel I 12:17About R. Yosef Kara, Ibn EzraShemot Second Commentary 8:8-9Bemidbar 16:4About R. Avraham ibn Ezra, RambamCommentary on the Mishna, IntroductionAbout R. Moshe b. Maimon, Radak #1Melakhim I 17:1Melakhim I 18:21Melakhim I 18:36About R. David Kimchi,³⁸ Avvat NefeshAvvat Nefesh, Commentary on Ibn Ezra Bemidbar 20:8, RalbagShemuel I 12, Toelet 23Melakhim I 17:1Melakhim I 18:32-36Melakhim I Toalot 18:36About R. Levi b. Gershom,³⁹ Akeidat YitzchakBemidbar 78Bemidbar 80Bemidbar 82About R. Yitzchak Arama, AbarbanelShemot 8:8Shemot 10:29, 11:1, 4Shemot 16:9Shemot 16Shemot 16:23Shemot 32:27Vayikra 9:5-6Vayikra 10:3Bemidbar 16:3Devarim 34:11Melakhim I 17:1Melakhim I 18:36Melakhim II 2:22Melakhim II 8:6About R. Yitzchak Abarbanel, ShadalShemot 8:8About R. Shemuel David Luzzatto, R. David Zvi HoffmannShemot 8:8About R. David Zvi Hoffmann

Prophetic autonomy – Prophets may act on their own and even decree supernatural phenomenon, trusting that Hashem will answer their prayers to perform miracles on their behalf.  Though Hashem normally responds in the affirmative, acting independently must always be accompanied by a slight doubt and the possibility that a prayer will not be answered.

"מֵקִים דְּבַר עַבְדּוֹ" and "וְתִגְזַר אֹמֶר וְיָקׇם לָךְ" – These sources point to these verses and other similar ones⁴⁰ to prove that generally Hashem does the bidding of the righteous, answering their prayers and fulfilling their wishes.

Biblical cases – The various cases in Tanakh where a prophet decrees a miracle without prior Divine command, and feels the need to pray to Hashem that his request be granted, provide support for this position.⁴¹ Though there are many instances where no prayer is mentioned, it can be assumed that either one was made, or that the prophet viewed his declaration not as a decree but as a request. ⁴²

"וְלֹא הָיָה כַּיּוֹם הַהוּא לְפָנָיו וְאַחֲרָיו לִשְׁמֹעַ י"י בְּקוֹל אִישׁ" – Though this verse supports the idea that prophetic decrees should be viewed as prayers that Hashem is to answer, it is nonetheless difficult in that it suggests that Hashem's agreeing to Yehoshua's demand was a unique case.

"וּבִדְבָרְךָ עָשִׂיתִי אֵת כׇּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה"

• Radak explains that Eliyahu did not mean his words to be taken literally, as he really was acting without a Divine command. Rather, he was trying to express that if Hashem did his bidding, the people would know that Eliyahu's actions accorded with the Divine will and that whatever he declares, Hashem fulfills.
• Ralbag, instead, proposes that Eliyahu was referring to the fact that Hashem said that He would bring rain.  Knowing that if rain came before the people repented, the entire drought would have been for nought, Eliyahu took it upon himself to do something to return the people to Hashem. His actions, thus, stemmed from Hashem's decision to end the drought.

Speaking / acting in Hashem's name when not directed – Most of these sources do not think that a prophet can act or speak by his own initiative but then attribute that decision to Hashem.  If a prophet speaks in God's name, he must have either received explicit Divine communication,⁴³ be interpreting an impartial or unclear directive, or applying Hashem's commands from one situation to another.⁴⁴

Prophetic fallibility – According to this position, since prophets can act on their own, there is the possibility of error and a chance that Hashem might not bring the prophet's words to fruition. Abarbanel, however, claims that even when Hashem disagrees with a prophet, He might nonetheless fulfill their decrees.  Thus, though Hashem was angry at Eliyahu's decisions to bring drought and make the altar on Mt. Carmel, He acquiesced since Eliyahu's intentions were positive.  Nonetheless, he later punished Eliyahu by removing his ability to prophesy.⁴⁵

Uniqueness of Moshe – Akeidat Yitzchak and Abarbanel differentiate between the actions of Moshe and those of other prophets.  While the vast majority of Moshe's actions were done via Divine command, other prophets often acted on their own, praying that Hashem would do their bidding.  Moshe, who had a direct line with Hashem, and as such was constantly receiving Divine instructions, never had to rely on himself.  Other prophets did not have this luxury, and, thus, of necessity needed to make independent decisions and pray that Hashem agree.⁴⁶

What's better: obedience or innovation? According to Akeidat Yitzchak and Abarbanel it is preferable to act only upon Divine command, and it was this ability that exalted Moshe above other prophets.⁴⁷  Only because other prophets had no choice did they make independent decisions.

¹ This seems to be Radak's less preferred understanding.  He also raises the possibility that prophets act on their own, trusting that Hashem will fulfill their words.

² In speaking of Moshe's actions during the rebellion of Korach, Ramban brings both this possibility and the possibility that Moshe acted on his own.

³ It should be noted that each of the sources above refer only to individual cases, and do not discuss the issue in general terms, so it is difficult to know for certain if they would necessarily take this approach regarding all miracles.

⁴ However, none of these sources explicitly make this claim.

⁵ His opinion is cited in Ibn Ezra's Sefat Yeter (Ibn Ezra refers to him as R. Adonim).

⁶ See also Shemot 8:25-27 and Shemot 9:29-33.

⁷ It is not clear, though, why then Moshe would need to pray that it be removed. The fact that the text goes out of its way to share that Moshe prayed outside of Paroh's palace, and in one case outside of the city entirely, means that Paroh did not even witness the prayer.  As such, one cannot claim that it was really meant for Paroh, so that he recognize Hasshem's role in the miracle.

⁸ It is not clear, though, why the story was not simply told in its proper order.

⁹ Alternatively, they could explain like Ibn EzraShemot Second Commentary 16:4About R. Avraham ibn Ezra, that when Hashem promised "הִנְנִי מַמְטִיר לָכֶם לֶחֶם" in verse 4, Moshe understood the word "לחם" in its general sense to include meat.

¹⁰ See R. Saadia, Ibn Balaam, Rashbam and Ramban.

¹¹ This is very similar to Eliyahu's later declaration, " הַיּוֹם יִוָּדַע כִּי אַתָּה אֱ-לֹהִים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וַאֲנִי עַבְדֶּךָ [וּבִדְבָרְךָ] (ובדבריך) עָשִׂיתִי אֵת כׇּל הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה". [See the discussion below.]

¹² Most other commentators, in contrast, explain that Moshe is speaking of the choosing of Aharon as priest.

¹³ He further suggests that Moshe even announced the miracle in the name of Hashem and the people themselves recognized the Divine role in the miracle. Later when they complained "אַתֶּם הֲמִתֶּם אֶת עַם י"י", they were referring only to those killed through the incense test, not by the earth.

¹⁴ Thus, the verse states, "אָז יְדַבֵּר יְהוֹשֻׁעַ לַי"י " emphasizing that Yehoshua's words were addressed to Hashem.

¹⁵ Alternatively, the sources might suggest that though a prophet cannot bring a miracle on his own, he does have the autonomy to make certain decisions on his own, especially those which could be corrected if he erred.

¹⁶ See Yerushalmi Ta'anit, Yerushalmi Megillah, Vayikra Rabbah and Radak.  The midrashic sources all focus on how Eliyahu can build a private altar if this is prohibited by the Torah, rather than the question of how Eliyahu could bring miraculous fire.

¹⁷ This is very similar to Moshe's statement during the rebellion of Korach, "בְּזֹאת תֵּדְעוּן כִּי י"י שְׁלָחַנִי לַעֲשׂוֹת אֵת כׇּל הַמַּעֲשִׂים הָאֵלֶּה כִּי לֹא מִלִּבִּי". [See the discussion above.]

¹⁸ See Radak who questions, as above, that if so, it is not clear why Eliyahu then needs to pray that Hashem answer him.  Radak answers that Eliyahu wanted to ensure that the people did not think that the fire was some magical trick.

¹⁹ The same fact, however, can be used to make the reverse argument.  The fact that an angel was needed to tell Eliyahu not to kill the third officer might support the possibility that otherwise Eliyahu's words themselves would have sufficed to have him killed by fire.

²⁰ See also: Melakhim II 4, and Melakhim II 5:25-27.

²¹ In each case, Elisha prefaces the bringing of the miracle with the statement, "כֹּה אָמַר י"י ", and at the miracle of bread the unit concludes by sharing, "וַיֹּאכְלוּ וַיּוֹתִרוּ כִּדְבַר י"י".

²² See Yerushalmi Taanit 2:8, Yerushalmi Megillah 1:11 and Vayikra Rabbah 22:9.

²³ Regarding the story of Korach, Ramban also raises the possibility that Hashem's will was known to Moshe not through speech but rather through  "רוח הקודש" and therefore no speech is mentioned in the text.

²⁴ See Radak on the verse in Yeshayahu.

²⁵ However, see above regarding Natan's mistaken response to David when asked about building the Beit HaMikdash.

²⁶ This is the first option brought by Ramban to explain the incense test proposed by Moshe.

²⁷ He does not limit this ability to prophets, but includes righteous, God-fearing individuals as well.

²⁸ Though it is ultimately Hashem who brings the miracle, the prophet knows with certainty that Hashem will fulfill his words, and so it is as if he alone is acting.

²⁹ Otherwise the prophet might cause a desecration of Hashem's name when people think that he wasn't capable of performing miracles.  R. Yosef Albo, in fact, claims that this was Moshe and Aharon's sin at Mei Merivah.  By running to the Tent of Meeting to seek Hashem's advice, rather than miraculously bringing the people water on their own, they caused the people to doubt their supernatural powers and that Hashem "fulfills the word of his servants".  For elaboration see Moshe's Misstep and Mei Merivah.

³⁰ This position would understand R. Yitzchak's statement, "אין שני נביאים מתנבאים בסיגנון אחד" in Bavli Sanhedrin 89a-b to mean that each prophet has his own style because he is allowed to choose his own words.

³¹ These are only several of many examples.  As further proof, R"Y Albo points to the miraculous feats of Talmudic sages such as R. Chanina b. Doas, R. Pinchas b. Yair and Nachum ish Gamzu, who also appear to change nature at will.

³² For example, Moshe prays to Hashem to stop some of the plagues of frogs and beseeches Hashem not to accept the offerings of Korach's rebels. Shemuel prays for rain and Eliyahu asks Hashem to bring fire to the altar on Mt. Carmel.

³³ R"Y Albo attempts to explain that the verse means that it was the only time that Hashem agreed to perform a miracle on that level.

³⁴ Alternatively, one might say that though a prophet can bring miracles on his own initiative, he is not able to act against the Torah without Divine permission. Thus, when Eliyahu said he was acting in the name of Hashem, he was referring to the decision to build a prohibited altar, not the miraculous consumption by fire.

³⁵ Both Seder Eliyahu Rabbah and Chizkuni say this with regards to Moshe, and it is not clear if they think this is true of all prophets or if Moshe was unique, due to his special connection to Hashem.

³⁶ Thus, for example, Seder Eliyahu Rabah suggests that Moshe independently decided to kill the worshipers of the Golden Calf, and, fearing that the people would be loathe to kill their brothers upon his orders alone, he further decided to present the decision as a command of Hashem.

³⁷ See above note that he claims that this was Moshe's sin at Mei Merivah.

³⁸ This appears to be Radak's preferred understanding, though he also raises the possibility that prophets act via Divine command.

³⁹ Ralbag also  brings the possibility that Eliyahu's actions on Mt. Carmel were done via Divine command.

⁴⁰ Akeidat Yitzchak also points to Tehillim 34, "עֵינֵי י"י אֶל צַדִּיקִים וְאׇזְנָיו אֶל שַׁוְעָתָם" and Tehillim 99, " קֹרִאים אֶל י"י וְהוּא יַעֲנֵם" to prove that Hashem answers the prayers of the righteous.

⁴¹ See the examples listed in the introduction.

⁴² It is possible that the more doubtful a prophet is regarding the outcome, the more likely he is pray explicitly. In addition, different prophets, due to their unique personalities,  might be more or less likely to explicitly pray than others.

⁴³ See Abarbanel, Shadal and R. D"Z Hoffmann.

⁴⁴ See Ibn Ezra and Ralbag.

⁴⁵ For more, see Eliyahu at Chorev.  See also E. Samet, "פרקי אליהו" (Jerusalem 2009) who elaborates on this position, viewing Eliyahu as an independent actor, whose will is done by Hashem, despite it not fully according with His will.  E. Samet reads much of the Eliyahu narrative as Hashem subtly or explicitly rebuking Eliyahu for his overly harsh decision to bring drought and his consistent role as prosecutor rather than defender.

⁴⁶ Akeidat Yitzchak points to the verse, "מֹשֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן בְּכֹהֲנָיו וּשְׁמוּאֵל בְּקֹרְאֵי שְׁמוֹ" to highlight the difference.  While Moshe (and Aharon) were servants of Hashem, doing his bidding, Shemuel was of "those who cried out to His name," a prophet who needed to pray that Hashem agree to fulfill his requests.

⁴⁷ See their discussion of the verse, "וְלֹא קָם נָבִיא עוֹד בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל כְּמֹשֶׁה אֲשֶׁר יְדָעוֹ ה' פָּנִים אֶל פָּנִים..." in Moshe's Epitaph – Signs and Wonders.